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Rooma sirutab oma tiivad - territoriaalne laienemine Puunia sõdade vahel, Gareth C. Sampson

Rooma sirutab oma tiivad - territoriaalne laienemine Puunia sõdade vahel, Gareth C. Sampson


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Rooma sirutab oma tiivad - territoriaalne laienemine Puunia sõdade vahel, Gareth C. Sampson

Rooma sirutab oma tiivad - territoriaalne laienemine Puunia sõdade vahel, Gareth C. Sampson

Kolm Puunia sõda on ilmselt kõige kuulsamad Rooma vabariigi võidelnud võõrsõjad (eriti teine ​​Puunia sõda, kus on kujutised Hannibalist, tema elevantidest ja tema purustav võit Cannae's), kuid samal perioodil võtsid ka roomlased oma võitluse vastu esimesed sõjad üle Aadria mere ja lõpuks alistada Põhja -Itaalia gallide hõimud, mis on pikaajaline oht Rooma linnale endale. Sellel perioodil üritas Kartaago ka taastada oma kaotusest Esimeses Puunia sõjas, luues Hispaanias uue impeeriumi.

Kuigi Puunia sõjad on üsna hästi dokumenteeritud, on nendevahelised lüngad halvasti täidetud. Paljud säilinud ajalood kiirustavad neid perioode ja eelistavad keskenduda dramaatilistele kokkupõrgetele Kartaagoga ning muudel juhtudel on sõdadevahelisi lõhesid käsitlevad lõigud täielikult kadunud (Liivi 20. raamat on võib -olla kõige masendavam lõhe). Autor ei püüa neid probleeme üle käia ning paljudes osades on arutelu keskmes allikate lünkade, säilinud allikate probleemide ja konkureerivate allikate vaheliste vastuolude arutelu. Neid arutelusid toetavad suured väljavõtted erinevatest allikatest. Siinkohal üks väike segadus - mõnikord esitatakse kaks või kolm erinevat allikat järjestikku, kuid need on tuvastatud ainult raamatu lõppmärkuste järgi, mis muudab need tegelikult viitamatuks - autori nimede panemine iga allika järel oleks selle suurepärase lähenemise tõhusamaks muutnud.

Mulle meeldib Sampsoni lähenemine sellele perioodile. Ta järgib suuresti Polybiust, kelle ajalugu on kõige paremini säilinud allikas, kuid toob seejärel sündmuste alternatiivsed versioonid, soovitades, kus need võivad anda lisateavet või kajastada hilisemaid vigu. Ma arvasin, et olen selle perioodiga üsna tuttav, kuid ma ei olnud aru saanud, kui tõsist ohtu Põhja -Itaalia gallid tol ajal Rooma võimule kujutasid, kui palju jõupingutusi Gallia sõdadeks tehti või kui lähedal olid gallid. linna ähvardamine - selle perioodi alguses ei kontrollinud roomlased vaevalt ühtki Põhja -Itaalia Po orgu, mistõttu nende võim piirdus Kesk- ja Lõuna -Itaaliaga, millest pean tunnistama, et ma ei saanud aru. See on periood, mil Rooma lõpetas Põhja -Itaalia vallutamise, kõrvaldades ühe tema kõige ohtlikuma vaenlase, ja seega on sellel suur tähtsus.

See on kasulik raamat, mis aitab täita lünki Rooma sõjaajaloos, kasutades hästi piiratud allikaid.

Peatükid
I - Rooma enne ja pärast esimest Puunia sõda (338-218 eKr)
1 - Rooma laienemine Itaalias ja mujal (338–241 eKr)
2 - Rooma laienemine Vahemeres - Sitsiilia, Sardiinia ja Korsika (241-218 eKr)

II - Rooma laienemine Itaalias ja idas (238–228 eKr)
3 - Rooma laienemine Itaalias - Gallia ja Liguuria sõjad (238–230 eKr)
4 - Rooma laienemine idas - Esimene Illüüria sõda (230–228 eKr)
5 - Kartaago laienemine Hispaanias ja Rooma vastus (237-226 eKr)

III - Rooma laienemine Hispaanias ja Rooma vastus (237-226 eKr)
6 - Gallia I sõda - tee Telamoni
7 - II gallia sõda - Telamoni lahing (225 eKr)
8 - Gallia III sõda - Rooma sissetung Põhja -Itaaliasse (224–223 eKr)
9 - Gallia IV sõda - Klastidiumi lahing (222 eKr) ja sellele järgnenud kampaaniad (222–218 eKr)

IV - Laienemise tagajärjed (225-218 eKr)
10 - Rooma laienemine idas - Teine Illüüria sõda (219 eKr)
11 - Kartaago laienemine Hispaanias ja Rooma vastus (225-218 eKr)

Autor: Gareth C. Sampson
Väljaanne: kõvad kaaned
Lehekülgi: 224
Kirjastaja: Pen & Sword Military
Aasta: 2016



Gareth C. Sampson, Rooma sirutab oma tiivad: territoriaalne laienemine Puunia sõdade vahel (Albright)

(Pliiats ja mõõk, 2016) 278 lk 25,00 £

Pöörates oma tähelepanu paar sajandit enne materjali oma eelmise raamatu kohta, mis käsitles Rooma lüüasaamist Pärsia vastu Carrhae linnas, leiab Gareth Sampson kasumliku uurimisvaldkonna selle läbimõeldud ja suurepärase töö jaoks Rooma ja Kartaago territoriaalse laienemise kohta esimese ja teise vahel. Puunia sõjad, mis suutsid panna nii Rooma kui ka Kartaago käitumise õigesse konteksti, selle asemel, et näha sel perioodil tehtud asju lihtsalt Rooma sõda Hannibali vastu. Selle perioodi haruldase raamatupikkuse käsitlusena õnnestub autoril ellu äratada Rooma ajaloo unustatud ja varjatud osa ning julgustada lugejaid, kes on niivõrd kalduvad heitma pilgu ajastu nappidele algallikatele.

Autori tõsiseltvõetavust allikmaterjali kriitilise, kuid ustava uurimise suhtes võib koguda sellest, kuidas raamatus käsitletakse enamasti Rooma ja Kreeka-Rooma allikaid. Raamatu põhiosas viidatakse sageli iidsetele allikatele, isegi kui nende ülevaated on ilmselt vastuolulised ja nõuavad nende käsitlemisel delikaatsust. Pärast raamatu põhiosa, mis on veidi üle 200 lehekülje, arutleb autor mitu lehekülge, arutades nii oluliste, kuid hämarate perioodide kohta nii Rooma kui ka Kartaago poolel säilinud ja kadunud allikaid. Pärast seda esitab autor nimekirja narratiivi erinevate tähtsate valdkondade valitsejatest, mitte ainult Rooma konsulitest, vaid ka Ardiaei, Epeirose ja Makedoonia kuningatest ja kuningannadest ning Kartaago Hispaanias keisriks laienemise eest vastutavatest Barcidest. võimalust sel perioodil Tribunate of Plebuse uuesti esile kerkida ja uurib vaieldavat Rooma tööjõu tugevust Polybiuselt.

Raamatu põhisisu väärib vähem huvi Rooma Vabariigi sõjaväelaste seas. Esimesed kaks peatükki annavad ülevaate Rooma laienemisest Itaalias ja mujal enne ja pärast Esimest Puunia sõda, näidates Rooma aeglast varajast kasvu ja selle oportunistlikku laienemist Sitsiiliasse, Sardiiniasse ja Korsikale vahetult pärast esimest Puunia sõda. Pärast seda käsitleb autor Gallia ja Liguuria sõda ajavahemikus 238–230 eKr, Rooma esimest rünnakut üle Aadria mere Esimeses Illüüria sõjas ja Kartaago laienemist Hispaanias ning Rooma vastust aastatel 237–226 eKr. Neli peatükki käsitlevad 228–218 eKr keskset, kuid sageli tähelepanuta jäetud Gallia sõda, kus Rooma esialgne esialgne kahtlane ja hirmutav suhtumine vihatud gallidesse muutus järk-järgult Põhja-Itaalia sõjaliseks domineerimiseks. Raamatu kahes viimases peatükis käsitletakse laienemise tagajärgi Teises Illüüria sõjas idas ja Rooma vastust Hispaania edasisele laienemisele Kartaago piirkonnas, mille tulemuseks oli Teise Puunia sõja puhkemine.

Lugejad, kes hindavad sellist ajaloolist teost nagu Robin Waterfieldi film „Taken At The Flood”, leiavad tõenäoliselt ka siin palju väärtustamist, uurides sarnaselt ja sarnaselt läbimõeldult Rooma suurt strateegiat või selle puudumist, militaarsete ja poliitiliste tegurite mõju üksteisele ning kuidas Rooma tegevust ei vaadelda vaakumis, vaid pigem osana laiemast kontekstist, mis hõlmab rivaalitsevaid keiserlikke jõude nagu Kartaago ja Makedoonia, aga ka väiksemaid linnriike ja linnade liite ning kus iga sõda tõi kaasa tagajärjed ja tagajärjed edasisteks konfliktideks nii vanade kui uute vaenlastega. Esitades tõsise ja väärt jutustuse Esimese ja Teise Puunia sõja vahelisest ajast, suudab autor lisaks vältida Hannibali mainimist kuni raamatu materjalideni, mis on mõistetav, arvestades paljude Rooma ajaloo üliõpilaste tendentsi käsitleda Hannibali kui saatuseinimene, kelle ümber keerleb ajastu ajalugu, mitte andekas, kuid algselt perifeerne tegelane Rooma kaasaegse poliitilise ja sõjalise juhtkonna mõtete, ambitsioonide ja plaanide piires.

Autori väärtuslikumate teadmiste hulka kuulub ka selle aja jooksul mõne Rooma Vabariigi unustatud liidri, eriti vapra ja kangelasliku L. Aemilius Papuse, kelle juhtimine tõi kaasa müüt gallide võitmatusest ja isegi üleolekust, ümberhindamine. ühe suure lahingu kulgu Telamonis. Ometi juhib autor Rooma sõjaajaloo süvaõppijana kavalalt tähelepanu sellele, kuidas Rooma poliitilise korra olemus oma lühikese juhtimisperioodi ja kasvavate pingetega isegi praegusel senaatoriajal ja plebiahuvide vahel viis selleni, et Rooma kindralid otsisid isiklikke au sõjavägede või üksuste eesotsas, aeg -ajalt kahjustades või kaotades Rooma Vabariiki tervikuna. Lisaks ei jäta autori arutelu tähelepanuta kaubanduse ja majanduse, samuti demograafia ja logistika arutelu, näidates end rohkem kui lihtsalt lahingute õpilasena.

Tulemuseks on raamat, mida tasub lugeda Rooma klassikalise ajaloo õpilasele. See teos pakub nii Rooma ebaselgete juhtide maine kriitiliseks ümberhindamiseks sel perioodil kui ka raamatuks, mis pakub suurt huvi sõjalise, poliitilise ja diplomaatilise ajaloo vastu, aga on palju pakkuda Rooma Vabariigi üliõpilastele nii uurimisväärtuse kui ka selle naudingud raamatuna narratiivsel tasandil. Sampson heidab valgust Rooma ajaloo süngele nurgale ja leiab, et Rooma eksisteerib keerulises maailmas, kus see on tõusmas Itaalia võimust piirkondlikuks võimuks, mida teised tunnustavad ja kardavad ning kelle tegevus kaitseb oma riigi turvalisust. oma poliitiliste pingetega tegelemine toob kaasa naabrite ja rivaalide vastumeetmed, luues keerulise pildi soovimatutest tagajärgedest, mis toovad kaasa aastakümneid kestnud pideva sõjapidamise ja Rooma mõju äkilise ja püsiva tõusu Vahemere piirkonnas. teema, mis võib väga hästi olla Sampsoni kirjatöö tulevikuala, arvestades tema selget huvi käsitleda Rooma Vabariigi sõjaajalugu sellistes nauditavates ja hästi uuritud raamatutes nagu see.


Rooma sirutab oma tiivad - territoriaalne laienemine Puunia sõdade vahel, Gareth C. Sampson - Ajalugu

Kaks aastakümmet esimese puunia sõja lõpu ja teise alguse vahel kujutavad endast olulist perioodi Rooma ja rsquose keiserlike ambitsioonide kujunemisel nii Itaalias kui ka väljaspool. Itaalias seisis Rooma silmitsi gallide sissetungiga Põhja -Itaaliast, mis ähvardas Rooma riigi olemasolu. See sõda kulmineerus Telamoni lahinguga ja Rooma lõpliku võiduga Itaalia gallide vastu, andes Roomale esimest korda ajaloos kontrolli poolsaare üle Alpideni. Lisaks Itaalia kallastele omandas Rooma oma esimesed provintsid Sardiinia ja Korsika näol, rajas jalamid Sitsiilias ja Hispaanias ning ületas Aadria mere, et luua kohalolek Kreeka mandril, viies Rooma hellenistliku maailma orbiidile.

Ometi käsitletakse seda perioodi sageli vaid vaheajana kahe tuntuma Puunia sõja vahel, kusjuures iga Rooma kampaania toimub näiliselt uue konflikti ootuses Kartaagoga. Niisugune vaade jätab tähelepanuta kaks võtmetegurit, mis nendest aastakümnetest esile kerkivad: esiteks, et Rooma ähvardas Põhja -Itaalia gallide näol palju tõsisem oht, kui ta oli Teises Puunia sõjas karthagolaste käe all teiseks. nendel aastakümnetel pandi alus Rooma ja rsquose ülemere impeeriumile. Selle töö eesmärk on tasakaalustada tasakaalu ja vaadata neid sõdu omaette, analüüsida, kui lähedal Rooma oli Itaalias lüüa saanud, ning hinnata nende aastakümnete tähtsust Rooma ja rsquose tulevase impeeriumi rajamisel.

Autori kohta

Pärast edukat karjääri ettevõtete rahanduses naasis dr Gareth Sampson Vana -Rooma õpingute juurde ja omandas doktorikraadi Manchesteri ülikoolis, kus ta praegu õpetab iidset ajalugu. Ta on üksikasjalikult uurinud Rooma varajast poliitilist ajalugu ja eriti plebade tribunalide poliitilist ametit. Praegu tegeleb ta kadunud vabariigi võimuvõitluse ja kodusõja ning selle ekspansionistliku poliitika uurimisega idas.

ARVUSTUSED

"Kuid teosena, mis on mõeldud peamiselt populaarsele publikule, on Sampson edukas esitama elavat narratiivi Rooma laienemisest aastatel 241-218."

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Sõda Inglismaa ja Šotimaa vahel 13. sajandi lõpus ja 14. sajandi alguses Scalacronica juurest

1355. aastal võeti Šotimaaga peetud sõja ajal vangi Sir Thomas Gray Hetonist, Norhami lossi valvur. Edinburghi lossis viibides hakkas Thomas kirjutama Scalacronica, Inglismaa ajalugu kuni Edward III valitsemisajani, teos lõppes 1362. Sellesse tõlkesse lisatud lõigud hõlmavad mõningaid sündmusi, kus Thomase isa, samuti Thomas Gray oli kaasatud ning Edward I ja II vahelised kampaaniad ja sõjad Šotimaa vastu, sealhulgas Bannockburni lahing.

Nimetatud kuningas Edward [Esimene] läks Šotimaale, investeeris Carlaverocki lossi ja vallutas selle, mille järel John de Menteith võttis Glasgow lähedal William Wallace'i piiramisrõnga ja toimetas ta Inglismaa kuninga ette, kes tõi ta üles ja tõmmati üles. Londonis.

Nimetatud kuningas ümbritses Berwicki linna kiviaiaga ja naasis Inglismaale ning lahkus Šotimaalt John de Segrave Guardianist. Šotlased hakkasid taas mässama Inglismaa kuninga Edwardi vastu ja valisid John de Comyni oma eestkostjaks ja pealikuks. Sel ajal järgnesid suurepärased relvad marsside vahel, eriti Teviotdale'is, enne Roxburghi lossi, Ingram de Umfraville'i, šotlaste Robert de Keithi ja nimetatud lossi korrapidaja Robert de Hastingsi vahel. Inglismaa kuninga Edwardi Šotimaa eestkostja John de Segrave marssis koos mitme Inglise marssi magnaadiga jõus Šotimaale ja koos Inglise kuninga järgija Patrick Earliga saabus Rosslyni küla ümber. , tema veerg tema ümber. Tema edasijõudnud valvur oli laagris kaugel alevikus. John Comyn koos oma järgijatega ründas öösel nimetatud John de Segrave'i ja häiris teda pimeduses ning tema kaugemal laagris olnud laiem valve ei teadnud tema lüüasaamisest, seetõttu tulid nad hommikul lahingumassiivi samasse kohta, kuhu nad olid öösel oma komandöri maha jätnud, kavatsedes oma röövimist teha, kus neid ründasid ja ründasid šotlaste arvud ning Rafe, Koffer, tapeti seal.

Selle uudise tõttu marssis kuningas Edward järgmisel aastal Šotimaale ja leppis oma esimesel sisenemisel Dryburghis. Hugh de Audley koos kuuekümne relvastatud mehega, kellel oli raskusi kuninga kõrval telkimisega, läks [edasi] Melrose'i ja asus neljandikku kloostrisse. John Comyn, tol ajal Šotimaa eestkostja, viibis Ettricki metsas suure relvastatud meeskonnaga, tajudes nimetatud Hugh kohalolu külas Melrose'is, ründas teda öösel ja murdis väravad lahti ning inglased kloostris moodustati ja kinnitati õukonnas oma hobustele, nad [šotlased?] panid väravad lahti viskama, [kui] šotlased sisenesid suurel hulgal hobusega, kandsid maani inglased, kes neid oli vähe ja nad kõik tabati või tapeti. Chevalier Thomas Gray vallutas pärast peksa saamist maja väravast väljas ja hoidis seda päästmislootuses, kuni maja hakkas üle pea põlema, kui ta koos teistega vangi võeti.

Kuningas Edward marssis edasi ja pidas jõulupüha [1303] Linlithgow's, sõitis seejärel kogu Šotimaa maal ja marssis Dunfermline'i, kus John Comyn mõistis, et ei suuda vastu pidada Inglismaa kuninga vägedele. Kuninga halastus, tingimusel, et tema ja kõik tema järgijad peaksid tagasi saama kogu oma õigustatud vara, ja nad said taas tema [Edwardi] kohtunikeks, mille järel avalikult hukati uusi instrumente.

John de Soulis ei nõustunud tingimustega, mille ta Šotimaalt lahkus ja läks Prantsusmaale, kus ta suri. Noor Šoti poissmees William Oliphant põhjustas Stirlingi lossi garnisonimise, kes ei nõustunud nõustuma John Comyni tingimustega, vaid väitis end lõvi ees hoidvat. Nimetatud kuningas Edward, kelle võimuses ja nende linnuste valduses olid peaaegu kõik Šotimaa inimesed, tuli Stirlingi lossi ette, investeeris selle ja ründas seda paljude erinevate mootoritega ning võttis selle jõuga ja üheteistkümne nädala piiramisega! Millise piiramise ajal tabas švaljöör Thomas Grayt vedruaia polt silmade all ja kukkus lossi piirete all surnuks maapinnale. [See juhtus] just siis, kui ta oli päästnud oma peremehe Henry de Beaumonti, kes oli nimetatud tõkete juurest kinni jäänud masinast visatud konksu abil ning oli alles väljaspool tõkkepuid, kui nimetatud Thomas ohu eest palgatõmbeid lohistas. Nimetatud Thomas toodi kohale ja tema matmiseks korraldati pidu, kui ta sel hetkel liikuma hakkas ja teda vaatama hakkas, ning pärast taastus.

Kuningas saatis lossi kapteni William Oliphant Londoni vanglasse ja pani tema armee rüütlid enne piiramisrõnga lõppu lahkuma. Olles määranud oma ohvitserid kogu Šotimaal, marssis ta MS -i. Inglismaale ja jättis Šotimaa eestkostjaks Pembroke'i krahvi Aymer de Valence'i, kellele ta kinkis Selkirki ja Ettricki metsad, kus Selkirkis põhjustas nimetatud Aymer ehitada pele ja paigutas sinna tugeva garnisoni.

Järgmine lõik algab Edward II valitsemisajast

Sel ajal oli Thomas de Gray Cupari ja Fife'i lossi valvur ning kui ta sõitis Inglismaalt välja kuningate kroonimisest nimetatud lossi, siis Šotimaa rüütel Walter de Bickerton, kes oli Roberti järgija de Bruce, olles oodanud nimetatud Toomase tagasitulekut, asetas end varitsusesse enam kui neljasaja mehega, muide, nagu Thomas kavatses mööduda, millest hoiatati, kui Thomas oli varitsusest vaevalt poole liiga kaugusel. Tal polnud kaasas rohkem kui kuus-kakskümmend relvameest ja tajus, et ei suuda kohtumist vältida. Nii võttis ta oma rahva heakskiidul tee otse varitsuse poole, olles andnud oma peigmeestele standardi ja käskinud neil mitte liiga lühikese ajavahemiku tagant järele sõita.

Vaenlane istus hobustele ja asus tegutsema, arvates, et nad [inglased] ei pääse nende eest. Nimetatud Thomas koos oma rahvaga, kes olid väga hästi istunud, lõi hobusele kannuseid ja lõi vaenlase otse nende kolonni keskele, kandes oma hobuse ja lantsi põrutusest paljusid maas. Siis tuli käsi tagasi keerates samamoodi tagasi ja. tungis uuesti ja naasis uuesti läbi vägede paksuse, mis julgustas tema rahvast nii, et nad kõik järgnesid talle samal viisil, millega nad kukutasid paljud vaenlased, kelle hobused tee ääres tembeldasid. Kui nad [vaenlane] maapinnalt tõusid, märkasid nad, et nimetatud Toomase peigmehed on heas korras ja hakkasid lendama kuiva turbasambla lähedale, mistõttu hakkasid peaaegu kõik [teised] lendama sambla, jättes oma hobused väheste ründajate eest. Nimetatud Thomas ja tema mehed ei pääsenud hobuse seljas nende lähedale, mistõttu ajas ta nende hobused nende ette sõitma mööda teed lossi juurde, kus öösel oli neil üheksa sadulise hobusega saak.

Teinekord, turupäeval, kui linn oli ümbruskonna inimesi täis, rünnati Alexander Friselit, kes oli Robert de Bruce'i pooldaja, sada relvastatud meest umbes poole liiga kaugusel nimetatud lossist. saatis teisi oma inimesi laskma alevikku teisel pool lossi. Nimetatud Thomas, kuuldes kära, paigaldas trahvi laadija enne, kui tema rahvas jõudis valmis saada, ja läks vaatama, mis jama on. Vaenlane kannustas oma varitsusest välja nimetatud lossi väravate ees, tehes seda seetõttu, et nad teadsid hästi, et ta (Sir Thomas) oli välja läinud. Nimetatud Thomas naasis seda tajudes jalgsi ja#8217s läbi Cupari linna, mille lõpus seisis loss, kuhu ta pidi sisenema hobusega ja [ja] kus nad olid hõivanud kogu tänava. Kui ta nende lähedale jõudis, lõi ta hobusele hobuseid nende vastu, kes tema vastu tungisid, lõi ta koidikut oma odaga, teine ​​oma hobuse põrutusega ja astus kõikidest läbi, astus väravast maha, ajas hobuse sisse, ja libises tõkkepuu sisse, kust leidis oma rahva kokkupanduna.

See kuningas Edward Teine pärast vallutamist avaldas oma isa eluajal suurt kiindumust Piers de Gavestonile, heast Gasconi perekonnast pärit noormehele, kuna tema isa muretses nii palju, et ta [Piers] ei viiks oma poega eksiteele. teda [Piersi] riigist välja saata ja pani isegi oma poja ja õepoja, Lancasteri Thomase ja teised magnaadid vanduma, et nimetatud Piersi pagendamine peaks olema igavesti tühistamatu. Kuid varsti pärast isa surma kutsus poeg nimetatud Piersi äkitselt tagasi ja sundis teda võtma oma õe tütre, ühe Gloucesteri tütrest, ja tegi temast Cornwalli krahvi. Piers muutus väga suurejooneliseks, liberaalseks ja hästikasvatatud, kuid aruteludes üleolevaks ja üleolevaks, kuigi mõned selle valdkonna suurmehed solvusid sügavalt. Nad kavandasid tema hävitamist ajal, mil ta Šoti sõjas kuningat teenis. Ta oli põhjustanud Dundee linna kindlustamise ja käitus seal ebaviisakamalt, kui riigi härrastele meelepärane oli, nii et ta pidi parunite vastuseisu tõttu kuninga juurde tagasi pöörduma. Tagasiteel üllatasid nad ja viisid ta Scarborough'isse, kuid ta toimetati Aymer de Valence'i tingimusel, et ta viiakse kuninga ette, kelle [Aymeri ’] inimeste juurest ta Oxfordi lähistel tagasi võeti ja tema ette toodi. Earl of Lancaster, kes lasi tal Warwicki lähedal pea maha lõigata, tõi esile kuninga sureliku viha, mis kestis nende vahel igavesti. Lancasteri krahvkonna rüütlipoiss Adam Banaster juhtis kuninga õhutusel mässu nimetatud krahvi vastu, kuid ta ei suutnud seda taluda ning võeti maha ja lõigati pea maha nimetatud krahvi käsul, kes oli järgnenud pikki marsse tema [Banaster ’s] inimesed.

Kuninga ja nimetatud krahvi vahelise vaidluse ajal uuendas Robert de Brits, kes oli juba kuninga isa ajal üles tõusnud, Šotimaal oma jõudu, nõudes võimu Šotimaa üle ja alistas paljud maad Šotimaa, mille Inglismaa kuningas alistas ja allutas ning see oli peamiselt kuninga ametnike halva valitsuse tulemus, kes haldas neid [maid] nende erahuvides liiga karmilt.

Roxburghi ja Edinburghi lossid vallutati ja lammutati, need lossid olid välismaalaste vahi all, Roxburgh [oli] vastutav Burgundia rüütli Guillemyng Fenygges'i eest, kellelt James de Douglas selle lossi ülestõusmispüha ööl vallutas. , nimetatud William tapeti noolega, kui ta kaitses suurt torni. Gaskoni rüütel Peres Lebaud oli Edinburghi šerif, kellelt nimetatud lossi piiranud Moray krahv Thomas Randolphi inimesed võtsid selle kalju kõrgeimasse ossa, kus ta ei kahtlustanud mingit ohtu. Nimetatud Peterist said šotlased Robert de Bruce'i teenistuses, kes süüdistas teda hiljem riigireetmises ning pani ta üles pooma ja joonistama. Öeldi, et ta kahtlustas teda [Peresit], kuna ta oli liiga otsekohene, uskudes, et ta on siiski hingelt inglane, andes endast parima, et teda [Bruce] solvata.

Nimetatud kuningas Edward kavandas ekspeditsiooni nendesse osadesse, kus Stirlingi lossi reljeefi püüdes sai ta lüüa ja suur osa tema rahvast tapeti, kaasa arvatud Gloucesteri krahv ja teised õiged aadlikud isikud ja Herefordi krahv viidi Bothwelli, kuhu ta oli taganenud, ja kuberner reetis ta. Ta vabastati [vastutasuks] Robert de Bruce'i naise ja St. Andrews'i piiskopi eest.

Mis puutub sellesse segadusse, siis kroonikad selgitavad, et pärast seda, kui Atholli krahv oli vallutanud Inglismaa kuninga kapten William Oliphantilt Robert de Bruce'i kasutusse St. John [Perthi] linna, et kasutada seda. , olles sel ajal oma [Edwardi ’ -de] pooldaja, kuigi vahetult pärast tema mahajätmist marssis nimetatud Robert jõus Stirlingi lossi ette, kus Philip de Moubray, rüütel, oli kuningale nimetatud lossi juhtimas Inglismaa, leppis nimetatud Robert de Bruce'iga, et ta loovutab nimetatud lossi, mille ta oli piiranud, välja arvatud juhul, kui ta [de Moubray] peaks vabanema: see tähendab, kui inglise armee ei jõua kaheksa päeva jooksul nimetatud lossi kolme liiga kaugusele. tuleval suvel püha Johannese päeval andis ta nimetatud lossi ära. Nimetatud Inglismaa kuningas tuli sel põhjusel sinna, kus nimetatud konstaabel Philip kohtus temaga lossist kolme liiga kaugusel, pühapäeval püha Johannese valvel, ja ütles talle, et tal pole mingit võimalust lähemale läheneda, sest pidas end kergendatuks. Siis rääkis ta talle, kuidas vaenlane oli metsa kitsad teed blokeerinud.

[Aga] noored väed ei peatuks mingil juhul, vaid hoidsid teed. Täiustatud valvur, keda Gloucesteri krahv oli käskinud, sisenes pargi teele ja#8217, kus läbipääsu hõivanud šotlased võtsid nad kohe umbkaudu vastu. Siin tapeti Robert de Bruce'i käe läbi kirvega rüütel Peris de Mountforth, nagu teatati.

Sel ajal, kui kõrgendatud valvur seda teed järgis, tegid Robert Lord de Clifford ja Henry de Beaumont koos kolmesaja relvastatud mehega tiiru teisel pool metsa lossi poole, hoides avatud maad. Thomas Randolph, Moray krahv, Robert de Bruce'i vennapoeg, kes oli Šoti kõrgema kaardiväe juht, kuulnud, et tema onu oli inglaste kõrgema valvuri teisel pool metsa tagasi löönud, arvas, et tal peab oma osa olema , ja puust välja andmine koos oma diviisiga marssis üle lagendiku kahe eespool nimetatud isanda poole.

Sir Henry de Beaumont kutsus oma mehi: "Ootame natuke, las nad tulevad, andke neile ruumi!"

"Härra," ütles sir Thomas Gray, "ma kahtlen, et kõik, mis te neile praegu annate, saavad nad liiga vara."

"Väga hästi!" hüüdis nimetatud Henry: "Kui kardate, siis minge ära! ’

"Härra," vastas Thomas, "see pole hirmust, et ma täna lendan." Nii ütles ta, et ta kannustas tema (Beaumont) ja Sir William Deyncourt'i vahel ning tungis vaenlase rüppe. William tapeti, Thomas võeti vangi, tema hobune tapeti haugide peal ja ta ise kandis koos nendega [šotid] jalgsi, kui nad sealt välja marssisid, olles täielikult ära sõitnud kahe nimetatud isanda eskaadri, kellest mõned [ Inglise] põgenes lossi, teised kuninga armee juurde, kes oli juba metsa kaudu teelt lahkunud, kuristanud Forthi vee lähedal asuvat tasandikku Bannockburnist kaugemal, kurjas, sügavas ja märjas soos, kus nimetatud inglise armee jäi terveks ja jäi terveks ööks, kaotades kahjuks enesekindluse ja olles päeva sündmustest liiga pettunud.

Šotlased metsas arvasid, et nad olid selleks päevaks piisavalt hästi hakkama saanud, ja hakkasid dekodeerima, et marssida öösel tugevamasse riiki Lennoxi, kui Inglismaa teenistuses olnud Sir Alexander de Seton oli tulnud koos kuningaga sinna, lahkunud salaja Inglise armeest, läinud Robert de Bruce'i juurde metsa ja öelnud talle: „Härra, see on aeg, kui kavatsete kunagi ette võtta Šotimaa vallutamise. Inglased on kaotanud südame ja on heitunud ning ei oota midagi muud kui äkilist avatud rünnakut. ”

Seejärel kirjeldas ta nende seisundit ja lubas poomise ja tõmbamise pärast pea, et kui ta [Bruce] ründab neid homme, võidab ta need kergesti ilma [palju] kaotusteta. Kelle [Setoni ’s] õhutusel otsustasid nad [šotlased võidelda ja homme päikesetõusu ajal marssisid metsast välja kolmes jalaväediviisis. Nad suunasid oma kursuse julgelt Inglise armeele, kes oli kogu öö relvade all olnud, hobused hammustatud. Nad [inglased] olid suure ärevusega, sest nad ei olnud harjunud jalgsi tülitsema, kuid šotlased olid õppust võtnud flaamidelt, kes olid enne seda Courtrainis jalgsi Prantsusmaa võimu võitnud. Ülalnimetatud šotlased tulid skiltroomide ritta ja ründasid inglaste kolonni, mis olid kokku kiilunud ja ei suutnud nende [šotlaste] vastu tegutseda, nii et nende hobused olid haugidele löödud. Inglise tagala väed langesid Bannockburni kraavi äärde, kukkusid üksteise kohal.

Inglise eskadronid, keda haugid hobustele peale surusid, ajasid segadusse ja hakkasid põgenema. Need, kes määrati katastroofi tajudes kuninga ohjeldama, viisid kuninga käe alt väljalt lossi poole ja ta läks minema, kuigi palju teravilja vastu. Kui Šoti rüütlid, kes olid jalgsi, hoidsid King ’s laadija korpust kinni, et teda peatada, lõi ta selja taga nii jõuliselt nuiaga, et polnud kedagi, keda ta puudutas ja mille alla ta ei kukkunud maapind.

Kuna need, kellel olid kuninga ohjad, tõmbasid teda alati edasi, ütles üks neist, Giles de Argentin, kuulus rüütel, kes oli hiljuti üle mere tulnud Luksemburgi keiser Henry sõdadest, kuningale: „Härra , sinu ohjad olid mulle pühendatud sa oled nüüd turvaliselt seal on sinu loss, kus su inimene võib olla turvaline. Ma ei ole harjunud lendama ega hakka ka praegu alustama. Ma kiidan teid Jumala ees! ”

Seejärel seadis ta hobusele kannustused tagasi mellaasse, kus ta tapeti.

King ’s laadija, olles pikitud, ei saanud enam edasi minna, nii et ta asus uuesti rajale ja viidi ümber Torwoodi ning [nii] läbi Lothiani tasandike. Need, kes temaga kaasa läksid, päästeti. Kuningas pääses suurte raskustega, sõites sealt edasi Dunbari, kus ms. Patrick, Earl of March, received him honourably, and put his castle at his disposal, and even evacuated the place, removing all his people, so that there might be neither doubt nor suspicion that he would do nothing short of his devoir to his lord, for at that time he [Dunbar] was his liegeman. Thence the King went by sea to Berwick and afterwards to the south.

Edward de Bruce, brother to Robert, King of Scotland desiring to be a king [also], passed out of Scotland into Ireland with a great army in hopes of conquering it. He remained there two years and a half, performing there feats of arms, inflicting great destruction both upon provender and in other ways, and conquering much territory, which would form a splendid romance were it all recounted. He proclaimed himself King of the kings of Ireland [but] he was defeated and slain at Dundalk by the English of that country, [because] through over confidence he would not wait for reinforcements, which had arrived lately, and were not more than six leagues distant.

At the same time the King of England sent the Earl of Arundel as commander on the March of Scotland, who was repulsed at Lintalee in the forest of Jedworth, by James de Douglas, and Thomas de Richmond was slain. The said earl then retreated to the south without doing any more.

On another occasion the said James defeated the garrison of Berwick at Scaithmoor, where a number of Gascons were slain. Another time there happened a disaster on the marches at Berwick, by treachery of the false traitors of the marches, where was slain Robert de Neville which Robert shortly before had slain Richard fitz Marmaduke, cousin of Robert de Bruce, on the old bridge of Durham, because of a quarrel between them [arising] out of jealousy which should be reckoned the greater lord. Therefore, in order to obtain the King’s grace and pardon for this offence, Neville began to serve in the King’s war, wherein he died.

At the same period the said James de Douglas, with the assistance of Patrick, Earl of March, captured Berwick from the English, by means of the treason of one in the town, Peter de Spalding. The castle held out for eleven weeks after, and at last capitulated to the Scots in default of relief, because it was not provisioned. The constable, Roger de Horsley, lost there an eye by an arrow.

Aymer de Valence, Earl of Pembroke, traveling to the court of Rome, was captured by a Burgundian, John de la Moiller, taken into the empire and ransomed for 20,000 silver livres, because the said John declared that he had done the King of England service, and that the King was owing him his pay.

This James de Douglas was now very busy in Northumberland. Robert de Bruce caused all the castles of Scotland, except Dunbarton, to be dismantled. This Robert de Bruce caused William de Soulis to be arrested, and caused him to be confined in the castle of Dunbarton for punishment in prison, accusing him of having conspired with other great men of Scotland for his [Robert’s] undoing, to whom [de Soulis] they were attorned subjects, which the said William confessed by his acknowledgment. David de Brechin, John Logie, and Gilbert Malherbe were hanged and drawn in the town of St. John [Perth], and the corpse of Roger de Mowbray was brought on a litter before the judges in the Parliament of Scone, and condemned. This conspiracy was discovered by Murdach of Menteith, who himself became earl afterwards. He had lived long in England in loyalty to the King, and, returned home in order to discover this conspiracy. He became Earl of Menteith by consent of his niece, daughter of his elder brother, who, after his death at another time, became countess.

The King of England undertook scarcely anything against Scotland, and thus lost as much by indolence as his father had conquered and also a number of fortresses within his marches of England, as well as a great part of Northumberland which revolted against him.

Gilbert de Middleton in the bishopric of Durham, plundered two Cardinals who came to consecrate the Bishop, and seized Louis de Beaumont, Bishop of Durham, and his brother Henry de Beaumont, because the King had caused his [Gilbert’s] cousin Adam de Swinburne to be arrested, because he had spoken too frankly to him about the condition of the Marches.

This Gilbert, with adherence of others upon the Marches, rode upon a foray into Cleveland, and committed other great destruction, having the assistance of nearly all Northumberland, except the castles of Bamborough, Alnwick, and Norham, of which the two first named were treating with the enemy, the one by means of hostages, the other by collusion, when the said Gilbert was taken through treachery of his own people in the castle of Mitford by William de Felton, Thomas de Heton, and Robert de Horncliff, and was hanged and drawn in London.

On account of all this, the Scots had become so bold that they subdued the Marches of England and cast down the castles of Wark and Harbottle, so that hardly was there an Englishman who dared to withstand them. They had subdued all Northumberland by means of the treachery of the false people of the country. So that scarcely could they [the Scots] find anything to do upon these Marches, except at Norham, where a [certain] knight, Thomas de Gray, was in garrison with his kinsfolk. It would be too lengthy a matter to relate [all] the combats and deeds of arms and evils for default of provender, and sieges which happened to him during the eleven years that he remained [there] during such an evil and disastrous period for the English. It would be wearisome to tell the story of the less [important] of his combats in the said castle. Indeed it was so that, after the town of Berwick was taken out of the hands of the English, the Scots had got so completely the upper hand and were so insolent that they held the English to be of almost no account, who [the English] concerned themselves no more with the war, but allowed it to cease.

At which time, at a great feast of lords and ladies in the county of Lincoln, a young page brought a war helmet, with a gilt crest on the same, to William Marmion, knight, with a letter from his lady-love commanding him to go to the most dangerous place in Great Britain and [there] cause this helmet to be famous. Thereupon it was decided by the knights [present that he should go to Norham, as the most dangerous [and] adventurous place in the country. The said William betook himself to Norham, where, within four days of his arrival, Sir Alexander de Mowbray, brother of Sir Philip de Mowbray, at that time governor of Berwick, came before the castle of Norham with the most spirited chivalry of the Marches of Scotland, and drew up before the castle at the hour of noon with more than eight score men-at-arms. The alarm was given in the castle as they were sitting down to dinner. Thomas de Gray, the constable, went with his garrison to his barriers, saw the enemy near drawn up in order of battle, looked behind him, and beheld the said knight, William Marmion, approaching on foot, all glittering with gold and silver, marvelous finely attired, with the helmet on his head. The said Thomas, having been well informed of the reason for his coming [to Norham], cried aloud to him: “Sir knight, you have come as knight errant to make that helmet famous, and it is more meet that deeds of chivalry be done on horseback than afoot, when that can be managed conveniently. Mount your horse: there are your enemies: set spurs and charge into their midst. May I deny my God if I do not rescue your person, alive or dead, or perish in the attempt!”

The knight mounted a beautiful charger, spurred forward, [and] charged into the midst of the enemy, who struck him down, wounded him in the face, [and] dragged him out of the saddle to the ground.

At this moment, up came the said Thomas with all his garrison, with levelled lances, [which] they drove into the bowels of the horses so that they threw their riders. They repulsed the mounted enemy, raised the fallen knight, remounting him upon his own horse, put the enemy to flight, [of whom] some were left dead in the first encounter, [and] captured fifty valuable horses. The women of the castle [then] brought out horses to their men, who mounted and gave chase, slaying those whom they could overtake. Thomas ms. de Gray caused to be killed in the Yair Ford, a Fleming [named] Cryn, a sea captain, a pirate, who was a great partisan of Robert de Bruce. The others who escaped were pursued to the nunnery of Berwick.

Another time, Adam de Gordon, a baron of Scotland, having mustered more than eight score men-at-arms, came before the said castle of Norham, thinking to raid the cattle, which were grazing outside the said castle. The young fellows of the garrison rashly hastened to the furthest end of the town, which at that time was in ruins, and began to skirmish. The Scottish enemy surrounded them. The said men of the sortie defended themselves briskly, keeping themselves within the old walls. At that moment Thomas de Gray, the said constable, came out of the castle with his garrison, [and,] perceiving his people in such danger from the enemy, said to his vice‑constable: “I’ll hand over to you this castle, albeit I have it in charge to hold in the King’s cause, unless I actually drink of the same cup that my people over there have to drink.”

Then he set forward at great speed, having of common people and others, scarcely more than sixty all told. The enemy, perceiving him coming in good order, left the skirmishers among the old walls and drew out into the open fields. The men who had been surrounded in the ditches, perceiving their chieftain coming in this manner, dashed across the ditches and ran to the fields against the said enemy, who were obliged to face about, and, then charged back upon them [the skirmishers]. Upon which came up the said Thomas with his men, when you might see the horses floundering and the people on foot slaying them as they lay on the ground. [Then they] rallied to the said Thomas, charged the enemy, [and] drove them out of the fields across the water of Tweed. They captured and killed many many horses lay dead, so that had they [the English] been on horseback, scarcely one would have escaped.

The said Thomas de Gray was twice besieged in the said castle: once for nearly a year, the other time for seven months. The enemy erected fortifications before him, one at Upsettlington, another at the church of Norham. He was twice provisioned by the Lords de Percy and de Neville, [who] came in force to relieve the said castle and these [nobles] became wise, noble and rich, and were of great service on the Marches.

Once on the vigil of St. Katherine during his Gray’s time, the fore-court of the said castle was betrayed by one of his men, who slew the porter [and] admitted the enemy [who were] in ambush in a house before the gate. The inner bailey and the keep held out. The enemy did not remain there more than three days, because they feared the attack of the said Thomas, who was then returning from the south, where he had been at that time. They evacuated it [the forecourt] and burnt it, after failing to mine it.

Many pretty feats of arms chanced to the said Thomas which are not recorded here.

Alates Scalacronica: the reigns of Edward I, Edward II and Edward III, as recorded by Sir Thomas Gray, and now translated by Sir Herbert Maxwell, (Glasgow, 1907), p. 23-26, 48-65.


Defeat of Rome: Crassus, Carrhae and the Invasion of the East

Gareth C. Sampson

Published by Pen & Sword Military 21/02/2008, 2008

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Before we can examine the period in question (241–218 BC) we must first understand how this period fits in with the wider expansion of the Roman state and the events which took place prior to 241 BC. It is tempting to view Rome of the third century BC through the lens of the later, more famous period a Rome which was unquestioned master of Italy, able to defeat any other Mediterranean power and on an inevitable course to mastery of the Mediterranean world. However, this was not the Rome of the third century BC. By 241 BC, Rome had only recently taken control of central and southern Italy, the latter of which had seen recent attempts made to annex it to being either a part of a Syracusan empire to the south or an Epirote empire to the east. Furthermore, it is important to note that Rome’s control of Italy did not extend to the north of the peninsula, which was occupied by a collection of Gallic tribes and formed part of a wider civilisation, which stretched from Spain to the Balkans and beyond.

We must also not forget that Italy did not exist in isolation, but was part of a Mediterranean world which was undergoing a major upheaval in terms of the established world order. Less than 100 years before 241 BC, the ancient superpower of Persia had been destroyed within a decade by one man: Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon. His death in 323 BC unleashed a generation of warfare across Greece and the Near East, which by the 280s had stabilised into an uneasy balance of power between three new superpowers: Antigonid Macedon, the Seleucid Empire and Ptolemaic Egypt (see Map 1). Italy sat on the edges of this new world order, but within striking distance of mainland Greece, dominated by the Antigonid Dynasty of Macedon.

The Roman Federation therefore must be placed in this context. To the north lay the vast and seemingly endless expanses of mainland Europe and the tribes that dwelt within, which encompassed northern Italy itself. To the east lay the far more culturally advanced civilisation of Greece, dominated by the great power of Macedon. To the south and the east lay the Carthaginian Empire, centred on North Africa, but extending across the western Mediterranean. Compared to these great civilisations, Rome was the emerging, and in some ways upstart power, and by 241 BC had announced itself on the wider world stage by an extraordinary period of expansion.

Roman Expansion in Italy (338–264 BC)

The year 338 BC marks a decisive point in the history of Italy, as coincidently it did in Greece, albeit for different reasons. In Greece, King Philip II of Macedon was victorious at the Battle of Chaeronea, which established Macedonian suzerainty over the Greek states for the next 200 years. In Italy, another war was also ending this time between Rome and her former allies in the Latin League, with Rome emerging victorious. Rome’s victory in this war did not give her suzerainty over Italy (akin to that of Macedon in Greece), merely mastery of the region of Latium, but the political settlement that followed this victory did provide the foundation for Rome’s domination of Italy, and ultimately the wider Mediterranean world.

Prior to the Latin War, Rome had been at war with her near neighbours for over four centuries (if we are to believe the traditional chronology) and yet barely controlled any territory beyond the coastal plains of Latium itself, in western central Italy. Furthermore, Rome faced an equally powerful neighbour in terms of the Samnite Federation and the ever-constant threat of the Gallic tribes of northern Italy (who had sacked Rome itself just fifty years earlier, c.390–386 BC). Therefore, to put Rome’s efforts in perspective, they had only conquered the neighbouring city of Veii (roughly ten miles from Rome) in 396 BC after intermittent warfare lasting 300 years. Yet despite this, within sixty years of the peace settlement of 338 BC Rome had established an unprecedented control of all central and southern Italy. It is to this political settlement (which accompanied the end of the Latin War) which we must turn our focus, when looking of the reasons behind this extraordinary wave of military expansion.¹

Prior to this war, fought by Rome against their rebellious allies, Rome’s power ostensibly lay through being head of the Latin League, a defensive alliance of supposedly equal states. However, over the centuries this federation had evolved into being dominated by Rome and, as many of her allies saw it, seemed to exist solely for Rome’s benefit. It was this resentment of Roman dominance of the League which saw Rome’s allies attempt to break free from the League and thus brought about the Roman–Latin War of 341–338 BC. Unfortunately for the other Latin cities, the war merely confirmed Roman military dominance and her enemies were comprehensively defeated.

Having been freed from the need to preserve the pretence of an alliance of equals, the Romans dissolved the Latin League and in its place stood a new unofficial federation, that of Rome. Livy provides a detailed description of these reforms, which he ascribes to the Consul L. Furius Camillus.² Instead of common ties between all the participants, each of the Latin cities was tied to Rome individually by treaty. Rome secured their treaties by means of carrot and stick policies. The ‘stick’ came in the form of Roman veteran colonies planted at strategic points within the territories of the defeated Latin states, accompanied by land confiscations. The ‘carrot’, however, was two-fold. Firstly, the various cities were able to maintain their own internal political and social structures and the local elites were left free from Roman interference to pursue their own internal policies. What was sacrificed was an independent foreign policy, which was now slaved to that of Rome. However, aside from this, they were left to their own devices, speaking their own language, continuing with the own culture and carrying on business as usual.

Furthermore, the Romans introduced a new graduated series of citizenship levels. At the peak was Roman citizenship, which gave full political and judicial rights, followed by partial citizenship (civitas cine suffragio), which had no rights of political participation in Rome, and only limited legal protection from Romans.³ This system of differentiating levels of citizenship allowed Rome the ability to incorporate new peoples without diluting the original core of the Roman citizens or jeopardizing the Roman elite’s control of its institutions, especially as voting had to take place in person in Rome itself. Despite the different grades of citizenship, this was not a closed system, nor was it one restricted to race.⁴ This meant that there were opportunities for advancement within the system, to both communities and in particular their elites, giving them a stake in the Roman system and buying their loyalty.

However, at the heart of this settlement lay the obligation on all citizens (whether full or partial) to be called upon for military service in Rome’s armies. It was not only those with citizenship (full and partial) who could be conscripted into the Roman Army, but Rome’s Italian allies were duty bound to send their citizens to serve in Rome’s armies. This created a massive supply of potential manpower for Rome, which was to be the central pillar of all future Roman expansion. In the ancient world, city states were limited by the availability of citizen manpower and one heavy defeat could set a state back a generation.

The years that followed this settlement saw a series of wars against Rome’s neighbours, most prominently the Samnite Federation. Starting in 326 BC, the Second Samnite War⁵ lasted for twenty years (until 304 BC), and saw Rome’s fortunes swing between victories and humiliating defeats, such as the Battle of Caudine Forks in 321 BC, which forever ranked as one of Rome’s most humiliating military reversals. Nevertheless, by 304 BC Rome had the upper hand and the Samnites were forced to sue for peace, albeit maintaining their independence.

The period saw two major reforms to the Roman military system. In 312 BC, one of the Censors, Ap. Claudius Caecus, ordered the construction of the Via Appia, the first major paved road in Italy, connecting Rome and Capua (crossing the Alban Hills and the Pontine Marshes). This allowed Rome to move her armies far more swiftly to the south to support the war against the Samnites.

The following year saw a Tribune of the Plebs (C. Marcius) pass a law allowing for the sixteen Tribunes of the Soldiers to be elected by the people, rather than appointed by the commanders. It has long been argued that this law came at the same time as the Romans doubled their legions from two to four (having four Tribunes per legion) and that this also coincided with the abandonment of the phalanx and the development of the more flexible Roman maniple.⁶ This year also saw the outbreak of war between Rome and various Etruscan cities. The years that followed saw Rome advance into central Italy and up into Umbria, conquering a number of peoples, such as the Herenici and Aequi and allying with others, such as the Marsi. The result of this was that by the late 300s BC Roman power extended throughout central Italy.

This massive extension of Roman power naturally led to a reaction from the peoples who were not yet under Roman rule, resulting in the formation of an alliance between the Samnites, Etruscans, Umbrians and Gauls (of northern Italy). This resulted in the war that is most commonly referred to as the Third Samnite War (298–290 BC), but was far wider in scale than the name suggests. This conflict was Rome’s greatest victory to date and resulted in Rome defeating each of the opposing alliance and gaining control of all of central and much of southern Italy, stretching to the Adriatic coast. The year 295 BC saw the Battle of Sentinum, in which Rome was able to field an army of 36,000, a huge figure for the time, and defeat a combined force of Gauls and Samnites. By 290 BC the surrender of the Samnites meant that the only regions of Italy which now lay outside of Roman control were the Gallic tribes of northern Italy and the Greek city states of the south.

A further war with the Gallic tribes of northern Italy soon followed (against the Boii and Senones), which ultimately saw further Roman success, culminating in a victory at the Battle of Lake Vadimon in 283 BC. A large section of the northern Adriatic coastline of Italy was thus added to Rome’s Italian empire. This war was soon followed by the more famous war for southern Italy, where Rome faced one of the Hellenistic world’s most celebrated generals: Pyrrhus, King of Epirus. Thus, for the first time, Rome faced a Hellenistic army from mainland Greece and famously at the battles of Heraclea and Ausculum (280 and 279 BC) were comprehensively defeated. These battles, however, gave rise to the modern concept of a ‘Pyrrhic victory’ as the Romans, thanks to their system of treaties and obligations to provide manpower, were able to replace their losses and return to full strength within the year, whilst Pyrrhus found his numbers steadily declining. Following a number of unsuccessful campaigns in Sicily, Pyrrhus returned to Italy and was finally defeated at the Battle of Beneventum in 275 BC. Following his withdrawal back to Greece, Rome advanced into southern Italy and conquered the Greek city states therein.

Rome and the First Punic War (264–241 BC)

The conquest of southern Italy brought Roman territory into proximity with the perpetual warzone that was the island of Sicily. For centuries the island had seen warfare between native peoples and various external powers, who coveted the island for its natural resources and strategic position. Perhaps the longest period of fighting had been between the North African power of Carthage and the native Sicilian power of Syracuse, with neither side managing to achieve a lasting dominance.

In the 270s, however, this balance of power had been disrupted by the arrival of King Pyrrhus of Epirus. Having defeated the Romans twice in battle, but unable to conclude the war, Pyrrhus accepted an offer from the Sicilian peoples, led by Syracuse, to take command of native Sicily and drive out the Carthaginians. Unable to resist the dream of a Sicilian, and possible African, empire to add to his hopes of an Italian one, Pyrrhus accepted and crossed into Sicily with his army in 278 BC.⁸ Ironically, this invasion brought the traditional allies of Carthage and Rome closer together, as they concluded a fresh (anti-Pyrrhic) alliance. However, Pyrrhus’s Sicilian campaign followed a similar course to his Italian one, being unable to convert military victory on the battlefield into a lasting settlement. Having alienated his Sicilian allies, he quit Sicily to return to his original ambition of carving out an Italian empire in 276 BC, leaving behind a shattered island.

This chaos was exploited by a group known as the Mamertines⁹ these were Campanian mercenaries who made a bid to seize control of large swathes of Sicily for themselves. In response to this new threat, a Syracusan general named Hiero (II) formed an alliance of native forces and drove the Mamertines back into the north-eastern tip of Sicily, and the city of Messana, which controlled the strategic crossing from Sicily to Italy (see Map 2).¹⁰ Faced with defeat at the hands of Hiero in c.265/264 BC the Mamertines appealed to both Carthage and Rome to assist them. Seeing a chance to restore their Sicilian empire, the Carthaginians agreed and installed a garrison at Messina, thwarting their old Syracusan rivals.

Unfortunately for all three sides already involved in the war in Sicily, the Roman Senate continued to debate the Mamertine request, understandably, as they had never operated in Sicily before, and they and the Carthaginians were long-standing allies. Ultimately, however, it was a vote of the Roman people which determined that Rome would send aid to Sicily and the Mamertines, and the Senate thus dispatched the Consul Ap. Claudius Caudex to Messina with a Roman Army.¹¹ Thus the situation in Sicily saw the entry of a fourth military force. Given the Roman vote of support, the Mamertines threw their lot in with Rome and were able to expel the Carthaginian garrison, allowing the Romans to seize control of the city. Faced with the expansion of Roman power into Sicily, the Carthaginians and Syracusans – traditionally old enemies – found common cause against Rome and thus the First Punic War began. Thus the war started as Rome and the Mamertines versus Carthage and the Syracusans (and their allies).

Ever since 264 BC, historians have been examining the question as to why Rome intervened in the interminable struggles in Sicily, and ultimately it must be acknowledged that we will never know for sure. Certainly the stated cause of the Roman intervention itself seems weak defending rogue mercenaries who had seized a native city. This is especially the case given that a few years earlier, in 270 BC, the Romans had expelled a similar group of Campanian mercenaries who had seized the city of Rhegium, in southern Italy.

Yet, as detailed above, Rome was undergoing a major period of expansion and had just seized control of southern Italy. As history had shown, southern Italy was open to attack from both mainland Greece (Epirus), but also from Sicily. In the period 390–386 BC Dionysius, the Tyrant of Syracuse, had invaded and conquered much of southern Italy, adding it to his greater Syracusan empire.¹² Having conquered southern Italy, Dionysius then used it as a launch pad to invade Epirus itself, to place a puppet on the throne. Therefore, strategically, no control of southern Italy would be secure without securing its eastern and western flanks (Epirus and Sicily). The Mamertine appeal thus gave Rome the excuse they needed to intervene and the prospect of Carthaginian control of Messina provided the motivation. Thus, for the first time, Rome embarked upon an overseas war.

During the early years of the war, Rome experienced a number of successes. They moved swiftly from the conquest of Messina to a siege of Syracuse itself, but fared no better than either the Athenians or the Carthaginians had over the centuries. However, what they could not achieve through force of arms they achieved through diplomacy when Hiero, now Tyrant of Syracuse, was persuaded to break his alliance with Carthage and conclude a treaty with Rome instead. Thus, within a year of the war’s outbreak Rome had secured both Messina and Syracuse and had isolated Carthage.

The Romans built on this success and 262 BC saw Rome storm the city of Agrigentum, a key Carthaginian base on the southern Sicilian coast. From this high point, however, the war in Sicily became one of attrition, with the Carthaginians wisely avoiding open battle on land. In an attempt to gain the initiative in the war, Rome invested heavily in building its first wartime navy in order to tackle Carthaginian naval dominance and cut Sicily off from Carthage itself. At first the Romans proved victorious, as seen in 260 BC at the Battle of Mylae, which saw a Roman Consul, C. Duilius, celebrate the city’s first naval triumph. This was in great part due to the Roman tactic of engaging ships at close quarters, using grappling irons to tie the two ships together and then sending marines across to secure the other ship thus turning a naval engagement into an infantry one.

Unfortunately for Rome, the war in Sicily had descended into a series of prolonged sieges, with the Carthaginian withdrawing to their key bases and allowing Roman forces free reign across the island’s interior. To end this stalemate in 256 BC, the Roman Consuls undertook their boldest military manoeuvre to date when L. Manlius Vulso Longus and M. Atilius Regulus led an invasion of Africa itself, in an attempt to knock Carthage out of the war. Another naval victory, at the Battle of Ecnomus, allowed the Romans to land their army in Africa. Unfortunately the Roman Army was then comprehensively defeated in the Battle of Bagradas the following year, at the hands of a Spartan mercenary commander named Xanthippus. With this bold invasion defeated, the war dragged on for another decade of Roman sieges in Sicily and naval encounters in Sicilian waters.

Ultimately, the First Punic War became one of attrition, with the resources of both empires being stretched to the limit. In the end, Rome was able to make the most of its fiscal and human resources and by 242 BC was able to finally reduce the last key Carthaginian strongholds of Drepana and Lilybaeum. With Sicily lost and Rome vying for control of the seas, the Carthaginian Senate had no choice but to seek terms. Thus Rome had won its first overseas war, but only through attrition. For Carthage, the terms of the peace treaty were the evacuation of all its forces from Sicily and twenty years of war reparations.¹³

The Aftermath of the First Punic War – Rebellion in Italy

At the conclusion of the war, both sides were faced with rebellions amongst their own allies. In Rome’s case, this rebellion broke out in 241 BC and centred on the Falisci. The Falisci were an Italic people who lived in Etruria, some thirty miles north of Rome. Regretably, there are no detailed surviving accounts of this revolt, which is unfortunate given the oddness of its timing just as Rome emerged victorious from twenty years of warfare and had large numbers of battle-hardened soldiers already mobilised. Of the surviving accounts which do mention the revolt and ensuing war, Zonaras and Eutropius provide the most detail:


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Dr Gareth Sampson holds a Phd in Ancient History from Manchester University and now lectures on Roman history. His previous books were the _Defeat of Rome_ (2008), _The Crisis of Rome: Marius and the Jugurthine and Northern Wars_ (2011), _The Collapse of Rome_ (2013) and _The Eagle Spreads Her Wings: Roman Expansion Between the Punic Wars_ (2016), all published by Pen & Sword.


Description of English soldiers in Italy by Filippo Villani

They were all young and for the most part born and raised during the long wars between the French and English – therefore hot and impetuous, used to slaughter and to loot, quick with weapons, careless of safety. In the ranks they were quick and obedient to their superiors yet in camp, by reason of their unrestrained dash and boldness, they lay scattered about in disorderly and incautious fashion so that a courageous enemy might easily harm and shame them.

Their armor was almost uniformly a cuirass and a steel breastplate, iron arm-pieces, thigh- and leg-pieces they carried stout daggers and swords all had tilting lances which they dismounted to use each had one or two pages, and some had more. When they take off their armor, the pages presently set to polishing, so that when they appear in battle their arms seem like mirrors, and they so much more terrible.

Others of them were archers, and their bows were long and of yew they were quick and dexterous archers, and made good use of the bow. Their mode of fighting in the field was almost always afoot, as they assigned their horses to their pages. Keeping themselves in almost circular formation, every two take a lance, carrying it in a manner in which one waits for a boar with a boar-spear. So bound and compact, with lowered lances they marched with slow steps towards the enemy, making a terrible outcry – and their ranks can hardly be pried apart.

It appears by experience that they are more fitted to ride by night and steal than to keep to the field: they succeed rather by the cowardice of our people than because of their own valor. They had ingenious ladders, one piece fitting into the next as in a [slide] trumpet, the largest piece three steps long, with which they could climb the highest tower. And they were the first to bring into Italy the fashion of forming cavalry in lances [of three men each] instead of in the old system of helmets (barbute) or flags (a bandiere).

This section is from The English Traveler to Italy, by George R. Parks (Stanford, 1954)


Rome Spreads Her Wings - Territorial Expansion between the Punic Wars, Gareth C. Sampson - History

Dr Gareth Sampson holds a Phd in Ancient History from Manchester University and now lectures on Roman history. His previous books were the _Defeat of Rome_ (2008), _The Crisis of Rome: Marius and the Jugurthine and Northern Wars_ (2011), _The Collapse of Rome_ (2013) and _The Eagle Spreads Her Wings: Roman Expansion Between the Punic Wars_ (2016), all published by Pen & Sword.

Reviews for Rome, Blood and Politics: Reform, Murder and Popular Politics in the Late Republic

Murder and mayhem in the waning years of the Roman Republic what more could you ask for in a book? This is a tour de force of the public and private machinations of the different characters in this time period of the Roman Republic. I find this book to be not only an enjoyable read, but also indispensable as a handy reference of the time period that it shows. I can easily recommend Dr. Sampson's book to anyone who has an interest in not only the workings of the Roman Republic, but also the time period. -- A Wargamers Needful Things


Vaata videot: Enchanting Abandoned 17th-Century Chateau in France Entirely frozen in time for 26 years (Mai 2022).


Kommentaarid:

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  2. Shen

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  3. Shakora

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  4. Sajinn

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  5. Daoud

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  6. Terry

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  7. Kazikinos

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