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20. Maine väikese ümmarguse ülaosas H. S. Melcher, 20. Maine'i rügement - ajalugu

20. Maine väikese ümmarguse ülaosas H. S. Melcher, 20. Maine'i rügement - ajalugu


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Väike ümmarguse ülaosa vallutamiseks määratud konföderatsiooni vägi näib olevat olnud Robertsoni brigaad, mis koosneb 1., 4. ja 5. Texasest ning 3D Arkansast; ja Law brigaad, mis koosneb 4., 44., 48., 47. ja 15. Alabamast, mõlemad Hoodi diviisist. Esimene pidi ründama ees, Law brigaad aga ründama mäe tagaosas; kuid Robertson, leides, et ta ei suuda oma brigaadiga kogu rinde katta, eraldas 44., 48. ja 4. Alabama Law'i brigaadist umbes samal ajal, kui nad jõudsid Round Topi jalamile ja ühendasid need Robertsoni liiniga. Little Round Topi ees. Nii jäid 47. ja 15. Alabama külgmised liikumised üksi ellu, mida nad ka tegid, möödudes Round Topi lõunaküljest ja peatades harjal kümme minutit puhkamiseks. See peatus osutus nende ettevõtmise edule saatuslikuks, kuna see võimaldas meie brigaadil (Vincenti) jõuda õigel ajal Little Round Topi, et nende edasiliikumisele vastu seista.

Jätkates oma marssi, möödusid need kaks rügementi Round Topi kirdeküljest ja liikusid üle mägede vahelise metsase süvendi, et laadida üles Little Round Topi tagumine osa ja pühkida maha Vincenti brigaad, seejärel tegelesid tuliselt Robertsoni Texase ja nende kolmega tema käsu alla määratud Õigusbrigaadi rügemendid, kes üritasid rindelt valdust saada. Kuid just siin olid need, mis olid Vincenti brigaadi vasakpoolne rügement ja ka kogu Potomaci armee vasakpoolne rong, ja et mäe harjaga vastavuses olla, painutatud ülejäänud rida täpselt täisnurga all. brigaad. See oli õnn, sest nende etteastes tabas 47. Alabama kolonelleitnant Bulgeri juhtimisel meie rügementi otse ette ja avas mõrvarliku tule meie kaitsmata liinil, nagu me just olime jõudnud, ja meil polnud aega visata. rinnatööd. Samal ajal liikus 15. Alabama, mida juhtis kolonel William C. Oates, kokku 644 meest ja 42 ohvitseri. Meie polkovnik Chamberlain kohtus selle liikumisega, pannes rügemendi parema tiiva ühtsesse auastmesse, et 47. vastu hakata, ja painutas rügemendi viis vasakpoolset kompaniid täisnurga all.

Meie rügementi kuulus 358 meest, kuid kuna kompanii B, mille arv oli 50 meest, oli saadetud "kaitsma oma tiiba", oli meil 308 meest rivis, et vastu seista nende kahe tugeva rügemendi raevukatele rünnakutele, mis ületasid meid rohkem kui 3: 1 Konflikt oli äge, kuid tingimata lühike, kuna tegemist oli vaid lühikese ajaga, mil iga mees peab langema meie vaenlase kõrgema tule ette.

Kui 130 meie vaprat ohvitseri ja meest olid maha lastud, kus nad seisid, ja alles jäi vaid 178 inimest - vaevalt rohkem kui tugev kokkupõrkejoon -, ja iga mees oli lasknud lahingusse kaasa võetud 60 padrunit ja ellujäänud kasutasid oma langenud kaasvõitlejate padrunikaste, oli saabunud aeg, mil tuleb otsustada, kas peaksime taanduma ja loovutama selle võtme kogu Gettysburgi väljale või laadima ja proovima selle vaenlase maha visata. Kolonel Chamberlain andis käsu "tääkide parandamiseks" ja peaaegu enne, kui ta jõudis öelda "lae!" rügement hüppas mäest alla ja sulges end vaenlasega, kelle leidsime iga kivi ja puu tagant. Üllatunult ja ülekoormatuna viskas enamik neist käed maha ja alistus.

Mõned võitlesid kuni tapmiseni; teised jooksid "nagu metsveiste kari", nagu kolonel Oates ise seda väljendas. Nende lennul kohtas neid kompanii B, kapten Morill, keda me arvasime olevat tabatud, kuid nüüd rünnati neid nii jõuliselt, et üle saja põgeniku olid sunnitud alistuma.

Kolonelleitnant Bulger, kes oli 47. juht, sai haavata ja langes meie kätte, üle kolmesaja vangi ja kõik haavatud.

20. Maine naasis koos oma vangidega algsele positsioonile ja jäi sinna, kuni varahommikul kästi edasi Round Topi.


Murtud võlakiri? Väike ümmargune vaen Joshua Chamberlaini ja Ellis Speari vahel

„Võib -olla päästis mu elu” leitnant Holman Melcher (mõõk tõstetud) ja kolonel Joshua Chamberlain osalesid silmapaistvalt 20. Maine’i bajonettlahingus Gettysburgis. Chamberlain, keda siin näidatakse 15. Alabama leitnant Robert H. Wickeri alistumisel, tunnistas hiljem Melcherit, et ta päästis süüdistuse ajal tõenäoliselt tema elu.

(Don Troiani/Erakogu/Bridgemani pildid)

20. juulil 1863 Little Round Topis toimunud Maine'i eepiline stend ja bajonettlaeng kindlustas selle rügemendi koha sõjaajaloos. Teisel Gettysburgi lahingupäeval lõid komandörid kolonel Joshua Chamberlain ja major Ellis Spear, kes olid juba enne sõda head sõbrad, veelgi näiliselt purunematu sideme, aidates männipuu osariigi poistel kolonel William Oatesi järeleandmatut 15. Alabamat tagasi pöörata ja vältida Konföderatsiooni läbimurre Potomaci vasaku ääre armees. Kui 20. Maine oleks enne pealetungi purunenud, oleks see võinud doominoefekti avaldada ka teistele surnuks surutud föderaalüksustele Cemetery Ridge'i ääres. Kahekümnenda positsioon oli kriitiline hetk järgmisel päeval jänkide triumfiks.

Chamberlain ja Spear elasid mõlemad sõja üle ja elasid pikki, õitsvaid elusid, nende sõprus oli ilmselt kindel. Umbes 25 aastat tagasi hakkas aga juurduma lugu, et Spear suri kibestunult, sest Chamberlain - nii tema kui ka teiste rügemendi kulul - oli sõjajärgsel kontol oma Little Round Topi edu eest liiga palju tunnustust nõudnud. Selles, mida me tänapäeval tunneme kui “Chamberlaini ja oda vastuolu”, on tõe elemente, kuid arusaam, et nende kahe vahel oli verevaen, on kaugeleulatuv ja väärib edasist uurimist.

Nii Spear kui ka Chamberlain kasvasid neljast poisist vanimana peredes, kes olid põlvkondi varem elama asunud väikestes laevaehituskooslustes Maine'i rannikult ülespoole. 1860. aasta USA rahvaloendusel elas Speari kodulinnas Warrenis 2300 elanikku, Chamberlaini õlletootjal 2800 elanikku. Mõlemad mehed õpiksid Brunswicki Bowdoini kolledžis, kus Speari 1858. aasta klass õpiks 1852. aastal lõpetanud professor Chamberlaini käe all.

Nende kahe kirjade põhjal on selge, et ülikoolis oli Spear lähedane sõber Chamberlaini järgmise noorema venna Horace'iga. Ehkki üliõpilastena oli nende vahel kaks aastat vahet, pidasid nad ühendust, isegi külastasid üksteist pärast kooli lõpetamist, samal ajal kui mõlemad õppisid õigusteadust. Horace oleks võinud isegi lõpetada kolmanda Chamberlaini vennaga, kes teenis 20. Maine'is - koos noorima Joshua ja Thomasiga - kui ta poleks surnud vaid üheksa kuud enne üksuse moodustamist.

Lühike paus sõjast: Ellis Spear lasi selle foto teha Maine'i osariigis Portlandis puhkusel olles. Vastupidi: sööda kork, mida Spear kandis 20. Maine'i ajal. (Hayesi perekonna kogumik aadressil MaineLegacy.com)

Spearil ja Chamberlainil oli omamoodi kokkutulek, kui nad leidsid end 1862. aasta hilissuvel ühes jalaväerügemendis teenimas. 20. Maine'i formeerimisel teenis Spear kaptenikoha, olles värvanud suurema osa meestest selleks ajaks, selle üksuse kompanii G. Chamberlain isiklikult rügemendi liikmeid ei värvanud, kuid kuberner andis talle kolonelleitnandi - teise koha - komisjoni. Sõja ajal hoolitses Spear ka Thomase eest, võttis ta oma seltskonda, edendas teda ja soovitas teda isegi üksuse juhtimiseks, kui Spear ise edutati.

Sõjajärgsetel aastatel ei langenud Speari kiindumus kõrgema Chamberlaini vastu. Nad pidasid kirjavahetust, osalesid koosviibimistel ja muudel üritustel ning jagasid võtmerolli oma vana rügemendi mälestamisel. 1896. aastal kirjutas Spear Tom Chamberlainile, selgitades oma katseid veenda Kongressi vastu võtma seaduseelnõu, millega tõstetakse kindrali pension 25 dollarilt 100 dollarile. "Palun kirjutage mulle ja andke mulle nõu, kuidas tal läheb ja kas ta tõenäoliselt sel suvel Maine'is on ja kus." Kirjutas Spear. "Mul võib olla võimalus teda suvel näha ja ma loodan teid näha."

Kolm aastat hiljem pooldas Spear endiselt pensionitõusu. Kirjas esindaja Amos Allenile (R-Maine) kirjutas ta: „[Joshua Chamberlain] on seitsmekümneaastane ja vaene. Ta säilitab oma parima välimuse ja on tundlik ja uhke ning on viimane mees, kes vabandab või isegi tunnistab vaesust. ” Spear lisas oma endisele ülemale palju kiitust. "Ma olin temaga koos, kui ta sai haavata, ja ma tean, kui raske see oli. Üldlevinud arvamus oli, et ta ei toibu sellest. Tema juhtum on silmapaistvaim ja ainulaadne juhtum sõjaväes, vanades ja vaestes. ”

Speari kirjeldus Chamberlaini vaesusest võis olla ülehinnatud - vanal kindralil oli kodu Brunswickis, suurem suvekodu mõne miili kaugusel ja jaht -, kuid kirjadest ilmneb Speari jätkuv lugupidamine ja imetlus ning aktiivne püüd hoolida oma endise seltsimehe pärast. Sellegipoolest näitasid tema püüded aidata Chamberlaini majanduslikku olukorda, isegi kui ta Tomiga vandenõu pidas, et neid oma venna eest hoida, et Speari tunded olid palju kaastundlikumad kui miski muu.

Ükskõik, milline oli Joshua Chamberlaini rahaline olukord hilises elus, ei keeldunud ta 500 dollari suurusest pakkumisest Ajakiri Cosmopolitan aastal 1912 kirjutada oma rolli kirjeldus Fredericksburgi lahingus selle lahingu 50. aastapäeva tähistamiseks. Samuti ei heidutanud teda mitu kuud hiljem, kui sama kirjastaja palus Gettysburgis sarnast tükki Hearsti ajakirja jaoks 1913. aastal.

Nende kahe artikli originaalkäsikirju pole kunagi leitud, seega ei ole võimalik nende esialgset sõnastust üksikasjalikult võrrelda sellega, mis ilmus trükis pärast toimetajate tööd. Mõlemad ajakirjad kuulusid aga William Randolph Hearstile, mehele, kes leiutas sensatsioonilise ajakirjanduse ja keda isegi süüdistati USA ja Hispaania vahelise sõja alustamises 1898. aastal. tuntud illustraator Frederic Remington sõitis Kuubale Kuubasse. Remington telegrafeeris peagi koju, öeldes: „Kõik on vaikne. Siin pole häda midagi. Sõda ei tule. Soov tagasi tulla. ” Hearsti väidetav vastus oli: „Teie esitage pildid, mina sisustan sõja” - ja ta tegi just seda, kasutades oma ajalehti USA valitsuse sõja kuulutamiseks.

"Hearsti toimetajad moonutasid ja" parandasid "minu" Gettysburgi "nii, et ma pole püüdnud hankida nende ajakirja koopiaid, milles see ilmus." - Joshua L. Chamberlain

Hearsti toimetajad järgisid kahtlemata omaniku eeskuju, ahvatlesid lugejaid ostma tema ajakirjade koopiaid, avaldades dramaatiliselt ilustatud lugusid, mis äratasid avalikkuse huvi, olgu see siis tõsi või mitte. On selge, et toimetajad võtsid märkimisväärseid vabadusi mõlema teosega, mille Chamberlain Hearsti perioodikale edastas, eriti teise osaga Gettysburgist, mille ta kirjutas enne oma Fredericksburgi essee avaldatud versiooni lugemist.

Kui sõbrad ja austajad mainisid Hearsti artiklit „Läbi vere ja tule Gettysburgis”, hüüdis Chamberlain, kurtes, et seda „lühendab ja muudab toimetaja„ sidekoe ”lisamine”. Kui üks naissoost austaja talle tüki eest komplimente tegi, vastas Chamberlain: „Hearsti toimetajad moonutasid ja„ parandasid ”minu„ Gettysburgi ”nii, et ma pole üritanud hankida nende ajakirja koopiaid, milles see ilmus.”

Nende artiklite lugemine mõjutas suuresti Speari, kelle mälestused sõjast olid tumedad ja traagilised. Ta pidas sedalaadi „asjatuid hiilgavaid” kirjutisi vastikuks, kuid tal ei olnud kunagi võimalust neid arutada oma endise ülemaga, kes suri aasta pärast Gettysburgi artikli avaldamist. Kui ta oleks seda teinud, oleks ta võib -olla üllatunud, kui avastas, et avaldatud versioonid ei meeldinud Chamberlainile.

Ilma Chamberlaini esialgsete mustandite koopiateta ei saa me täiesti jumalikult aru saada, kui palju igast artiklist pärineb tema sulest ja kui palju oli mõne sensatsioonilise Hearsti toimetaja liialdus või leiutis. Siiski on vihjeid. Näiteks Gettysburgi tüki sees on oletatav kiri, mis on sõna -sõnalt trükitud täies vormis, 15. Alabama sõdurilt, kes meenutas, et Gettysburgis oli ta korduvalt Chamberlainil silmapiiril, kuid „mingi veider arusaam” takistas tal päästikut vajutamast. Lõpetuseks ütles ta: "Mul on praegu hea meel ja loodan, et olete ka."

Kõikides mahukates kirjakogudes, mille Chamberlain oma eluajal sai, pole kusagil selle kirja koopiat ega selle episoodi mainimist. Ometi avaldas Hearst selle täielikus vormis. Ühest neist kogudest võib leida kirja Bowdoini vilistlaselt, kes 1903. aastal külastas 15. Alabama veteranile kuulunud hotelli Lõuna -Euroopas. Selles andis ajaloolane edasi veterani loo sellest, kuidas ta oli tulistanud Chamberlaini piirkonda Little Round Top, kuid „Chamberlaini elu päästis vaid koloneli ette hüpanud reamehe tegu, kes sai tulistuse, tappes ta ise. ”

Kuigi selle arusaama toetamiseks puuduvad otsesed tõendid, võib kergesti ette kujutada, et Chamberlaini mustand sisaldas viidet sellele tegelikule kirjale, millest Hearsti inimesed kujutasid ette ja lõid tegelikult sarnase, kuid dramaatilisema loo ning lõid terve kirja, millega dramatiseerida seda.

Essees, mida ta kunagi ei avaldanud, lahkas Spear analüütiliselt Chamberlaini “Minu lugu Fredericksburgist” punkthaaval, paljastades selle, mida ta nägi rumalate avaldustena. Vananenud ja haige (ta oli 78, kui Gettysburgi artikkel trükki jõudis), vallandas Spear oma pettumuse paljudest Chamberlaini „mälestustest” nende kahe lahingu kohta.

Paljastavamate hulka kuulub ka kirjeldus Chamberlaini Fredericksburgi jutustuses, kui rügement Marye’s Heightsi surmavasse keerisesse sattudes kohtas hulkuvat koera. Oma mälestustes meenutas Spear, et tuulevaikuse ajal „[tuli] väike koer ehmunult vingudes, ilmselt kellegi kodune lemmikloom, võtsime ta sülle ja hoidsin teda, kuni ma sinna jäin.” Lugu samast kobedast koerast ilmus aga Chamberlaini Fredericksburgi artiklis üsna erinevalt: "Minu silmad võtsid kollase koera kuju, kes istus püsti ja surnud isandaga." Koer jäi sinna fikseeritult, truuks lõpuni, hoolimata kuulide vilinast ja kestade lõhkemisest. „Tõepoolest oleks olnud kahju, peaaegu pühaduseteotus, seda eestkoste häirida. Ja me jätsime ta sinna. "

Sama osa Fredericksburgi kirjeldusest hõlmas kohtumist tuviparvega, kes keeldus mässust põgenemast, hoolimata nende lennuvõimest.

Kas need kontod on kirjutatud Chamberlaini koostatud kujul või olid need mõne Hearsti kirjatundja osalise või täieliku leiutise eesmärgiks müüa rohkem ajakirju, võime vaid oletada. Siiski on paljutõotav märkus, mille Chamberlain kirjutas talle kommenteerimiseks saadetud varase trükitud koopia ääres. Selle tekstiosa juurde kirjutas ta: „Palun tõrjuge välja koerad ja tuvid.” Vaatamata tema väitele jäid need melodramaatilised “episoodid” lõplikku trükki.

Kui need vihjed selle kohta, kuidas 20. sajandi alguse ajakirjade toimetajad-vähemalt need, mis kuuluvad WR Hearstile-kirjutasid oma lugejatele meelepärased artiklid ümber, siis „asjatu hiilgus”, mille Ellis Spear oma endise sõbra kirjutistes nii vastikuks pidas, professor, komandör ja veteranikaaslane olid vaid kellegi muu kui Chamberlaini leiutis. Kui see oleks nii ja kui Chamberlain oleks piisavalt kaua ellu jäänud, et kaks vana seltsimeest saaksid nende kahe kirjanduslike jõupingutuste tulemusega oma vastikust jagada, oleks Spear võinud nende tõelisest allikast aru saada ja niinimetatud „Chamberlaini-oda vastuolu” ei pruugi kunagi on tekkinud rohkem kui kolmveerand sajandit hiljem.

Pine Tree State'i päritolu Tom Desjardin on Maine'i parkide ja maade büroo direktor. Gettysburgi riikliku sõjaväepargi endine ajaloolane Desjardin on mitme raamatu autor, sealhulgas Seisake kindlalt, Maine'i poisid. Ta oli ka näitleja Jeff Danielsi konsultant 1993. aasta filmi filmimise ajal Gettysburg.

Lähedased kõned: Melcher (ülal) ja Chamberlain tapeti peaaegu teineteisest nädalate jooksul 1864. aastal - Melcher Spotsylvania kohtumajas mais ja Chamberlain (allpool) Peterburis 18. juunil (Maine'i riigi arhiiv)


Miks oli mäel nimeks väike ümmargune tipp?

Gettysburgi lahingu arenedes esimese päeva jooksul hoidsid liidu väed linnast lõunasse kulgevaid ridu. Selle harja lõunapoolses otsas oli kaks erinevat mäge, mida kohapeal tunti aastaid Big Round Top ja Little Round Top.

Little Round Topi geograafiline tähtsus on ilmne: kes seda maad kontrollis, võis domineerida maal lääne pool kilomeetrit. Ja kuna suurem osa liidu armeest oli mäest põhja pool, kujutas mägi liidu äärmist vasakpoolset külge. Selle positsiooni kaotamine oleks katastroofiline.

Ja vaatamata sellele, kuna 1. juuli öösel asus positsioonidele tohutu hulk sõdureid, jäid Liidu ülemad kuidagi kahe silma vahele. 1863. aasta 2. juuli hommikul oli strateegiline mäetipp vaevalt hõivatud. Mäe tippu oli jõudnud väike salk signaalijaid, vägesid, kes andsid käske lipusignaalide kaudu. Kuid suurt võitlusüksust polnud saabunud.

Liidu ülem kindral George Meade oli saatnud oma inseneride pealiku kindral Governeur K. Warreni, et kontrollida föderaalseid positsioone Gettysburgist lõunas asuvate mägede ääres. Kui Warren Little Round Topi jõudis, mõistis ta kohe selle tähtsust.

Warren kahtlustas, et Konföderatsiooni väed kogunevad positsiooni ründamiseks. Tal õnnestus panna lähedal asuv relvameeskond laskma kahurikuuli Little Round Topist läänes asuvasse metsa. Ja see, mida ta nägi, kinnitas tema hirme: sajad konföderatsiooni sõdurid liikusid metsas, kui kahurikuul nende peade kohal purjetas. Hiljem väitis Warren, et nägi nende tääkide ja püssitorude juurest säravat päikesevalgust.


20. Maine'i vabatahtlike jalaväerügement

Gettysburgi 20. Maine'i vabatahtlike jalaväerügemendi juurde kuulub kaks monumenti ja kompanii positsioonimärk.

Teave 20. Maine'i vabatahtlike jalaväerügemendi kohta Gettysburgis

20. Maine'i vabatahtlik jalavägi tõi Gettysburgi 386 meest, kellest 29 tapeti, 91 sai haavata ja 5 kadus. Ohvrite nimed on märgitud Little Round Topi monumendil.

Kolonel Chamberlain ja seersant Andrew Tozier pälvisid 2. juulil oma tegude eest aumärgi. Chamberlain “ julma kangelaslikkuse ja suure visaduse eest, kui ta hoidis oma positsiooni väikesel ümmargusel ülaosas korduvate rünnakute vastu ja kandis edasipääsu Suurele ümmargusele topile ja#8221 Tozierile, kes “ kihluse kriisis oli see sõdur värviline kandja, seisis üksi kõrgel positsioonil, rügement oli tagasi võetud ja kaitses oma värve musketi ja laskemoonaga, mis oli tema jalge ette võetud. ”

Gettysburgi lahingu 20. Maine'i ja#8217 komandör kolonel Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain on tänu romaanile saanud kodusõja kuulsaimateks meesteks Tapjainglid ja filmi Gettysburg. Ta sai kuus korda haavata, teenis aumärgi ja jätkas pärast sõda Maine'i kuberneri ja Bowdoini kolledži presidendi ametit.

Vasakul pool 20. Maine'i monumenti Little Round Topil

Peamine monument 20. Maine'ile

Peamine monument asub Little Round Topi kaguküljel. (Little Round Topi ringreisi kaart) See tähistab selle joone keskpunkti, mida rügement pidas 2. juulil kuulsa Little Round Topi kaitsmise ajal. Selle pühendas Maine osariik 1886. aastal.

Peamise monumendi esiküljelt Little Round Topil

Kahekümnes Maine

Vabatahtlik jalavägi
Kolmas brig. Esimene div.
Viies korpus

Peamälestise paremalt küljelt Little Round Topil

Siin on 20. Maine'i rügement,
Kolonel J.L. Chamberlain, kes kamandas,
rahvuslikust lahingujoonest vasakpoolne
juulil 1863 2. päeval tõrjus
Longstreet ’s paremäärmusluse rünnak
Korpus ja laetud kordamööda, hõivates 308
vangid. Rügement kaotas 38 hukkunut või
surmavalt haavatud ja 93 haavatut
358 kihlatud.

See mälestussammas püstitas ellujäänud
see rügement pKr 1888. Märgib väga peaaegu
koht, kus värvid seisid.

Peamälestise vasakult küljelt

Kahekümnenda ohvitseride ja meeste nimed
Maine'i vabatahtlikud, kes tapeti või surid
Selle toimingu käigus saadud haavad:

Peamälestise tagant

Priv. Oscar Wyer Co. F.
” Charles F. Hall ” F.
” Benjamin W. Grant ” F.
” Frank B. Curtis ” F.
” Elfin J. Ross ” F.
Serg. William S. Jordan ” G
Corp. Melville C. Law ” G
Priv. James A. Knight ” G
1. seerum Charles W. Steele ja#8221 H.
Serg. George W. Buck ja#8221 H.
” Isaac M. Lathrop ” H
Priv. Aaaron Adams ja#8221 H
” Goodwin S. Iirimaa ” H
” Iredell Lamson ” H
” Alexander E. Lester ” I
1. seerum George S. Noyes ” K.
Priv. James R. Merrill ” K
” William F. Merrill ” K
” Stephen C. Chase ” K
” Williard W. Buxton ” K.

20. Maine'i jalaväerügemendi peamälestise asukoht

Peamine monument 20. Maine'ile asub Little Round Topil Gettysburgist lõuna pool. See asub Little Round Topi kaguküljel, umbes 170 jardi lõuna pool Sykese avenüü parkimispiirkonnast ja umbes 65 jardi kirdes Sykesi, Warreni ja Wrighti avenüü ristmikust. (39 ° 47 󈧚.1 ″N 77 ° 14 󈧎,1 ″W)

Ettevõtte B positsioonimärk Little Round Topil

Märk, mis näitab 20. Maine'i rügemendi ja kompanii B positsiooni Little Round Topi kaitsmisel, on 100 meetrit põhimälestisest ida pool. Kapten Morrill ja umbes 40 kompanii B meest, kellega liitus rühm Ameerika Ühendriikide Sharpshootersi, paigutati siia, et pakkuda kaitset 20. Maine'i küljele.

Gettysburgi 20. Maine'i jalaväe kompanii B monument

Ettevõtte B monumendist väikesel ümmargusel ülaosas:

Ettevõtte B positsioon,
20. Mina. Vol., Kapten Walter G. Morrill,
irdunud kui vastaseisjad,
rünnates vaenlase paremat äärt,
2. juuli pärastlõunal 1863.

Ettevõtte B positsioonimärgi asukoht

Monument B -le 20. Maine'is Little Round Topis asub Little Round Topi kaguküljel, umbes 100 meetrit põhimälestisest ida pool. (39 ° 47 󈧘,0 ″N 77 ° 14 󈧉,0 ″W)

Monument 20. Maine rügemendile suurel ümmargusel ülaosas

Kolmas monument 20. Maine'ile Gettysburgis on Big Round Topi tippu lähedal. See näitab positsiooni, kuhu 20. Maine jõudis 2. juuli õhtul ja mida ta hoidis 3. päeva hommikul. Monument pühitseti 1889.

Monument 20. Maine'i jalaväele suurel ümmargusel ülaosas

Suure ümmarguse ülaosa monumendilt:

20. Maine'i reg. 3D Brig. 1. Div. 5. korpuse kolonel Joshua L. Chamberlain vallutas ja asus sellele ametikohale 2. juuli 1863. aasta õhtul, jälitades vaenlast oma rindelt allpool asuva monumendiga tähistatud joonel. Regt. kaotas lahingus 130 hukkunust 130 tapetut ja haavatut. See monument tähistab kolmanda päeva lahingu ajal liidu äärmist vasakpoolset osa.

20. Maine'i mälestusmärgi asukoht Big Round Topil

Suure Round Topi 20. Maine'i monument on Gettysburgist lõuna pool, umbes 350 meetri kaugusel suhteliselt järsust kõnniteest kuni Big Round Topi tippuni. (39 ° 47 󈧏.9 ″N 77 ° 14 󈧚.4 ″W) Jalutusrajale kulgev rada asub Lõuna -Konföderatsiooni avenüü lõunaosas, mis on ühesuunaline ida suunas. Külastajad võivad kõigepealt soovida seda monumenti külastada, enne kui nad jätkavad mööda Lõuna -Konföderatsiooni avenüüst kuni Little Round Topini.

Soovitatav lugemine:

Kahekümnes Maine: Klassikaline lugu Joshua Chamberlainist ja tema vabatahtlike rügement

“ Üks parima kodusõja üksuse ajalugu I ’loen. ”
“ Selle vapra rügemendi lõplik ülevaade ”
– Amazoni arvustused


Thomas D. Chamberlain sündis Breweris, Maine'is, noorim viiest lapsest. Noor Tom kasvas üles perefarmis Breweris koos oma nelja vanema õe -vennaga: Joshua Lawrence (sündinud 1828), Horace Beriah (1834), Sarah Brastow (1836) ja John Calhoun (1838). Nende kasvatus näib olevat olnud range ja religioosne, kuid samas ka armastav. Thomas oli kelmikas ja sümpaatne poiss-vend nimetas teda "väikeseks kelmiks"-ja pere beebina oli ta ema lemmik. Thomas oli ainus poeg, kes ülikoolis ei käinud. Kas see oli intelligentsuse, rakenduse või kalduvuse puudumise tõttu, pole teada. Teismeliste keskel töötas Thomas Bangoris toidupoes asjaajajana.

Chamberlaini vanavanaisad olid Ameerika vabadussõja sõdurid ja tema vanaisa oli teeninud 1812. aasta sõja ajal. Tema isa oli teeninud ka 1839. aastal toimunud ebaõnnestunud Aroostooki sõja ajal. Tema vend Joshua oli samuti sõjaväes.

1862. aastal liitus Chamberlain liidu armeega. Tema motiivid olid segased - isiklikud, isamaalised ja religioossed.

Peagi paigutati ta koos oma venna Joshuaga vastloodud 20. Maine'i jalaväkke, kellest sai rügemendi kolonel.

20. Maine'i polk marssis Antietami lahingusse, kuid ei osalenud lahingutes. Nad võitlesid Fredericksburgi lahingus, kannatades kergeid ohvreid rünnakutes Marye kõrgustele, kuid nad olid sunnitud veetma viletsa öö külmetaval lahinguväljal paljude teiste rügementide haavatute ja surnute seas. Nad jätsid maha 1863. aasta mais toimunud Chancellorsville'i lahingu, kuna nende ridades puhkes rõuge, mis hoidis neid tagavalves. Juunis 1863 ülendati Joshua rügemendi polkovnikuks, pärast esimese polkovniku Adelbert Amesi ülendamist brigaadikomandoks. Thomas Chamberlain osales enamikus teistes lahingutes, milles 20. Maine võitles, eriti Gettysburgi lahingus.

Gettysburgi lahing Edit

Little Round Topi kaitsmise ajal sattus 20. Maine Konföderatsiooni 15. Alabama rügemendi, mis oli osa kindralmajor John Bell Hoodi juhitavast diviisist, rünnaku alla ja pärast umbes 3-4 tundi kestnud võitlust 20. Maine jooksis täielikult. laskemoon otsas. Chamberlaini vend Joshua tunnistas kohutavaid asjaolusid ja käskis oma vasakul tiival mässulistele vastata, laadides allamäge fikseeritud tääkidega, lõpetades sellega Konföderatsiooni rünnaku mäel. 20. Maine ja 83. Pennsylvania vallutasid koos üle 400 sõduri ründavatest Konföderatsiooni vägedest. Joshua sai kulunud kuuli tõttu kergelt jalga haavata. Thomas oli vigastamata, välja arvatud "mitu kriimustust". Nende vapralt mäe kaitsmise tulemusena saavutasid vennad Chamberlainid, eriti Joshua Chamberlain ja 20. Maine suurepärase maine ning nende kohta ilmus palju väljaandeid ja lugusid.

Pärast Gettysburg Edit

Pärast Gettysburgi olid peamised lahingud, milles Thomas Chamberlain ja 20. Maine osalesid, Spotsylvania kohtumaja lahing ja Peterburi piiramine. Peterburi piiramisrõngas oli 20. Maine reservis, samas kui Joshua (tema parema otsustusvõime vastu) juhtis oma Pennsylvania Bucktail brigaadi süüdistatuna konföderatsiooni kaitsesektsioonis, mida tuntakse Rives's Salientina. Pöördudes oma vägede juhtimise poole, tabas Joshut minipall, mis sisenes tema parema puusa alla, lõi tema põie ja kusiti ning peatus vasaku puusa juures. Selline laastav haav oleks pidanud saatuslikuks saama ja kui ta jõudis välihaiglasse, kolm miili joonte taha, kardeti tema elu. Thomas Chamberlain koos oma rügemendiga kuulis lõpuks uudiseid. Tema ja 20. Maine'i kirurg dr Abner O. Shaw läksid haiglasse, kus Joshua oli suremas. Kui Thomas ootas, töötas dr Shaw koos dr Morris W. Townsendiga 44. New Yorgist terve öö, et päästa Joshua Chamberlaini elu. Kolmkümmend viis aastat hiljem kirjutas Joshua Chamberlain, et pärast kirurgide lõpetamist: "Tom seisis minu kohal nagu vend ja selline nagu ta oli." Tähelepanuväärne on see, et kolonel Chamberlain jäi ellu, et nautida oma "kohapeal" edutamist brigaadikindraliks, kuigi ta ei taastunud enam kunagi. Mitmed Joshua Chamberlaini biograafid ütlevad, et tema elu päästis tema venna Thomase tegevus.

Appomattoxi kampaania muutmine

Pärast Peterburi osalesid Thomas Chamberlain ja 20. Maine viie kahvli lahingus (mille eest anti talle vapruse eest Breveti kolonelleitnant) ja Appomattoxi kohtumaja lahingusse. Sõja lõpus marssis 20. Maine 2. mail Virginia osariigist Appomattoxist, jõudes 12. mail Washingtoni, kus see lõpuks 16. juulil 1865. aastal teenistusest kõrvaldati. Ta lõpetas sõja alampolkovnik.

Pärast sõda triivis Chamberlain vaatamata oma silmapaistvatele sõjalistele saavutustele ühelt töökohalt teisele. Ta kannatas alkoholismi, samuti raske kopsuhaiguse ja südamehaiguste all. Ta suri 55 -aastaselt Bangoris, Maine'is.

Chamberlain oli Michael Shaara Pulitzeri auhinna võitnud ajaloolise romaani tegelane, Tapjainglid. Teda kujutati ka selle romaani põhjal filmis, Gettysburg, mängis näitleja C. Thomas Howell, kes kordas seda rolli filmis Jumalad ja kindralid eellugu, mis põhineb romaanil, Jumalad ja kindralid, mille on kirjutanud Michael Shaara poeg Jeff Shaara. Chamberlaini on kahes kinofilmis kujutatud energilise ja noorusliku abina oma komandörile ja vanemale vennale Joshua Chamberlainile (mängib Jeff Daniels).


Süüdistus, mis päästis liidu: Gettysburgi 20. Maine'i bajoneti tasu Little Round Topis, 2. juuli 1863

Edwin Forbesi väike ümar top

Vasakul küljel oli 20. Maine'i rügemendi ja 83. Pennsylvania 386 ohvitseri ja meest. Nähes, kuidas konföderaadid oma tiiva ümber liiguvad, venitas Chamberlain esmalt oma joont punktini, kus tema mehed olid ühefaililises reas, ja käskis seejärel oma lõuna kõige lõunapoolsel poolel pärast teist konföderatsiooni süüdistust tuulevaikusel tagasi pöörata. Just seal keeldusid nad liinist ” - moodustasid põhiliini suhtes nurga, püüdes takistada Konföderatsiooni külgmanöövrit. Vaatamata suurtele kaotustele pidas 20. Maine 15. Alabama ja teiste Konföderatsiooni rügementide poolt järgneva kahe laenguga kokku üheksakümmend minutit.

Chamberlain (teades, et tema meestel oli laskemoona otsas, tema numbrid olid ammendunud ja tema mehed ei suutnud teist konföderatsiooni süüdistust tagasi lükata) käskis oma meestel varustada tääkid ja vasturünnaku. Ta käskis vasakul küljel, mis oli tagasi tõmmatud, edasi liikuda ‘ parema rattaga edasi ja manööverdada. Niipea kui nad olid ülejäänud rügemendiga kooskõlas, asus ülejäänud rügement sarnaselt uksele, mis sulgus. This simultaneous frontal assault and flanking maneuver halted and captured a good portion of the 15th Alabama.[16] While Chamberlain ordered the advance, Lieutenant Holman Melcher spontaneously and separate to Chamberlain’s command initiated a charge from the center of the line that further aided the regiment’s efforts.

Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain ordered the bayonet charge on Little Round Top.
During their retreat, the Confederates were subjected to a volley of rifle fire from Company B of the 20th Maine, commanded by Captain Walter G. Morrill, and a few of the 2nd U.S. Sharpshooters, who had been placed by Chamberlain behind a stone wall 150 yards to the east, hoping to guard against an envelopment. This group, who had been hidden from sight, caused considerable confusion in the Confederate ranks.

Thirty years later, Chamberlain received a Medal of Honor for his conduct in the defense of Little Round Top. The citation read that it was awarded for “daring heroism and great tenacity in holding his position on the Little Round Top against repeated assaults, and ordering the advance position on the Great Round Top.” About Little Round Top

Little Round Top (left) and [Big] Round Top, photographed from Plum Run Valley in 1909

Seonduvad postitused:

Comments on this entry are closed.

Hi Gerard– Thanks for this post. Here are two links to paintings from the National Guard’s Heritage Series about July 2, 1863. The first is “The Twentieth Maine,” http://www.nationalguard.mil/Resources/Image-Gallery/Historical-Paintings/Heritage-Series/Twentieth-Maine/

Not to detract from the valor of Chamberlain’s charge at Little Round Top, the First Minnesota suffered appalling casualties in preventing the Confederates from pushing the Union forces off Cemetery Ridge on July 2. “The unit’s flag fell five times and was raised again each time. The 47 survivors [out of 262 men] rallied back to General Hancock under the senior surviving officer, Captain Nathan S. Messick. The 82% casualty rate stands to this day as the largest loss by any surviving military unit in U.S. history during a single day’s engagement.”

Two of my great-great-grandfathers were in one of the German-speaking Pennsylvania regiments at Gettysburg. They were not hotheads– their high respect for the Confederate soldiers they met at Gettysburg has been passed down through my family’s history. I hope Gerard will add a few words about the need to avoid another bloodletting like the one we endured from 1861 through 1865.

I’ve been there, many times, but I won’t tell the story. But I will say that the most amazing thing I ever saw was in the Gettysburg museum and it can’t be appreciated until you see it with your own bare eyeballs. Hundreds upon hundreds of bullets that met in mid-air on display on a wall. And those are just the ones that were found. I’m sure more than that are still in the ground.

Think of that. 2 bullets hitting in mid air is an almost impossibility if you tried to do it. But hundreds upon hundreds of them? The hellfire must have been thick enough to go hiking on. How does anybody survive something like that?

I was born there.
I seen that wall for the first time when I was about 8, and then many times after. It bore right into my skall. I learned everything possible about the civil war and gettysburg in particular and Lincoln was my hero. 40 years later I found out that most of what I learned was a lie. A goddamned lie. It was about then that I started to grow a deep distrust for this rotten assed gov’t. How dare they lie to me that way then, and now? If not for people like me they wouldn’t exist, and they lie to me? Over and over and over? I have no use for it. Any of it. Ever.

Too bad my side didn’t win their independence on that battlefield. I’d have preferred the outcome if the 15th Alabama had drove a bayonet into Chamberlin’s abolitionist guts and rolled the whole Yankee line up.

Amazing battle and extraordinary courage on both sides. But the battle that saved the Union? Nope, not even close. It probably had almost no noteworthy effect on the course of the battle. I rest my case upon a lecture of the battle given to me and my fellow officers by the US Army’s Chief of Military History (Ph.D., Princeton University), Brig. Gen. Nelson (can’t recall his first name), who I would say spoke with authority. I posted about it back in 2013 (with the same video, too!). “Little Round Top battle was not a decisive action.”

I hear ya Ghostsniper. I never thought much about the civil war when I was growing up. My best friend in high school was a black guy who couldn’t get enough of it. I never doubted the official narrative until one day my friend told me straight out that Lincoln started the war intentionally.

I thought he was joking, but he wasn’t. That was years ago, but since then i’ve discovered he was right. That war was intentionally provoked by Lincoln, and it was done to stop European trade from moving out of New York to Southern ports, taking 200 million dollars per year with it.

We are still living with the consequences of that war today, though many of us don’t recognize it because we don’t see the roots of what has happened regarding Federal power.

We are way far away from what the founders intended regarding Federal power.

Who started the war and why? The Northerners knew at the time and said so. “
The Civil War did not start over slavery.”


(Appeared in July, 1996, Camp Chase Gazette and reprinted by permission)

Jim Morgan has written on various topics for CCG over the years. His somewhat divergent Civil War interests include artillery and music. In addition to writing artillery articles, he has produced a tape of Civil War music called "Just Before the Battle" and is now working on a second tape. Currently living in Lovettsville, Va, Jim works as the Acquisitions Librarian for the U.S. Information Agency in Washington, DC.

In November, 1896, Ellis Spear, formerly of the 20th Maine, sent a manuscript to Joshua L. Chamberlain, his old commanding officer, with the request that Chamberlain review it. The manuscript, authored by Spear, covered certain events from the wartime history of their regiment and Spear wanted Chamberlain's comments and evaluation.

In his response, Chamberlain noted some of the then-recent writings about the 20th Maine at Little Round Top, saying that "quite a number of things have been put in distorted perspective lately."1

"The Melcher incident," Chamberlain said, referring to Lieutenant Holman S. Melcher, "is also magnified. He is now presented to the public as having suggested the charge. There is no truth in this. I had communicated with you before he came and asked me if he could not advance his company and gather in some prisoners in his front. I told him to take his place with his company that I was about to order a general charge. He went on the run and did, I have no doubt, gallant service but he did no more than many others did, - you for instance, on whom so much responsibility devolved in bringing up the left wing and making it a concave instead of a convex line in the sweeping charge." 2

Nearly a century has passed since that Chamberlain-Spear exchange and the question, "Who saved Little Round Top?," has not been much debated during that time. Though some have claimed the honor for Brigadier General Gouverneur Warren because of his perception, for Colonel Strong Vincent because of his initiative, or for Colonel Patrick O'Rourke because of his regiment's timely arrival on the right, the question, as it relates to the overall action, has had a generally accepted answer. The savior of Little Round Top was Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain.

Recently, however, the Melcher challenge was revived in a 1994 work titled, With a Flash of His Sword: The Writings of Major Holman S. Melcher, 20th Maine Infantry. Edited by William B. Styple, and generally reflecting its sub-title, this book also includes reports, letters, speeches, and articles by Chamberlain, Spear, several other members of the 20th Maine, and Colonel William C. Oates of the 15th Alabama, all of whom were involved at Little Round Top. It is largely from these additional materials that the editor reconstructs the argument for Melcher.

Beginning with a slightly veiled reference to Tapjainglid, Mr. Styple criticizes the "novelization of history," 3then declares categorically that it was Lieutenant Melcher, not Colonel Chamberlain, who conceptualized and led the bayonet charge which immortalized the 20th Maine.

Melcher, it is true, does not appear in Tapjainglid, though Michael Shaara readily acknowledged having condensed some of the action and left out several individuals whom he judged to be "minor characters."4 Whether or not that judgement is correct, it was a simple exercise of artistic license in what is, after all, a work of fiction.

More importantly, Melcher's story is not unknown. He is mentioned in many relevant works, from the original pieces cited by Mr. Styple to John Pullen's definitive regimental history, The Twentieth Maine. He appears in Willard Wallace's Soul of the Lion and in Alice Rains Trulock's more recent biography, In the Hands of Providence: Joshua L. Chamberlain and the American Civil War. Lieutenant Melcher has not been neglected by history.

Though the various documents clearly show that Melcher behaved gallantly during the Little Round Top action, they "prove" only the old bromide that different men, viewing the same battle from different points and perspectives, will have different impressions of what went on.

At the end of his third chapter, Styple sums up his argument with a list of 10 conclusions about the Round Top fight. Of these, however, only three -- numbers one, two, and four -- relate directly to his contention that Melcher, rather than Chamberlain, deserves the credit for the charge. The other seven, though no doubt true enough, are, at best, interesting side issues.

To cite just one example, conclusion number five states that Colonel Oates "was planning to retreat before the charge was made."5 Oates himself later said that he had, in fact, already ordered such a retreat and there seems no reason to doubt him. But Chamberlain could hardly have read Oates' mind and was facing an enemy who had given him no indication of quitting the contest. That Colonel Oates "was planning to retreat" is simply beside the point.

The three conclusions noted above, however, address the issue more directly and therefore warrant close analysis.

Number 1: "The charge of the Twentieth Maine was an impulsive and spontaneous effort in order to protect their wounded comrades in front. 'Bayonets' was the only command given."

Mr. Styple contends that Chamberlain never ordered a charge, but that Melcher, out of compassion for the wounded, took it on himself to advance, and that it was his courageous personal example which led the rest of the regiment to follow his lead.

In support of this argument, Styple quotes a July 6 after-action report in which Chamberlain writes, "I ordered the bayonet. The word was enough. It ran like fire along the line."6

He further quotes from Chamberlain's 1889 speech at the dedication of the 20th Maine's monument on Little Round Top. In this speech, Chamberlain said, "(i)n fact, to tell the truth, the order was never given, or but imperfectly . There was only time or need for the words, 'Bayonet! Forward to the right!'"7 As far as they go, these two statements support Mr. Styple's contention.

Chamberlain, however, wrote two after-action reports on July 6. Mr. Styple quotes only from the second. In the first, Chamberlain wrote, "(a)s a last, desperate resort, I ordered a charge (underlined in the original). The word 'fix bayonets' flew from man to man."8

Melcher himself later says that Chamberlain "gives the order to 'fix bayonets,' and peaaegu (my emphasis) before he can say 'charge' the regiment . leaps down the hill."9

This is all somewhat misleading and easily could degenerate into an argument over semantics. It does, however, demonstrate the danger of interpreting such texts literally without accounting for the possibility of hyperbole on the part of the writer.

At issue here is not whether Chamberlain actually said, "Charge!," or even whether he remembered precisely what he said during that very busy couple of hours, but whether, at any time, he gave his men some understandable order or instruction about the movement which put the 20th Maine into the history books. In the documents cited by Styple, statements made by Chamberlain (pp. 42, 123, and 296) and Melcher (p. 133), as well as by Private Theodore Gerrish (pp. 68-69), Captain J.H. Nichols (p. 72), Sergeant William T. Livermore (pp. 77-78), Corporal Elisha Coan (p. 84), Captain Howard L. Prince (p. 115), and Lieutenant Samuel L. Miller (p. 259) all either clearly state or reasonably can be interpreted to mean that he did.

It seems especially clear that the idea of an offensive movement came from Chamberlain. "It was too evident," he stated in his first report, "that we could maintain the defensive (underlined in the original) no longer."10

More to the point, Melcher seems only to have wanted to move his company forward and even asked his Colonel's permission to do this. Such a movement would have been a limited and essentially defensive action, while his request for permission shows that what happened was neither "impulsive" nor "spontaneous."

Chamberlain indicated to Spear in the 1896 letter quoted above that he had decided on the charge before Melcher approached him. Perhaps this is so, though time has a way of becoming very fluid at such stressful moments. Chamberlain also may have expanded on Melcher's more limited suggestion or he may have thought to charge about the same time that Melcher thought to advance his company. Various comments can be interpreted to support various conclusions and, as the line already had moved up and down the hill several times anyway, the idea of some sort of movement must have been in the minds of many of the men.

In any case, the evidence does not support an absolute declaration that the charge resulted simply from a spur-of-the-moment impulse by Lieutenant Melcher. It does, however, lend credence to the view that Chamberlain gave some sort of order or instruction beyond simply shouting "Bayonets!" This point will be explored further below.

Number 2: A "right wheel forward," was never ordered by Chamberlain. His first report stated that, "an extended right-wheel" was made only after the initial charge and the breaking of the first enemy line."

What Mr. Styple calls "his first report," actually was Chamberlain's second report. In the first, after noting his order to charge, Chamberlain wrote, "The men dashed forward with a shout. The two wings came into one line again, and extending to the left, and at the same time wheeling to the right, the whole Regiment described nearly a half circle."11

The "first enemy line" being, at most, 30 yards away, it is not surprising that the wheel did not develop until after that line was hit and broken. The 20th Maine did not have the manpower actually to flank the 15th Alabama, so wheeling before hitting the Confederate line would only have exposed it's own flank. "Extend-ing to the left," as Chamberlain said, the Maine men hit as far on the Alabamians' right as they possibly could before wheeling. They had no other choice.

Could an order to wheel have been given after the Confederate line was hit? This seems highly unlikely. Such an order would not only have to have been given, but effectively communicated to the extended and already advanced left, and then properly executed, all while the 20th was fully in motion, scattered through the woods, mixed up with the prisoners, and otherwise distracted.

Could the wheel have happened without an order? This is possible, but, again, unlikely. In fairness, it must be admitted that, by following the lay of the land, the attack more or less naturally would have drifted to the right anyway once the saddle between the Round Tops was reached. Still, mere "drift" does not seem an adequate explanation for a movement described by an eyewitness as looking "like a great gate upon a post."12

One other point. If the forward movement had been made on impulse with no order to wheel, the two wings of the regiment would have charged down the hill away from each other. Had that happened, Chamberlain could not possibly have made the statement quoted above from his first July 6 report.

Wheeling an infantry line requires considerable control and coordination even on the drill field. In the conditions then existing on Little Round Top, the very fact that the maneuver happened strongly suggests that clear preparatory instructions were given and that enough time passed between those instructions and their execution that the men knew exactly what was expected of them. Who but the regimental commander would have given either the instructions or the order to advance?

In other words, before he shouted "Bayonets!," Chamberlain must already have somehow informed his regiment that he was going to order a wheel. So why did he not mention any preparatory instructions in his July 6 reports?

Perhaps a better question is "why should he have done so?" Is it really necessary to detail in an after-action report background information which might reasonably have been inferred by the report's intended readers? Could Chamberlain not have thought that his statement, "I ordered a charge," combined with his short description of the wheel, were enough to make the point?

Chamberlain did, however, provide some of this background in his 1889 monument dedication speech at the regimental reunion and in articles written in 1907 and 1913. Given the various late-century writings on the topic, with the differing perspectives they brought to the public debate, and considering the mysterious rift which developed between himself and Spear in later years, a rift which included Spear's strident public attacks on him, Chamberlain, quite reasonably, might only then have felt a need to detail the background for the historical record.

In the 1889 speech he noted that, having decided on the bayonet charge, he "at once sent to the left wing to give them notice and time for the required change of front."13

In the very short 1907 piece, Chamberlain expressed this by saying that he "sent word to the senior officer on my left to make a right wheel of the charge and endeavor to catch the enemy somewhat in flank on the right."14

He addressed the same point in his 1913 essay, "Through Blood and Fire at Gettysburg," by noting that he "communicated this to Captain Spear of the wheeling flank, on which the initiative was to fall."15 And, of course, he mentioned this to Spear in the 1896 letter with which this essay began. These statements clearly demonstrate that Chamberlain sent a runner to inform Spear of his decision, a quite logical thing for him to have done.

Spear claimed in a 1913 article never to have received any orders 16. This could easily be true, given both the normal condition on a battlefield and the fact that Sgt. Reuel Thomas, serving as Chamberlain's designated messenger that day, was wounded during the fight. Spear's claim, however, does not support the argument that no order ws given.

The historical record, in any case, is quite clear that the wheel happened. Chamberlain described it in both of his July 6 reports. Oliver Willcox Norton, the brigade bugler, states in his classic, The Attack and Defense of Little Round Top, that Chamberlain "made a right wheel with his line, which cleared the valley of the Confederates."17 Captain A.M. Judson, in his History of the 83rd Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, made the "gate upon a post" comment noted above, stating specifically that the line of the 20th Maine "swing (sic) around upon a moving pivot, like a great gate upon a post, until its left had swept down through the valley and up the sides of Big Round Top."18

Melcher himself made a revealing comment in an 1885 newspaper article (cited by Mr. Styple) when he wrote of how the Confederates "were driven in their flight, at first (emphasis mine), directly to the rear of the line of battle of our army."19 Obviously speaking of the initial thrust of the 20th Maine's sharply refused left wing, Melcher implies the development of the wheel with the phrase, "at first," which itself implies that the general direction of the Confederate retreat changed during the course of the action.

Parenthetically, this also explains how several dozen Confederates (those on their own far right) ended up behind the Union lines. When the Federals wheeled, the men who had retreated "directly to the rear" were cut off. Their only possible escape lay to the east. Either in panic or in a deliberate attempt to circle around the Union troops and get back to their own lines, they moved directly, if only temporarily, out of harm's way, and ultimately were killed or captured in fields east of the Round Tops.

Finally, we know that the 20th Maine took prisoners from Alabama and Texas regiments which were to the 15th Alabama's left. To do this, the 20th had to have swept around to its own right.

So the right wheel happened. It was not parade ground pretty and very likely was not even made by the entire regiment, as some portion of the 20th Maine's left wing must have pursued those Confederates who fled "directly to the rear." Nevertheless, it happened, which means that at least some of the men in the refused left knew about it, which in turn means that Chamberlain had indeed passed the word -- whether Spear got it or not.

Knowing specifically what they were to do, the veteran soldiers of the 20th Maine were ready to do it. Thus, at the critical moment, "the word was enough."

Number four: Col. Chamberlain did not lead the charge. Lt. Holman Melcher was the first officer down the slope.

Though directly related to Mr. Styple's argument, this is a very minor point and could even be called a quibble. Even granting Melcher the honor of being first down the slope (and such an interpretation is perfectly plausible), he did not "lead" the charge in a command sense, which is what the conclusion implies. Chamberlain probably was standing in his proper place behind the line when he yelled "Bayonets!," so if indeed "the word was enough" to get the men started, he could not have gone first as the entire line would have moved out ahead of him.

But it does not matter. The questions, "who was first down the hill?" and "who led the charge?" are different questions which should not be posed as one.

The Melcher papers are a valuable addition to the literature of the war. As a challenge to the traditional wisdom about Little Round Top, however, the Melcher argument is rather like the assault of the 15th Alabama -- a tenacious and courageous effort, to be sure, but one which ultimately falls short.

The question, therefore, remains: who saved Little Round Top? Given the available historical evidence, the answer likewise must remain: Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain.<>


Maine History Online

While most Civil War regiments were created with men from one geographical region, the 20th Regiment Infantry, Maine Volunteers was formed in August 1862 to absorb the overflow of volunteers.

Its members came together from across the state, in response to President Abraham Lincoln's call in July 1862 for 300,000 volunteers.

17th Maine Infantry volunteers, 1864

In late 1865 Joshua Chamberlain wrote of the 20th Maine, "It was made of the surplus recruits drifted together, the last of a call for 300,000 more.

"It was without pride. No county claimed them. No city gave them a flag. They received no words of farewell on leaving their state. No words of welcome on their return."

Scouts and guides with the Army of the Potomac, ca. 1865

Being primarily farmers and lumbermen before they enlisted, most of the men had no military background, but many were used to hard work and surviving in an often unforgiving environment, were familiar with firearms and had the benefit of having volunteered for service.

Colonel Adelbert Ames of Rockland, commander of the regiment, knew the soldiers were an independent lot and would not always obey orders with questioning or commenting on them.

Bowdoin College, Brunswick, 1862

Also lacking military experience, a number of officers were well educated, including 10 who had graduated from Bowdoin College.

Many were named officers because of their success at recruiting volunteers for the Maine regiments.

Commanding officer Col. Ames was trained as a military officer. He was a graduate of West Point and recipient of the Medal of Honor for his actions during the First Battle of Bull Run.

Joshua L. Chamberlain, ca. 1862

Joshua L. Chamberlain was the regiment's lieutenant colonel.

A professor at Bowdoin College before his enlistment, Chamberlain lacked military training, but made up for that deficit with his intelligence.

Chamberlain was a graduate of Bowdoin College and the Bangor Theological Seminary.

When Chamberlain went to the Governor of Maine to acquire a commission in the Army, the Governor offered him the rank of Colonel.

Chamberlain declined, saying that he would like to learn the position first and took the rank of lieutenant colonel instead.

Battlefield of the United States Civil War, 1861-1865

Soon, the 20th traveled by rail and steamer to Washington, D.C., to join the Army of the Potomac as part of Butterfield's "Light Brigade" of the Fifth Corps.

From there, they marched to Antietam (Sharpsburg), Maryland, and were held in reserve with the rest of the 5th Corps during the battle of September 16-17, 1862.

The Battle of Antietam, known as the bloodiest battle of the Civil War, was the 20th's first taste of the war.

The Union Army won a strategic victory as Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia withdrew after suffering considerable losses.

The Battle of Antietam also gave President Lincoln the victory he needed to implement a preliminary Emancipation Proclamation in September 1862 that freed slaves in rebel states. He issued the more detailed Proclamation in January 1863.

Thomas Chamberlain, Brewer, ca. 1864

Colonel Ames, who attempted to turn the untrained volunteers into an effective regiment, was respected by the troops -- but not liked.

Thomas Chamberlain, a young non-commissioned officer summed Ames up best when he wrote, "I tell you, he is about as savage a man you ever saw . . . I swear the men will shoot him the first battle we are in."

Chamberlain was the brother of Lt. Col. Joshua Chamberlain, later the commander of the regiment.

General Joshua L. Chamberlain, ca. 1910

In May 1863, Col. Ames was promoted to a Brigadier General in General Oliver Otis Howard's corps.

Joshua Chamberlain was promoted to Colonel and commander of the regiment.

The men took to Chamberlain, admiring him for his willingness to get into the midst of things alongside of them.

Map of Gettysburg battlefield, 1863

Throughout the winter and spring of 1863 the Union and Confederate Armies were making their way north with only a few minor engagements.

It was not until Gettysburg that the armies met in a full-scale fight.

The Battle of Gettysburg began July 1, 1863, and at the end of the first day the Union Army had dug in on Cemetery Ridge and had command of the battlefield while the Confederate Army had taken position on Seminary Ridge.

Dead artillery horses after fight at Trostle's house in Gettysburg

On July 2, 1862, Confederate Gen. James Longstreet recommended that the rebel army move around the end of the Union line, get behind Gen. George Mead's army and attack from that position, but Gen. Robert E. Lee ordered a direct attack.

Because Sickle's Third Corps failed to take its assigned position at the left end of the Union line, after the Confederate attack began, four regiments of Vicent's Brigade, including the 20th Maine moved into position at Little Round Top.

Chamberlain managed to move his troops into a position that surprised the Confederates and then, when the 20th Maine was close to losing its hold on the hill, Chamberlain ordered an unlikely attack with bayonets -- as the regiment was out of ammunition -- on the resting Confederate soldiers.

The 20th Maine suffered heavy casualties, but held Little Round Top and allowed a Union victory at Gettysburg.

McLean House at Appomattox

The regiment later participated in every major battle with the Army of the Potomac, but Gettysburg had been its moment in the sun.

It would never again have as many men in its ranks as it did at Little Round Top.

Col. Chamberlain was soon put in command of a brigade and in 1865 was promoted to Brigadier General and later put in command by Ulysses S. Grant of all Union troops during the surrender of the Confederates.

Chamberlain and 20th Maine, Gettysburg reunion, 1889

The 20th Maine regiment was mustered out of service on June 16, 1865. Out of a total enlistment of 1,621 men, nine officers and 138 enlisted men were killed or mortally wounded and one officer and 145 enlisted men died of disease, for a total of 293 lost.

The war had a profound affect on many soldiers and transition back into civilian life was not always easy. Abner R. Small summed up the war well when he wrote in a letter to a friend, "War and heroes sound well in history but the reality is known to but the few that survive the strife."

Sources: John J. Pullen, The Twentieth Maine: A Volunteer Regiment in the Civil War, Dayton, Ohio: Morningside House, 1984.

Thomas A. Desjardin, Stand Firm Ye Boys From Maine: The 20th Maine and the Gettysburg Campaign, Gettysburg, Pa.: Thomas Publications, 1995.


The Ballad of the 20th Maine

In 2019, almost a century after Maine adopted its state song “The State of Maine Song,” and seven years after the state adopted its state march “The Dirigo March,” Governor Janet Mills signed into legislation a bill which made “The Ballad of the 20 th Maine” the official state ballad of Maine. The ballad was written by Griffin Sherry, a member of the Maine-based folk band The Ghost of Paul Revere.

“The Ballad of the 20 th Maine” tells the story of Andrew Tozier, a member of the 20 th Maine Volunteer Infantry Regiment during the American Civil War. Beginning with his early life in Lichfield, Maine, the song follows him as a runaway teenager before he joins the Union army. The rest of the song focuses on Tozier’s role in the 20 th Maine’s iconic last stand at Little Round Top during the Battle of Gettysburg. Tozier, by that point injured, was the colors-bearer for the regiment, and thus “alone I stood with colors, flying proud and true, for to let my northern brothers know the battle was not through.”

Representative Scott Cuddy introduced the bill to recognize the song as Maine’s state ballad as a way to both recognize Maine musicians and to commemorate the sacrifice of Maine’s men who fought in the Civil War. The bill ended up passing unanimously in both chambers, but did face some initial objection in the State and Local Government Committee from two Republican representatives. Rep. Frances Head thought that the pro-Union message would be insulting to the South, while Rep. Roger Reed praised the confederate cause, saying that “Many of them were great Christian men on both sides. They fought hard and they were fighting for states’ rights as they saw them.”

While these comments were made by a minority group which had no effect on the final passing of the bill, they prompt an important discussion about controversy and commemoration. Even recognizing the smallest and most insignificant audience reactions to controversial pieces of commemoration can give great insight. The internet has given us access to reactions that we could never have from the past—for example, Andrew Gockel of Jefferson, Maine. Wrote on twitter that “Rep. Scott Cuddy of Maine is partaking too much of mind-altering drugs” in response to Cuddy’s initial bill proposal.

These reactions—both from elected officials and Twitter commentators—tell us about the state of our country and its position on commemoration of our own dark past. In an era when Confederate monuments are at the forefront of thought, it’s unfortunately difficult to be surprised that legislators are arguing that the Civil War was fought solely about “states’ rights.” As the country grapples with how to commemorate our history, reactions to new commemorations can reveal the truth about where we are—which is perhaps much less far along than we might think if we ignored the controversy


Maine Memory Network

While most Civil War regiments were created with men from one geographical region, the 20th Regiment Infantry, Maine Volunteers was formed in August 1862 to absorb the overflow of volunteers.

Its members came together from across the state, in response to President Abraham Lincoln's call in July 1862 for 300,000 volunteers.

17th Maine Infantry volunteers, 1864
Item 4127 info
Maine Historical Society

In late 1865 Joshua Chamberlain wrote of the 20th Maine, "It was made of the surplus recruits drifted together, the last of a call for 300,000 more.

"It was without pride. No county claimed them. No city gave them a flag. They received no words of farewell on leaving their state. No words of welcome on their return."

Scouts and guides with the Army of the Potomac, ca. 1865
Item 4288 info
Maine Historical Society

Being primarily farmers and lumbermen before they enlisted, most of the men had no military background, but many were used to hard work and surviving in an often unforgiving environment, were familiar with firearms and had the benefit of having volunteered for service.

Colonel Adelbert Ames of Rockland, commander of the regiment, knew the soldiers were an independent lot and would not always obey orders with questioning or commenting on them.

Bowdoin College, Brunswick, 1862
Item 4334 info
Maine Historical Society

Also lacking military experience, a number of officers were well educated, including 10 who had graduated from Bowdoin College.

Many were named officers because of their success at recruiting volunteers for the Maine regiments.

Commanding officer Col. Ames was trained as a military officer. He was a graduate of West Point and recipient of the Medal of Honor for his actions during the First Battle of Bull Run.

Joshua L. Chamberlain, ca. 1862
Item 5187 info
Maine Historical Society

Joshua L. Chamberlain was the regiment's lieutenant colonel.

A professor at Bowdoin College before his enlistment, Chamberlain lacked military training, but made up for that deficit with his intelligence.

Chamberlain was a graduate of Bowdoin College and the Bangor Theological Seminary.

When Chamberlain went to the Governor of Maine to acquire a commission in the Army, the Governor offered him the rank of Colonel.

Chamberlain declined, saying that he would like to learn the position first and took the rank of lieutenant colonel instead.

Battlefield of the United States Civil War, 1861-1865
Item 4287 info
Maine Historical Society

Soon, the 20th traveled by rail and steamer to Washington, D.C., to join the Army of the Potomac as part of Butterfield's "Light Brigade" of the Fifth Corps.

From there, they marched to Antietam (Sharpsburg), Maryland, and were held in reserve with the rest of the 5th Corps during the battle of September 16-17, 1862.

The Battle of Antietam, known as the bloodiest battle of the Civil War, was the 20th's first taste of the war.

The Union Army won a strategic victory as Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia withdrew after suffering considerable losses.

The Battle of Antietam also gave President Lincoln the victory he needed to implement a preliminary Emancipation Proclamation in September 1862 that freed slaves in rebel states. He issued the more detailed Proclamation in January 1863.

Thomas Chamberlain, Brewer, ca. 1864
Item 4332 info
Maine Historical Society

Colonel Ames, who attempted to turn the untrained volunteers into an effective regiment, was respected by the troops -- but not liked.

Thomas Chamberlain, a young non-commissioned officer summed Ames up best when he wrote, "I tell you, he is about as savage a man you ever saw . . . I swear the men will shoot him the first battle we are in."

Chamberlain was the brother of Lt. Col. Joshua Chamberlain, later the commander of the regiment.

General Joshua L. Chamberlain, ca. 1910
Item 4330 info
Maine Historical Society

In May 1863, Col. Ames was promoted to a Brigadier General in General Oliver Otis Howard's corps.

Joshua Chamberlain was promoted to Colonel and commander of the regiment.

The men took to Chamberlain, admiring him for his willingness to get into the midst of things alongside of them.

Map of Gettysburg battlefield, 1863
Item 4327 info
Maine Historical Society

Throughout the winter and spring of 1863 the Union and Confederate Armies were making their way north with only a few minor engagements.

It was not until Gettysburg that the armies met in a full-scale fight.

The Battle of Gettysburg began July 1, 1863, and at the end of the first day the Union Army had dug in on Cemetery Ridge and had command of the battlefield while the Confederate Army had taken position on Seminary Ridge.

Dead artillery horses after fight at Trostle's house in Gettysburg
Item 4286 info
Maine Historical Society

On July 2, 1862, Confederate Gen. James Longstreet recommended that the rebel army move around the end of the Union line, get behind Gen. George Mead's army and attack from that position, but Gen. Robert E. Lee ordered a direct attack.

Because Sickle's Third Corps failed to take its assigned position at the left end of the Union line, after the Confederate attack began, four regiments of Vicent's Brigade, including the 20th Maine moved into position at Little Round Top.

Chamberlain managed to move his troops into a position that surprised the Confederates and then, when the 20th Maine was close to losing its hold on the hill, Chamberlain ordered an unlikely attack with bayonets -- as the regiment was out of ammunition -- on the resting Confederate soldiers.

The 20th Maine suffered heavy casualties, but held Little Round Top and allowed a Union victory at Gettysburg.

McLean House at Appomattox
Item 4285 info
Maine Historical Society

The regiment later participated in every major battle with the Army of the Potomac, but Gettysburg had been its moment in the sun.

It would never again have as many men in its ranks as it did at Little Round Top.

Col. Chamberlain was soon put in command of a brigade and in 1865 was promoted to Brigadier General and later put in command by Ulysses S. Grant of all Union troops during the surrender of the Confederates.

Chamberlain and 20th Maine, Gettysburg reunion, 1889
Item 4163 info
Maine Historical Society

The 20th Maine regiment was mustered out of service on June 16, 1865. Out of a total enlistment of 1,621 men, nine officers and 138 enlisted men were killed or mortally wounded and one officer and 145 enlisted men died of disease, for a total of 293 lost.

The war had a profound affect on many soldiers and transition back into civilian life was not always easy. Abner R. Small summed up the war well when he wrote in a letter to a friend, "War and heroes sound well in history but the reality is known to but the few that survive the strife."

Allikad:
John J. Pullen, The Twentieth Maine: A Volunteer Regiment in the Civil War, Dayton, Ohio: Morningside House, 1984.

Thomas A. Desjardin, Stand Firm Ye Boys From Maine: The 20th Maine and the Gettysburg Campaign, Gettysburg, Pa.: Thomas Publications, 1995.



Kommentaarid:

  1. JoJorisar

    Suurepärane idee, nõustun.

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    Kõik omal ajal.

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    See ei ole tõsi.

  4. Adin

    great all

  5. Jonathyn

    Very very



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