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Charles Evans Hughes

Charles Evans Hughes

USA peakohtunik Lisaks peakohtuniku ametikohale aastatel 1930–1941 oli ta New Yorgi kuberner (1907–1910), ülemkohtu kohtunik (1910–1916), vabariiklaste presidendikandidaat (1916), riigisekretär (1921– 1925) ja Maailma Kohtu kohtunik (1928–1930). Tema tõus avalikku ellu oli suuresti tingitud tema intelligentsusest, kohusetundest, töövõimest ja iseseisvusest.

Enneaegne laps õppis Hughes lugema kolme ja poole aastaselt. Enne kuueaastaseks saamist luges ja luges ta salme Uuest Testamendist, tegi vaimset aritmeetikat ning õppis prantsuse ja saksa keelt. Pärast vaid kolm ja pool aastat ametlikku kooliteed lõpetas ta keskkooli 13 -aastaselt. Pärast Phi Beta Kappa lõpetamist Browni ülikoolist läks Hughes Columbia õigusteaduskonda, kus ta oli oma klassi esimene. Kui ta 1884. aastal New Yorgi advokatuuri eksami sooritas, sai ta seni kõrgeima hinde, 99 1/2 protsenti. Tal oli fotograafiline mälu ja ta suutis lühidalt lugeda lõigu, õhtul traktaadi. Need võimed tegid Hughesest baaris hirmsa vastase-ta praktiseeris peaaegu kolmkümmend aastat juristi-ja aitas kaasa tema edule poliitiku, kohtuniku ja läbirääkijana.

Hughesile tähendas kohustus väärt asjade tegemist ja nende head tegemist. Ta sõitis ennast halastamatult. Tema kohusetunne viis ta avalikku teenistusse ja võimaldas tal silma paista peaaegu kõigis ettevõtmistes. Hughesil polnud isiklikke ega poliitilisi nõunikke, lemmikuid ega usaldusisikuid. Herbert Hoover ütles kord, et ta on kõige iseseisvam mees, keda ta kunagi tundnud on. Ta tegi oma otsused oma analüüside põhjal. Tööl oli ta organiseeritud, intensiivne ja tõsine ning tal oli vähe aega meeldivateks asjadeks. See pool temast tekitas eemalehoidva, laheda ja humoorika avaliku kuvandi. Kodus näitas ta aga soojust ja huumorit; ta oli tundlik abikaasa ja hoolitsev kolme lapse isa.

Hughes jõudis presidendiks valimise lähedale 1916. aastal. Californias vähem kui nelja tuhande hääle nihe oleks andnud talle selle osariigi valijate hääled ja presidendi koha. Kui Hughes poleks nii karmi avalikku kuvandit projitseerinud (või oleks ta taganud kuberner Hiram W. Johnsoni toetuse), oleks ta tõenäoliselt valitud.

Hardingi ja Coolidge'i administratsiooni riigisekretärina pidas Hughes Saksamaaga eraldi rahulepingu läbirääkimisi, kui senat ei suutnud Versailles 'lepingut ratifitseerida. Samuti juhtis ta aastatel 1921–1922 Washingtoni desarmeerimiskonverentsi, toetas USA osalemist maailma kohtus ja hoidis ära Ameerika tunnustamise Nõukogude Liidule. Kuigi ta teenis kahte presidenti, kes tegid poliitilise kapitali, lükates tagasi Woodrow Wilsoni nägemuse rahvusvahelisusest, juhtis ta välispoliitikat, mis tunnustas Ameerika Ühendriikide rahvusvahelisi kohustusi. Ladina -Ameerikas otsis ta vahendeid USA sekkumise vähendamiseks, kaitstes samal ajal traditsioonilist arusaama rahvuslikest huvidest. Euroopas kinnitas ta Ameerika Ühendriikide konstruktiivset rolli, vältides samas ametlikke kohustusi, mis oleksid kaasa toonud Kongressi või erutanud avalikku arvamust.

Peakohtunikuna juhtis Hughes ülemkohtu ühel selle raskematel perioodidel. Ta juhtis seda, kuidas kohus muutis oma põhirolli omandiõiguste kaitsjast kodanikuvabaduste kaitsjaks, kirjutades selle perioodi olulised arvamused sõna- ja ajakirjandusvabaduse kohta-Near v. Minnesota, Stromberg vs California ja DeJonge vs Oregon. Samuti astus ta edukalt vastu president Franklin D. Roosevelti plaanile riigikohus 1937. aastal pakkida.

Lugeja kaaslane Ameerika ajaloos. Toimetajad Eric Foner ja John A. Garraty. Autoriõigus © 1991 Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company. Kõik õigused kaitstud.


Charles Evans Hughes

Meie toimetajad vaatavad teie esitatud teabe üle ja otsustavad, kas artiklit muuta.

Charles Evans Hughes, (sündinud 11. aprillil 1862, Glens Falls, New York, USA - surnud 27. augustil 1948, Osterville, Massachusetts), õigusteadlane ja riigimees, kes oli USA ülemkohtu kaaskohtunik (1910–16), USA riigisekretär (1921–25) ja Ameerika Ühendriikide 11. peakohtunik (1930–41). Peakohtunikuna juhtis ta ülemkohtu läbi suure vaidluse, mis tekkis president Franklin D. Roosevelti New Deal'i seadusandluse üle.


Dan Ernst: Charles Evans Hughesi lugupidamine kohtute vastu kogu elu

Kuna arutelu Franklin D. Roosevelti kohtupakkimise plaani üle käis seitsekümmend viis aastat tagasi, tegid presidendi pressiesindajad poliitilise heina, tsiteerides kõnet, mille peakohtunik Charles Evans Hughes oli aastaid varem New Yorgi kubernerina pidanud. "Meil on põhiseadus," ütles Hughes Elmira teatrisse pakitud 2000 -kohalisele publikule, "kuid põhiseadus on see, mida kohtunikud ütlevad."

Ignoreerige algset konteksti, nagu tegid FDR -i pressiesindajad, ja tsitaat sobis kergesti nende argumendiga plaani kasuks. Kohtunikud ei leidnud ega kuulutanud välja olemasolevat põhiseadust, mille nad tegid. Hughes Courti väljateenitud kohtunikud kasutasid omi tehes möödunud ajastu väärtusi. Ameerikat teeniksid paremini kohtunikud, kelle väärtused pärinesid tänapäeval.

Kui pressiesindajad oleksid soovinud võtta punkte mitte presidendi peamise kohtuliku vastase mõõtu, vaid koguda punkte, oleksid nad paremini teinud tsitaadi konteksti. Hughes üritas toetada 1907. aasta kommunaalteenuste komisjoni seadust, mis on regulatsiooni ajaloo maamärk. Ettevõte oli seadusele vastu, kui see ei andnud neile õigust komisjoni otsuseid kohtusüsteemile kaebuses uuesti proovida. Hughes nõudis vähem pealetükkivat kohtulikku kontrolli:

Hughes pooldas haldusasutuste korralduste läbivaatamisel juriidilist piirangut, mitte seadusandlust, mõtlesin eelmisel nädalavahetusel tema peenest arusaamast kohtuvõimust ja õiguspärasusest, kui ma James F. Simoni raamatut lugesin. FDR ja ülemkohtunik Hughes (Simon & amp; Schuster, 2012). Simoni raamat, millest täna pärastlõunal New Yorgi õigusteaduskonnas sümpoosion toimub, vaheldub FDR ja Hughes vahel. Vähemalt minu jaoks on Simoni Hughesi käsitlus veenvam, sest ta näitab, et õigusteadlane pole kunagi ette näinud ustavust kohtusüsteemile, mida ta Elmira juures kinnitas. Kui järsult lõhestunud ülemkohus ja Roosevelti kohtupakkimisplaan seadsid ohtu „kohtusüsteemi sõltumatuse ja lugupidamise”, hoolitses Hughes, et tema ideaal kohtusüsteemist kui mõistuse hoidlast jääb ellu. Ta säilitas selle ideaali - ja nagu me võiksime täna öelda - "võitis", järgides oma nõuandeid: ta võttis oma kohtu välja "küsimustest, mis on avaliku kannatamatuse lähedal", tehes otsuseid, mis toetasid vastuolulisi õigusakte põhiseadusest.

Senati käsitlus Hughesi esimeheks nimetamisest 1930. aastal oli ootamatult verevalum, mitte midagi sarnast tunnustust, mida Hughes nautis, kui ta 1910. aastal esmakordselt ülemkohtusse nimetati. Progressiivsed vabariiklased ja demokraadid pahandasid teda selle eest, et ta lahkus kohtust 1916. aastal presidendiks kandideerima. George Norris Nebraskast taunis Hughesi kliente, „peaaegu ütlematu rikkusega ettevõtteid”. Kuid kohtunik Louis D. Brandeis, progressiivne tribüün, oli õnnelik, et sai ta oma pealikuks. Brandeis ütles Felix Frankfurterile mõnda aega, et Hughesi eelkäija William Howard Taft "oli õukonnast tõesti haarde kaotanud". Kaaskohtunikud Willis "V [an] D [evanter] ja Pierce Butler juhtisid teda." Hughes seevastu juhtis korraga kohus nõutavat juhtimist. Kuigi Hughesi „tugev tunne kohtu maine vastu” ajendas teda eristama pretsedente, mille Brandeis soovis tühistada, viis see ka ülemkohtu esimehe „paremale tiivale”. "Tegelikult," teatas Brandeis Frankfurterile, "Butleri ja mõnede saba suled on täielikult kitkutud."

Peagi kasvasid nad tagasi. Kuna majanduse halvenemine ajendas osariike ja föderaalvalitsusi võtma vastu uusi õigusakte, püüdis Hughes hoida kohtu lahutamatute ja liberaalsete tiibade vahelist lahknevust ohtu tema kohtu autoriteedist. Simon arvab, et Hughesel õnnestus see suuresti kuni aastani 1936. Kindlasti tekitasid tema arvamused, mis toetasid Kongressi resolutsiooni, mis takistasid võlausaldajatel oma võlgade kulda sissenõudmist, kutsunud justiits James McReynoldsi hüüdma pingilt: „See on Nero halvimal juhul. Põhiseadus on kadunud. ” Sellegipoolest ühendas Hughes oma kohtu oma arvamuse taga, mis lükkas ümber saja päeva seadusandliku maamärgi - riikliku tööstuse taastamise seaduse. Simons väidab, et alles 1936. aastal kaotas Hughes kontrolli oma õukonna üle. Otsustades New Deali peamise põllumajandusprogrammi ja New Yorgi naiste miinimumpalga seaduse saatust, lükkas kohtunik Owen Roberts tagasi kompromissid, mida Hughes tegi, ja ühinesid konservatiivide Butleri, McReynoldsi, Sutherlandi ja Van Devanteriga.

1920. aastatel erapraktikuna peetud loengutes karistas Hughes XIX sajandi ülemkohtu kolme "enda tekitatud haava" eest. Dred Scott, Legal Tender Cases ja Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan & amp Trust (millega kaotati föderaalne tulumaks). Kuna ametiaeg lõppes 1936. aasta juunis, usub Simon, et Hughes oli meeleheitel, et ta ei suutnud hoida konservatiivset enamust „õukonna prestiižile” uusi haavu tekitamast. Kogu oma karjääri jooksul oli Hughes püüdnud vabastada seadused ja valitsuse „poliitika saastatustest ja intriigidest”, nüüd vallandas ta FDR -i üks korrespondentidest „midagi enamat kui„ jaoskonnapoliitik ””.

Simon arvab, et 1936. aasta suvel Robertsi Pennsylvania farmi ühe visiidi ajal kutsus Hughes oma võõrustajat konservatiividest loobuma. Kui jah, siis tegutses ta kohtut kaitses juba enne FDR-i maalihe tagasivalimist novembris 1936 või FDR-i avalikustamist kohtupakkumise plaanis veebruaris 1937. Enne selle pommiplahvatuse plahvatust oli Roberts juba nõustunud, hääletades koos Hughesi ja liberaalidega. Washingtoni osariigi naiste miinimumpalga seaduse alusel jätkas ta koos nendega hääletamist riiklike töösuhete seaduse ja sotsiaalkindlustusseaduse osas. Kui haldusametnikud selgitasid kohtumõistmise vältimatult poliitilist iseloomu ja Roosevelt karistas ülemkohtu kui kohutavat hobust, kes teiste valitsusharudega kokku ei tõmba, säilitas Hughes kohtuliku rahu. Kui ühiskond soovib, et teda juhiksid „mõistuse protsessid”, kuulutas ta Ameerika Õigusinstituudi ees, „peab ta säilitama neid protsesse kehastavad institutsioonid”.

Kui ametiaeg lõppes, arvas Felix Frankfurter, et Hughesit tuleks tema „poliitiliste saltode” pärast hukka mõista, ta sai ühe enkomiumi teise järel. Vaatemäng „sünteetiline halo. . . mind paneb poliitiliselt kõige kalkuleerivamate meeste pea peale, ”kirjutas ta Stone. . . „Puke.” ”Kuid pärast tema kohtusse nimetamist jaanuaris 1939 isegi Frankfurter kiidaks Hughesi juhtimist vendade üle.

Simon lõpetab Hughesi käsitlemise järgmise tunnustusega:

Eile teatasid ajakirjanikud Robert Barnes ja Scott Clemens a Washington Post ABC Newsi küsitlus, mille kohaselt pool Ameerika avalikkust eeldab, et ülemkohtu kohtunikud otsustavad patsiendi kaitse ja taskukohase hoolduse seaduse väljakutsed peamiselt nende "erapooletu poliitilise vaate" alusel. Charles Evans Hughes lõpetas oma kohtu otsustava ja nutika juhtimisega sarnase ohu kohtusüsteemi legitiimsusele. Kas ülemkohtunik, kes on veetnud ka tööelu, „tingituna kohtute austamisest”, teeb seda täna?


Charles Evans Hughes ja põhiseaduslikud sõjajõud

Matthew Waxman, Liviu Librescu õigusteaduse professor ja Hertogi õiguse ja riikliku julgeoleku programmi esimees, oli juba ammu teadnud, et selle fraasi mõtles välja hiilgav juriidiline vaim Charles Evans Hughes, kes oli teeninud kaks eraldi ekskursiooni. USA ülemkohus. Kuid umbes neli aastat tagasi hakkas Waxman mõtlema selle täpse konteksti üle, milles see tekkis.

Hughes oli 1910. aastast kuni 1916. aastani, kui ta astus tagasi presidendiks kandideerima, olnud justiitspartner ja oli seejärel 1930. – 1941. Aastal taas peakohtunik, astudes tagasi kuus kuud enne Pearl Harborit. Waxmanit huvitas see, miks Hughes (1884. aasta klass) oli sõjajõudude poole pöördunud, kui Hughes ei istunud kunagi õukonnas, kui riigis oli sõda.

See küsimus viis lõpuks Waxmani põneva uurimustööni, mis avaldati 79-leheküljelisena Columbia õiguse ülevaade artikkel pealkirjaga "Jõud edukalt sõda pidada".

Selgub, et Hughes ei kirjutanud sõnu kummagi ülemkohtu ametiaja jooksul. Samuti ei kirjutanud ta neid sulepeale Haagi alalise rahvusvahelise kohtu kohtunikuna (1928–1930). Samuti ajal, mil ta töötas New Yorgi kubernerina (1907–1910) või USA riigisekretärina (1921–1925).

Pigem kirjutas ta selle fraasi eraisikuna. Need sõnad - koos mitmete teiste talismanlike fraasidega, mis on üldjuhul antud ülemkohtu avaldustele - olid tegelikult osa pöördumisest, mille Hughes pidas Ameerika Advokatuuri konverentsil 5. septembri õhtul New Yorgis Saratoga Springsis.

Kõne ajendasid põhiseaduslikud arutelud riikliku eelnõu üle ja muud küsimused, mis on nüüd mõnevõrra „anakronistlikud”, märgib Waxman. Siiski, nagu Waxmani uurimusest selgub, on Hughesi lähenemine põhiseadusliku sõjajõu küsimuste lahendamisele endiselt valgustav ja asjakohane isegi ajal, mil USA võitleb sõdadega kodakondsuseta terrorismi vastu.

Avastus arhiivides

Kui Waxman Hughesi kõnesse süvenes, saatis ta lõpuks oma õpilasuurija Ian MacDougalli ’14 Columbia haruldaste raamatute ja käsikirjade raamatukokku, millele Hughes oli oma arhiivi annetanud. Seal leidis MacDougall paksu faili nimega “Sõda”, mis oli täidetud uurimistööga, mille Hughes oli kõne jaoks teinud ja kritseldanud oma käsitsi kirjutatud märkmetega.

"Need failid olid suurepärane arheoloogiline tööriist, et uurida, mis Hughesi meelest tegelikult toimus," ütleb Waxman. "Ta tahtis, et see oleks mõjuv kõne. Ta tahtis, et sellel oleks püsiv jõud. Mis tal on. ”

Selle kõne taust oli ebatavaline. Eelmise aasta novembris oli vabariiklaste kandidaat Hughes kaotanud presidendivalimised senisele Woodrow Wilsonile. "Valimisõhtul," ütleb Waxman, "Hughes läks tegelikult magama, kui tema nõunikud ütlesid talle, et ta võitis."

Kuid toona kulus häälte lugemiseks mitu päeva, jätkab ta. "Hughes kaotas California vähem kui 4000 häälega ja see muutis valimiskolledži Wilsoni kasuks."

Pärast seda, kui kongress 1917. aasta aprillis sõja kuulutas, kirjutas president Wilson seadusele alla valikteenistuse seaduse, millega loodi kohustuslik eelnõu, samuti teatavad sõjaaja majandust reguleerivad õigusaktid. Kuigi selliste meetmete põhiseaduspärasust peetakse tänapäeval iseenesestmõistetavaks, selgitab Waxman, et sel ajal peeti neid radikaalseks ja nende kehtivust vaidlustati tuliselt. (See oli enne uut kokkulepet, kui ülemkohus laiendas kaubandusklausli tõlgendust, andes kongressile majanduse reguleerimise suhtes palju vabamad käed.)

Tähtis kõne

Hughes asus oma ABA kõnes jõuliselt põhiseaduslikku kaitset vastaspoole presidendi vastuolulistele tegevustele. Lisaks ütleb Waxman: „Mul on tõesti raske mõelda kedagi tänapäeval võiks rääkida sama poliitilise, juriidilise ja intellektuaalse autoriteediga, mis tal oli 1917. aastal. ”

Päev pärast kõnet trumbati Hughesi seisukohad esilehel The New York Times artiklis, mis kajastas ka aadressi enda pikki osi. Varsti pärast seda avaldas ABA oma aastaaruandes kogu kõne koos joonealuste märkustega 18-leheküljelise artiklina. Hughesi kõne kanti ka kongressi protokolli.

Pöördumises väitis Hughes, et põhiseaduse osi võiks sõjaajal leebemalt lugeda ja seda tuli lugeda. Teisest küljest taanduksid valitsuse laienemisvolitused normaalseks, kui sõda lõppes.

“Meie oma on a võitlus Põhiseadus, "väitis ta teises sageli viidatud lõigus ja see" marsib ", mis tähendab, et see peab muutuvate vajaduste rahuldamiseks arenema. Hughes põhjendas, et Kongressi laiaulatuslikud sõjaaja volitused olid kaudsed põhiseaduse „Vajalik ja õige klausel”, mis andis Kongressile volituse „teha kõik seadused, mis on vajalikud ja sobivad täitmiseks ... kõik muud põhiseadusega antud volitused”.

Waxman selgitab, et sel ajal juhtis Hughes keskteed nende vahel, kes nõudsid, et põhiseadus kehtestaks valitsusvõimudele paindumatu kitsasjope, ja nende vahel, kes väitsid, et sõjaaja hädaolukordades see lihtsalt enam ei kehti.

Miks sõnad elavad

Hiljem, kui Hughes sai peakohtunikuks, lisas ta oma kõnest teatud read, sealhulgas „võimu edukalt sõda pidada” 1934. aasta määruse teksti, mille ta avaldas rahuajal - sellesse, milles ta võrdles hädaolukord, mille suur depressioon esitas sõja ohvritele.

Lõpuks, 1948. aastal - kaks kuud pärast Hughesi surma - kohtunik Harold Burton sõjaajal sõlmitud lepingus Lichter versus Ameerika Ühendriigid, tsiteeris oma otsuses Hughesi ABA kõne pikki lõike.

"Ma pole kunagi näinud teist alusdokumenti, rääkimata eraisiku kirjutatud teosest, mida ülemkohtu arvamuses nii pikalt tsiteeritakse," märgib Waxman. "See on peaaegu nii, nagu [Burton] prooviks lugeda Hughesi kõnet ametlikult ülemkohtu protokolli, andes sellele pretsedendi."

Lisaks märgib ta, et Hughes oli ette kujutanud, et sõjajõudude laiaulatuslikud kontuurid naasevad oma rahu taastamisel kohe oma tavapärastesse mõõtmetesse. Praktikas on seda aga harva ette tulnud. On leitud, et riiklikud julgeolekuohud püsivad pärast vaherahu sõlmimist ja ähvardavad enne sõjategevuse puhkemist. Tänapäeval on pideva terroriohu ees piir rahuaja ja sõjaaja vahel hägustunud kui kunagi varem.

Kuid Waxmani sõnul on pöördumise kesksed väited, et meil on „võitluslik põhiseadus”, mis annab paindlikkuse, mis on vajalik „edukaks sõjapidamiseks”, - kehtivad ja ajatud. "Meie põhiseadus kasvas välja revolutsioonilise sõja kogemusest," ütleb ta. "Seda raamisid suured Ameerika teoreetikud, kes teadsid, et demokraatliku vabariigi pikaajaline elujõulisus sõltub selle tõhususest sõjas."

Lugege Matthew Waxmani Columbia seaduse ülevaadet artikkel "Jõudu edukalt sõda pidada".


Walesi ajalookuu: mees, kellest sai peaaegu president. ja Walesi Ameerika jaoks erakordne aasta

Austusavaldused Denis Healeyle pärast tema hiljutist surma on teda aeg -ajalt nimetanud parimaks peaministriks, keda meil kunagi pole olnud.

Charles Evans Hughes, teise põlvkonna kõmri päritolu ameeriklane, kelle juured on Lõuna -Walesi orgudes ja oskab kõmri keelt, võib õigustatult kanda Ameerika parimate presidentide hulka.

Paljud neist, kes teda tundsid ja temaga koostööd tegid, uskusid, et ta oleks olnud vähemalt Valge Maja läänetiiva suurepärane elanik.

Võimas kehaehitus ning suurepärane vaimne ja füüsiline energia

Tegelikult sai Hughes peaaegu presidendiks aastal 1916. Sama aasta juunis võeti ta 54 -aastaselt vabariiklaste kandidaadiks võitlema demokraatliku presidendi Woodrow Wilsoni vastu, kes taotles teist ametiaega. Hughesi kandidatuur näitab, et selleks ajaks oli ta juba oma riiki oluliselt mõjutanud.

Alates ajast, mil ta hakkas kahekümnenda sajandi esimesel kümnendil Ameerikas riiklikku tähtsust saavutama, oli Hughes suure huvi ja austuse keskmes.

Nii ajakirjanikke kui ka avalikkust paelusid kõmri-ameerika ajakirja Cambrian sõnad tema „võimsa kehaehituse ning suure vaimse ja füüsilise energiaga“ ning mitte vähem tähtsana tema habemega. Pole üllatav, et võib -olla oli ta rahvasuus tuntud kui “Vurrud”.

Ajakirjandus ja karikaturistid armastasid Hughesi habet väga, muutes selle “rahvuslikuks maamärgiks”. See Walesi mõju kvootilisem näide elab edasi.

USA ülemkohus näitab praegu näitust pealkirjaga „Kujutise jõud: Charles Evans Hughes trükistes, fotodes ja joonistustes”.

Hughesil oli ka tohutuid kingitusi, mis võimaldasid tal olla suurepärane advokaat ja jurist. Tema intellektuaalsete võimete teravus oli legendaarne, nagu ka tema fotomälu, suurepärane detailide juhtimine, otsustusvõime sõltumatus, ausus ja rikkumatus.

Aastal 1916 uskus tema partei, et tema võimekus ja ausus meeldivad Ameerika valijatele väga tugevalt. „Intellektuaalses ja moraalses jõus seisis Hughes pea ja õlad kõrgemal ajast aega teeninud poliitikutest, kes oleksid võinud kandideerida“, kirjutas Dexter Perkins oma 1956. aasta raamatus „Charles Evans Hughes and American Democratic Statesmanship“.

Hughes oli saavutanud sellise väljapaistvuse loomuliku võime ja tohutu töövõime tugeva kombinatsiooni kaudu. Ta sündis 11. aprillil 1862 New Yorgis Glens Fallsis, kus tema isa David Charles Evans oli baptistist ja ema õpetaja.

Noor Charles Evans Hughes alustas õiguskarjääri

David oli pärit Tredegarist ja oli enne 1850ndatel Ameerikasse emigreerumist olnud seal ja mujal orgude tippude juures usuminister ning Merthyr Tydfilis trükikoda.

Noor Charles Evans Hughes alustas juristikarjääri ja lubati advokatuuri 1884. aastal.

Aastatel 1884–1906 tegi ta väljapaistvat karjääri juristina ja asutas 1888. aastal advokaadibüroo Hughes Hubbard, mis tegutseb tänapäevalgi Ameerika ühe parima advokaadibüroona. Ta oli 1890ndate keskel lühikest aega ka Cornelli ülikooli õigusteaduse professor.

Hughesi kasvav tähtsus ja tuntus vabariiklaste parteis suurenes oluliselt aastatel 1905 ja 1906, kui ta tegutses väga edukalt New Yorgi osariigi valitsuse vandeadvokaadina nende jõupingutustes kõrvaldada kuritarvitused osariigi gaasi- ja kindlustustegevuses.

Järgmisel aastal valiti ta suure häälteenamusega New Yorgi kuberneriks, alistades demokraatide kandidaadi, pressimagnaadi William Randolph Hearsti (St Donati lossi omanik 1920. ja 1930. aastatel). Hughes oli kubernerina kaks ametiaega.

Poliitikas oli Hughes tolleaegse termini kasutamisel vabariiklik või progressiivne.

Ta oli üks paljudest kahekümnenda sajandi algusaastatel reformiplatvormidel valitud osariikide kuberneridest, kes püüdsid reguleerimata suurettevõtete näol kontrollida kapitalismi liialdusi ning kõrvaldada korruptsioon tööstuses ja poliitikas.

Tema valimine kuberneriks on seega oluline element progressivismi ajaloos ja varanduses.

Hughes oli suhteliselt edukas kuberner. Aastal 1910 võttis ta vastu kutse asuda ülemkohtu kaaskohtunikuks.

Siit algas pikk ja silmapaistev juristi karjäär, mis kestis kahel eraldi perioodil, mis tagas tema staatuse ühe kõrgeima ja tähtsaima tegelasena USA ülemkohtu ajaloos.

Kuus aastat hiljem pidi ta kohtust tagasi astuma, sest kandideeris presidendiks.

Vurri pekstud

1916. aasta valimised tekitasid kogu maailmas suurt huvi, sest USA polnud tol ajal Esimesse maailmasõda astunud. Eelseisvad valimised suurendasid spekulatsioone selle üle, kas USA liitub lõpuks liitlastega, kuigi mõlemad kaks peamist kandidaati olid kasutusele võtnud sõjavastased platvormid.

See, et Hughes oli Walesi baptistist ministri poeg, tekitas arusaadavalt elevust Walesis ja Walesi ameeriklaste seas. Isegi Western Maili tuntud karikaturist
J M Staniforth osales. Iseloomulikult vaimukas ja terava multifilmiga, mis ilmus valimispäeval, 7. novembril, soovitati ameeriklastel tungivalt valida „uus kaubamärk” (Hughes), sest „see pärineb Walesist”.

Kui Hughes oleks võitnud, oleks ta saanud valmis märkimisväärse Walesi kolmiku maailma juhtidest, kes olid samal ajal saavutanud oma riigi kõrgeima ametikoha. See oli aeg, mil Billy Hughes ja David Lloyd George olid Austraalia ja Suurbritannia peaministrid.

Valimisööl 1916 läksid paljud ameeriklased magama, uskudes, et Hughes on võitnud. Järgmisel hommikul teatasid vähemalt kaks New Yorgi ajalehte Herald ja Tribune ning (London) Times, et ta oli võidukas. Kuid selleks ajaks, kui paar päeva hiljem olid lõplikud tulemused, oli selge, et Ameerika hääletav avalikkus on läinud „vana kaubamärgiga”, valides Wilsoni väga väikese vahega. Hughes sai lüüa 277 valimiskogu häälega 254 vastu. Ta oli ilma jäänud, “juuksekarva võrra”, nagu mitmed tolleaegsed kommentaatorid ütlesid. (Võib -olla oleks tema kuulsat karvavõitu arvestades sobinud paremini "vurr".)

Western Mail kirjeldas teda kui meest, kes sai peaaegu presidendiks

Sellest ajast peale pidi Hughesit mäletama eelkõige mehena, kellest sai peaaegu USA president. Täpselt nii kirjeldas teda Lääne Mail, teatades tema surmast augustis 1948.

Kuid Hughes avaldas oma 86-aastase eluea jooksul Ameerikale rohkem mõju kui see. Ütluskõne talle New York Timesis väitis, et pärast kaotust kolmkümmend kaks aastat varem „oleks ta võinud avalikust elust taanduda, olles kindel Ameerika ajaloo austatud nišis”. Selle asemel jätkus see: „Järgmise rahutu 25 aasta jooksul vastas ta kutsele pärast üleskutset täiendavale teenistusele, mis kinnitas, et ta on üks oma aja suurimaid ameeriklasi”.

Hughes jäi Ameerika elu esirinnas. Ta oli väga lugupeetud riigisekretär, üks neljast kõige olulisemast ametikohast presidendikabinetides, kaks ametiaega ajavahemikus 1921–1925. 1930. aastal naasis ta ülemkohtunikuna ülemkohtunikuna. Selles ametis kindlustas ta Mark Drakefordi sõnadega „oma põlvkonna väljapaistvaima juristi maine, kelle meisterlikkus on kohtu ajaloos võrreldamatu”.

Walesi Ameerika jaoks erakordne aasta

Hughesi pikk ja erakordne karjäär väärib selles sarjas artiklit selle kohta, mida Wales on maailma heaks teinud. Kuid selleks, et rõhutada ja sümboliseerida seda, mida Walesi emigrandid ja nende järeltulijad on Ameerika heaks teinud, tasub meeles pidada, et Hughes oli üks paljudest Walesi ameeriklastest, kes saavutasid 1930. aastatel Ameerika elus olulise tähtsuse. Nende mõju keskendus eriti teravalt ühe aasta jooksul, 1937. aastal.

See aasta oli Hughesi jaoks paljuski eluaegne kõrgete saavutuste tipp. (Võib -olla oleks ta mõistnud metafoori oma noorematel päevadel, kui ta oli innukas jalutaja ja mägironija, kes külastas sageli Šveitsi Alpe.)

1937. aasta esimesel poolel, nn ülemkohtu vaidluses ehk „põhiseaduskriisis”, nägi ta välja seda, mida enamik ajaloolasi peab praegu president Franklin D Roosevelti ekslikuks plaaniks „pakkida” kohus kohtunikega, kes oleksid soodsamad. oma reformiva New Deal programmi.

Ülemkohtus domineerisid 1930. aastatel kaks waleslast

Kohus kuulutas põhiseadusega vastuolus olevaks mõned õigusaktid, mille Roosevelt oli kehtestanud, et leevendada massilist tööpuudust ning laialdast vaesust ja stressi, mille põhjustas 1930. aastate majandussurutis. See oli Roosevelti suurim lüüasaamine tema 12 presidendiaasta jooksul.

Hiljutises artiklis Click on Wales avaldab Mark Drakeford loo „kõigi aegade suurimast tülist presidendi ja ülemkohtu vahel” ning on meile meelde tuletanud, et Hughes polnud ainus waleslane. Tema lähim liitlane selles tohutult olulises põhiseaduskriisis oli teine ​​ülemkohtu kohtunik Owen J. Roberts.

Teates Robertsi surmast mais 1955, vaatas Western Mail tagasi 1930. aastatesse kui aega, mil ülemkohtus domineerisid kaks waleslast.

"Terve 1937. aasta," kirjutab Drakeford, "USA põhiseadus oli see, mida need kaks kõmrilast ütlesid."

Võitlev kõmrilane

Kaaskohtunik Owen Josephus Roberts oli sageli tuntud kui “võitlev Walesi mees”. Nagu Hughes, oli ta määratud ülemkohtusse 1930. aastal. Ta sündis Germantownis, Philadelphias, 2. mail 1875. Tema vanaisa William Owen Roberts emigreerus 1808. aastal Llanbedrogi piirkonnast Pennsylvaniasse.

Kolmanda põlvkonna Walesi ameeriklane Roberts oli alati uhke oma Walesi päritolu üle ning tundis suurt huvi Walesi ja Walesi põhjuste vastu Ameerikas. Ta nimetas oma talu Phoenixville'is Pennsylvanias “Bryn Coed”.

Ta oli tuntud oma kodu avamise eest kõmri inimestele ja selle eest, et ta oli alati valmis ja helde võõrustaja.

Roberts oli ülemkohtu kohtunik kuni 1945. aastani ja oli Ameerika Filosoofia Seltsi president 1952. aastal. Kena ja väärika välimusega 1935. ja 1936. aastal räägiti temast laialdaselt vabariiklaste kandidaadina võitlema Rooseveltiga 1936. aasta presidendivalimistel, kuid teda peeti riigikohtus kasulikumaks.

Kõige vihatum mees Ameerikas

Veel üks Walesi emigrantide poeg, kes oli ka Ameerikas - ja palju kaugemal - 1937. aastal massiliselt uudistes, kuid erinevatel põhjustel, oli John Llewellyn Lewis. Ta on Ameerika ajaloo üks tähtsamaid tööjõuliidreid ja ilmsem näide kõmri panusest Ameerika töölisliikumisse. Tema elu on ka Ameerika kaltsukate lugu.

Alandlikust päritolust tõusis ta, et saavutada mitte ainult jumaldamist, kuulsust ja tuntust, vaid ka rikkust, võimu ja mõju. Paljud tema kaasaegsed ja ajaloolased on pidanud teda kahekümnenda sajandi keskmistel kümnenditel USA üheks võimsamaks inimeseks.

Lewisest ja tema karjäärist, saavutustest ja pärandist, nii positiivsest kui ka negatiivsest, on palju kirjutatud. Ta oli keeruline, karismaatiline, isegi vastuoluline tegelane. Nagu Charles Evans Hughes, oli Lewise füüsiline kohalolek lõputute kommentaaride allikas. Üks vaatleja kirjeldas teda 1936. aastal kui "võib-olla kõige värvikamat isiksust Ameerika asjades tänapäeval" ja kui "tohutut meest, mustade juuste šokiga, põõsaste kulmude, rusikatega nagu singid- mida ta on sageli kasutanud hecklerite puhul ja" ei. kaup ”.

Lewis kasvas üles kõmri keelt kõnelevas kultuurikeskkonnas

Lewis sündis Iowas Lucase maakonnas 1880. aastal. Tema vanemad olid Walesi emigrandid, isa kaevur ja talutööline. Lewis grew up in a Welsh-speaking cultural milieu seeped in the mining and union traditions his family brought over from Wales but it’s not clear to what extent these remained an influence on him. He seems not to have made much of his Welshness but he was certainly aware of his roots, as his frequent visits to Wales show. Occasionally he expressed pride in his Welsh heritage. Some contemporaries even associated his fighting spirit and championing of labour as proof that he was “a chip off the old Cymric block.”

In the late 1890s and early 1900s Lewis worked in local coal mines in Lucas and in mining and construction in the Western states. In 1908 he and his family moved to the new mining town of Panama, in south-central Illinois. Lewis had already gained minor office with the United Mine Workers of America in 1901, and at Panama he began a career in unionism.

From 1911 onwards, Lewis’ rise was rapid, culminating in his becoming President of the UMWA in 1920. He held that office for the next 40 years, eventually retiring from the UMWA in 1960. He died nine years later having spent the last years of his life in relative obscurity.

Moving labour from the fringe of the economy to its core

The UMWA struggled in the 1920s and early 1930s. During the savage depression years of the 1930s and after Franklin D. Roosevelt became President, the political climate became far more favourable to labour. A great orator, negotiator and strike tactician, Lewis built the UMWA into a powerful, financially secure union that succeeded in winning increased wages for miners and improving their conditions.

He also devoted his considerable energies to successfully establishing permanent unions among workers in the hitherto unorganised mass production industries, notably steel and automobiles, who were being ignored by the craft union dominated American Federation of Labor.

Between 1935 and 1940 Lewis served as President of the newly formed Committee of Industrial Organization (as it was initially known) which was expelled by the AFL in March 1937. Lewis was the architect of the CIO’s dramatic growth in the late 1930s. Lewis, according to his biographers Melvyn Dubovsky and Warren Van Tyne, succeeded in moving labour “from the fringe of the economy to its core”.

In an article in Wales and Monmouthshire in August 1936, Glyn Roberts predicted that Lewis “will be heard of more and more in the next few years”. Roberts didn’t have to wait long before being proven right for it was in 1937 that Lewis truly acquired national prominence for the first time and, in some circles became “the most hated man in America”. In that year the New York Times alone devoted 99,816 column inches to his activities.

There was a vital link between Hughes, Roberts and Lewis in the historic events of 1937

He played a crucial role in many strike victories, both for his own union and the CIO, during the explosion of militant action, unofficial industrial unrest and often violent confrontations with employers that occurred in the USA from the mid 1930s onwards.

Non-unionised workers adopted a new and dramatic weapon, the sit-down (later called sit-in) strike, as they sought to force big corporations in steel and manufacturing to recognise unions. The most tumultuous of these was the General Motors sit-down strike at Flint, Michigan in February 1937. By the end of that year, the sit-down strike had enabled the United Automobile Workers to win union recognition from every car manufacturing company except Ford.

There was a vital link between Hughes, Roberts and Lewis in the historic events of 1937, even though they occupied markedly different positions on the left-right political spectrum. In 1937 the Supreme Court ruled that the National Labor Relations, or Wagner, Act, originally passed in 1935, was constitutional.

Most historians agree that the Act made a tangible contribution to labour gains in the USA in the 1930s. It gave unions much greater protection against recession and a counter attack by employers while more than ever before in America, the government was brought into industrial conflicts between workers and their employers, with the federal power being generally on the side of the unions.

In his 1936 article on Welsh people in contemporary America, Glyn Roberts declared that there had never been a time in the history of the USA when people of Welsh birth, or born of immigrant parents, had held so many prominent and key positions in the political and economic life of the USA.

‘You cannot blind yourself to the fact that Welsh blood, Welsh ingenuity, energy and drive are making themselves felt in the currents of American life to-day as never before’, he wrote.

In their own ways Charles Evans Hughes, Owen J Roberts and John L Lewis significantly channelled and steered some of the most important of the those American currents.

Throughout their careers “Whiskers Hughes”, the “Fighting Welshman” and the “most hated man in America” made a profound and lasting impact on American history.

In 1937 they were at the forefront of perhaps the most momentous episodes and struggles their country witnessed that year and they often dominated that year’s headlines. It was a truly extraordinary year for Welsh America.

SO, WHO ARE YOU, BILL JONES?

I am Professor of Welsh History at Cardiff University and Co-director of the Cardiff Centre for Welsh American Studies.

I teach and research the cultural, economic, political and social history of Wales in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

My research specialism is the history of Welsh migration and of the Welsh overseas.

If you could go back to one period of history, when would that be?

I’m fascinated by how Wales changed during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a period of great hardships and tragedies yet also of immense dynamism and possibilities.

Being in the crowd at the 1905 Wales v All Blacks game and during the Tonypandy riots in 1910 (in a safe spot!), being present at an Evan Roberts revival meeting in 1904-05, and singing with the South Wales Welsh Choral Union at the Crystal Palace in 1872 are all very tempting.

On balance, though, I think I’d rather stay in early 21st century Wales!

What do you think is the best thing Wales has given the world?

More specifically, it has increased global stocks of passion, humour, imagination, faith, music and determination.

Welsh History Month is in association with The National Trust, Cadw, the National Museum of Wales and the National Library of Wales


Varased aastad

1905
Hughes leads successful investigations, particularly the Armstrong investigation of the insurance industry and gains a political reputation. President Theodore Roosevelt encourages Hughes to run for Governor of New York.

1906
Hughes is elected Governor of New York.

1910
After two terms as Governor, Hughes is appointed to the Supreme Court of the United States by President William Howard Taft.

1916
Hughes resigns from the Court to run for President against Woodrow Wilson. After a narrow defeat for the Presidency, Hughes rejoins his old partners.

1917
Allen Hubbard, a law school classmate of Hughes’ son, Charles Evan Hughes Jr., joins the firm and apprentices under the elder Hughes. He would lead the firm as senior partner three decades later.

1921-1925
Charles Evans Hughes Sr. serves as Secretary of State under Presidents Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge.

1925
Hughes rejoins the firm as a partner.

1928
Francis Reed, a renowned corporate lawyer who also took his early paces under the elder Hughes, joins the firm. He would lead the firm from 1959 to 1974 and have an enduring influence on the firm’s culture, encouraging lawyers to keep their doors open and use each other’s first names.

1929
Charles Evans Hughes Jr., who is also a partner in the firm, resigns to become Solicitor General of the United States.

1930
The elder Hughes is appointed as Chief Justice of the United States, and his son resigns from his position of Solicitor General to rejoin the firm as a partner. Learned Hand, one of the great judges of the 20th century, is said to have once observed that the greatest lawyer he had ever known was Charles Evans Hughes, except that Hughes’ son was even greater.

1930’s
During the Great Depression, business failures and financial difficulties gave rise to major litigation and corporate reorganization. While most Wall Street firms suffered along with the economy, Hughes’ consistent emphasis on litigation paid off, and the firm grew. During that same period, the Fox Film Corporation and its nationwide chain of theaters retained the firm to handle its corporate reorganization.


The Autobiographical Notes of Charles Evans Hughes

Harvard University Press has partnered with De Gruyter to make available for sale worldwide virtually all in-copyright HUP books that had become unavailable since their original publication. The 2,800 titles in the &ldquoe-ditions&rdquo program can be purchased individually as PDF eBooks or as hardcover reprint (&ldquoprint-on-demand&rdquo) editions via the &ldquoAvailable from De Gruyter&rdquo link above. They are also available to institutions in ten separate subject-area packages that reflect the entire spectrum of the Press&rsquos catalog. More about the E-ditions Program »

Charles Evans Hughes (1862&ndash1948) was lawyer, governor of New York, Supreme Court Justice, presidential candidate in 1916, Secretary of State in the Harding and Coolidge administrations, a member of the World Court, and Chief Justice of the United States from 1930 until his retirement in 1941. To some, Hughes appeared larger than life. Robert H. Jackson once said of him, &ldquo[He] looks like God and talks like God.&rdquo But to those who knew him well, he was quite human, extraordinarily gifted, but human nonetheless. Tema Autobiographical Notes portray him as no biography could and provide comment on almost a century of American history as seen by one who played a part in shaping its course.

Hughes&rsquos notes reveal two sides of his personality&mdasha serious side when he was at work, and a genial, sometimes humorous, side when he was relaxing or with friends and family. When he writes of unofficial lifeespecially his boyhood, college years, and early years at the bar&mdashhe is raconteur telling his story with a certain amount of humor when he writes of his official life he tends to be matter-of-fact. The early chapters describe the formative influence which shaped his character: his loving but intellectually demanding parents and deeply religious training his unusual early education, which took place mostly at home and gave full scope to his precocity. Hughes&rsquos accounts of college life in the 1870s at Madison (now Colgate) and Brown University and of his career as a young lawyer in the New York City of the 1880s and 1890s are valuable portraits of an era.

Brought up to a high sense of duty, Hughes, from the start of his career, felt bound to take worthy legal cases and it was his reputation for integrity and thoroughness that led to his selection as counsel in the gas and insurance investigations of 1905&ndash1906. This was the turn of events that precipitated him into the public eye and, subsequently, into politics. The culmination of his career came in 1937 when he led the Supreme Court through a constitutional crisis and confronted Franklin Roosevelt in the Court packing battle. In the intervening thirty years, Hughes was a major figure in American political and legal circles. Tema Märkused record his impressions of presidents, statesmen, and justices. His reflections on the diplomacy of the 1920s and on the causes leading up to the Second World War are of immense historical importance.

The editors have supplied an introduction to the Märkused, commenting on Hughes&rsquos personality and public image, his political style and rise to fame. They have remained unobtrusive throughout, intervening only to clarify references and provide necessary details. For the rest, they let Hughes speak for himself in the crisp and clear style that reveals his unusual intelligence and the retentive and analytical mind that distinguished his conduct of affairs.


Roosevelt, Hughes, and the Battle over the New Deal: Interview with James Simon

/>This spring may see the issuance of one of the most significant U.S. Supreme Court decisions in decades as the Court weighs in on the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act of 2010, President Obama’s major legislative achievement. A politically polarized Supreme Court, controlled by conservatives led by Chief Justice John Roberts, will determine the fate of the controversial new law by June. The decision may well go beyond the health care act itself and alter the course of the modern federal administrative state.

Seventy-five years ago, the nation witnessed another conflict that pitted the Court against the chief executive. Then Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, a Republican, faced off against a popular Democratic president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who derided the Court for striking down several key New Deal laws including the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act.

Arguing that the elderly justices of the Court were overworked, Roosevelt proposed expanding the Court from nine to fifteen members by adding a new member for every justice over age 70. Hughes responded that the Court was efficient and up to date with its work while critics blasted FDR’s thinly veiled effort to pack the Court with his political allies. The Court-packing plan fizzled in 1937. After that, however, the Court upheld every New Deal law that came before it as appropriate exercises of congressional authority on social and economic issues.

In his timely new dual biography, FDR and Chief Justice Hughes: The President, the Supreme Court and the Battle Over the New Deal (Simon & Schuster), law professor and historian James F. Simon tells the story of these two dynamic, visionary American leaders from opposing political parties.

Prof. Simon places each man in the context of the time and sets the scene for their collision on the Court’s role. Before he became president, the deft politician FDR honed his skills as a lawyer, state legislator, assistant secretary of the Navy, and governor of New York. Hughes, a Republican progressive and brilliant legal thinker, had also served as governor of New York, as well as U.S. secretary of state and associate justice of the Supreme Court before his appointment as chief justice. He also was nearly elected president in 1916. As Prof. Simon writes, both FDR and Hughes continued to respect one another even at the height of the Court-packing controversy.

Prof. Simon is Martin Professor of Law Emeritus at New York Law School. He is the author of seven previous books on American history, law and politics, including two other books on American presidents and chief justices: Lincoln and Chief Justice Taney: Slavery, Secession, and the President’s War Powers ja What Kind of Nation: Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall, and the Epic Struggle to Create a United States. He lives with his wife in West Nyack, New York.

Dean Simon recently talked by telephone from New York about his new book and its resonance for issues now faced by the president and the Court.

What inspired you to write a dual biography of Franklin Roosevelt and Charles Evans Hughes? Did it grow out of your past work?

It did. About fifteen years ago, I had decided to do books on American presidents and chief justices at critical times in American history. I did the research, and I limited my studies to Jefferson and Chief Justice Marshall, Lincoln and Chief Justice Taney, and FDR and Chief Justice Hughes. I wrote about Jefferson and Marshall in What Kind of Nation, which came out in 2002 and was very well received. That encouraged me to do the second book on Lincoln and Taney. And finally, I got around to FDR and Hughes, which is the most dramatic of the three.

How did you decide to cast the book as a dual biography?

I did a previous dual biography, The Antagonists, about Justices Hugo Black and Felix Frankfurter, before my three books on the presidents and the chief justices. First, I think it’s dramatic to juxtapose the lives and conflicts of two American leaders. Second, with a dual biography, you’re more prone to be objective. You don’t tend to attach yourself to one life, to become enamored of your subject as biographers of a single subject tend to do. It is more difficult to do that with a dual biography.

You point out many similarities between FDR and Hughes. Hughes, a Republican, shared many of FDR’s progressive views.

They were both progressive politicians even though they were in different parties. And both were reform governors of New York. Hughes had a progressive agenda as governor. First, he was a very strong civil libertarian. Second, he did believe in government regulation of private utilities. He also was willing to challenge the entrenched bosses in the state legislature by promoting his reforms. And FDR essentially followed in Hughes footsteps when he was governor of New York.

They also had in common their personal background in the sense that they were both only children of doting parents and both were Ivy League-educated.

But the differences were also quite interesting. Roosevelt grew up in a gilded existence in Hyde Park on a beautiful estate, and he had tutors and servants. He went to Groton, a rich boy’s prep school. He and his family vacationed in Europe most summers. So it was a luxurious childhood, whereas Hughes was the son of an itinerant Baptist preacher in upstate New York and [his family] was of modest means. He was a prodigy and had a photographic memory. He was tutored by his parents and self-educated. He was elected to Phi Beta Kappa at Brown in his junior year, graduated at the top of his class at Columbia Law School, and recorded the highest grade on the New York bar exam. He then became a brilliant lawyer and investigator of corruption and mismanagement in the utilities and insurance industries.

In contrast, Roosevelt was an indifferent student at Harvard and Columbia Law School. After passing the New York bar, he was an uninspired young lawyer. He had not yet found his true calling, which was politics. He ran for the state legislature at the age of 28 and showed even then the talent of one of the greatest politicians in our history. Even though he came from a very wealthy background, he demonstrated an extraordinary ability to communicate with ordinary people.

Roosevelt was sworn in as president in 1933, and immediately took bold steps to lift the country out of the Great Depression. That’s where the clash came. Hughes was by then chief justice, and he had to deal with a polarized Court, not unlike the Court today, and that Court struck down a number of New Deal statutes, which infuriated Roosevelt.

Some readers will be surprised by Hughes’ political accomplishments. He not only ran for president as a Republican in 1916, but he was almost elected over Woodrow Wilson.

Jah. With four thousand more votes in California, he would have been president. In that campaign, he showed that he was not a natural politician. He was very stiff on the stump, in contrast to Roosevelt who excelled in public speaking and was a natural campaigner.

And Hughes served as an effective secretary of state under President Harding with many accomplishments, including the Disarmament Conference of 1921.

Hughes convened the Disarmament Conference in 1921 with the great naval powers -- the United States, Great Britain and Japan -- and he was able to negotiate a treaty in which all three nations dramatically reduced the tonnage of their warships. That had never been done, and it was a great triumph for him. He was a excellent secretary of state.

Even in the most tense periods of their relationship—when the Court struck down New Deal laws and FDR was openly angry—it seems FDR and Hughes always respected one another.

It’s very clear that Roosevelt respected Hughes. When Roosevelt first ran for the New York legislature, he declared that Hughes’s progressive record as governor was outstanding. Before Hughes administered the presidential oath to Roosevelt in 1933, the two men exchanged letters expressing their respect for each other. Roosevelt told Hughes that he had long admired his public service. Hughes responded graciously and said he looked forward to their association “in the great American enterprise.”

Why did the Court strike down various New Deal statutes and what was Chief Justice Hughes role?

The first major anti-New Deal decision was in 1935 when the Hughes’ Court struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act, basically the foundational legislation to spur the industrial economy. Hughes wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court, which is often forgotten. He brought together the four ideological conservatives known as “The Four Horsemen,” as well as the liberal justices: Brandeis, Cardozo and Stone. He wrote that the Congress had delegated too much authority to the president, and that in promulgating this law, they had exceeded their power to regulate interstate commerce.

In a second major decision, the Court struck down the Agricultural Adjustment Act which, like the National Industrial Recovery Act, was a pillar of the New Deal. The AAA was passed to spur the agricultural economy. This time the Court was divided. In a 6-3 decision, The Court struck down the AAA, and [the majority] included Hughes and Justice Owen Roberts, who were considered non-ideological centrists. The majority ruled that the Congress had exceeded its power to spend for the general welfare, declaring that the regulation of agricultural production resided with the states. The liberal dissenters were very critical of this decision.

Can you talk about Roosevelt’s reaction to the anti-New Deal decisions and his thoughts on reforming the Supreme Court?

Roosevelt had been eyeing the Court warily since these anti-New Deal decisions in 1935 and 1936. He had been privately brooding and trying to find a way to persuade the Court not to thwart the popular will. He thought the American people were clearly in favor of this legislation.

When he was re-elected by a landslide in 1936, he decided to act. He proposed what he called a “Judicial Reform Bill” that he said would give new energy to the Court. It would have allowed him to appoint a new justice for each sitting justice over seventy years old. It turned out that six justices, including Chief Justice Hughes, were over seventy. Had the bill passed, Roosevelt would have been able to add six justices, making a total of 15.

Hughes wrote a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee and said that the Court was abreast of its calendar. The justices knew how to do their work, Hughes said, and were doing it very well. After that letter was made public before the Committee, the air came out of Roosevelt’s plan, and it was defeated. Most people gave the Hughes’ letter great credit for the rejection of what was then termed Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan.

It seems that Hughes’ letter was a watershed moment in American legal history.

Roosevelt said he lost the battle but won the war. Hughes, I think, not only won the battle over the Court-packing plan, but he also won the war by protecting the integrity of the Court from a powerful and popular president. It was true that within three years, Roosevelt was able to appoint five new members to the Court, which then rejected every challenge to New Deal legislation. But that would have been true even had he not proposed his Court-packing scheme.

After the Court-packing plan failed, the Court sustained the New Deal measures that came before it -- yet it didn’t overrule the earlier anti-New Deal decisions. How were the later acts found constitutional in the face of the earlier cases?

Beginning in 1937, the Court gave broader authority to Congress than the conservative majority was willing to do in the anti-New Deal decisions. Hughes wrote an extremely important decision in 1937 which gave broad authority to regulate interstate commerce as long as there was a close and substantial relation of the activity within a state to interstate commerce. Hughes led the Court into the modern constitutional era in which the Court was deferential to Congress on economic and social legislation but was much more careful in protecting individual civil rights and liberties. Those are the hallmarks of the modern Supreme Court since 1937.

Although not overruled, isn’t the precedential value of the anti-New Deal decisions very limited now?

Yes, and it’s particularly relevant today as the Court deliberates over the Affordable Care Act and is looking at Congress’s authority to regulate interstate commerce.

Even though the Court did not overrule those earlier decisions, they nonetheless from 1937 to 1995 were deferential to Congress in finding economic and social legislation constitutional. In a couple of cases, one in 1995 and one in 2000, the Court found that the Congress had exceeded its authority under the commerce clause. But both of those cases, as pointed out in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, involved noneconomic activities and were within the prerogative of the locality or the state. One had to do with the possession of guns around a public school and the other dealt with the effect of the Violence Against Women Act. Both congressional actions were struck down.

But the Affordable Care Act is more in line with the precedents going back to 1937 with an activity which is clearly economic and clearly dealing with a national economic problem. I think the precedents are very much in favor of the Roberts Court sustaining this statute. That doesn’t mean the Court will do so. You could tell that the questioning [during oral argument] by the most conservative members of the Court was very hostile to the Solicitor General’s argument they aggressively challenged him. Certainly, if they strike down the health care law and it’s five to four with the five Republican appointees voting to strike it down and the four Democratic appointees voting to uphold it, we won’t have seen anything like that since the New Deal days.

We haven’t seen such a partisan division of the Court since 1937. There were truly four ideological conservatives on the Court in the early 1930s, as there are today, [but] the difference is that the chief justices are different. Chief Justice Hughes was a centrist who came from a progressive background, and, although a Republican, he came out of the progressive wing of the Republican Party, whereas Chief Justice Roberts is an ideological conservative fully embedded in the conservative wing of the Republican Party. And whereas Hughes tried to bring the two sides together and sometimes successfully, Roberts has consistently aligned himself with the most conservative members of the Court on the most polarizing issues of the day, such as campaign finance reform in Citizens United. He has not been shy about voting with the ideological conservatives.

Hughes looked to the Court to be above partisan politics, and he went out of his way to make it so. He discouraged decisions that would appear to be politically partisan. We’ll have to see what happens with the Roberts Court and the health care law.

President Obama recently said that, if the Court finds the Affordable Care Act unconstitutional, that would be the result of judicial activism. And then a federal judge in Texas has asked the Department of Justice to submit a memo to the president that states that the federal courts have the authority to declare congressional acts unconstitutional.

I suspect that judge was doing a bit of grandstanding. It’s not a major judicial development. He cannot demand a response from the Justice Department to the president of the United States. He might get one, but the president doesn’t have to respond to him. He’s just playing to the gallery.

It’s a very polarizing issue and the president invited it to some extent by calling out the Court before its decision by saying, if the justices strike down this law or even a part of it, they’re going to be categorized as an activist Court, and I think he’s right. Usually presidents, even FDR, wait for the decision to come down before they attack the Court, but President Obama anticipated a decision, and that’s very unusual. That’s probably what got that judge in Texas riled up.

The president has made statements publicly when he thinks the Court has been out of line. You will recall his State of the Union address in 2010 with the justices in front of him when he criticized the Kodanikud Ühendatud decision for opening the floodgates to special interests, and it turns out he’s right. That doesn’t necessarily mean the decision was wrong, but it’s changed the political environment.

This may not be a fair question, but if you can speculate, where do you think Charles Evans Hughes would come down on Kodanikud Ühendatud and the Affordable Care Act cases?

I can’t answer on Citizens United, because the Hughes Court did not deal with any issue like campaign finance reform.

On the health care law, I think Hughes would find the law constitutional based on his opinions and votes in challenges to Congress’s authority to regulate interstate commerce from 1937 until his retirement in 1941. Beginning with his opinion in the 1937 decision, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, he took a very broad of Congress’s authority to regulate interstate commerce and he consistently voted in favor of upholding congressional economic and social legislation from 1937 and until his retirement in 1941. I would say, to be consistent with his opinion and his votes, he would uphold the Affordable Care Act.

And Hughes cared about projecting an image of the Court as being impartial and above politics. I think he would have hesitated before voting with the four most conservative members of the Court, which would project political partisanship. So I think Hughes would be in favor of upholding the Act.

What did you learn about the last meeting between Hughes and FDR in June 1941 upon Hughes’s retirement?

They were primarily talking about Hughes’s successor. Hughes told FDR that he should nominate Associate Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, a Republican, to be chief justice. Roosevelt agreed with him. This was just before [the American entry into] World War II, and the idea of bipartisanship was certainly on Roosevelt’s mind.

When Hughes retired, Roosevelt wrote him a heartfelt letter truly regretting that Hughes was retiring. He respected Hughes greatly, and their friendship endured after Hughes’ challenge to the Court-packing plan. I don’t think they saw each other again after Hughes retired.

Hughes was at Roosevelt’s funeral as shown in the last photograph in my book. It shows Hughes very distraught over the death of Roosevelt, which suggests both respect and affection for the man he had challenged in 1937.

Hughes should rank among the greatest chief justices in history, after John Marshall and Earl Warren. He was not only a great judicial craftsman and a great lawyer, but also an effective leader of a polarized Court. He survived the Court-packing battle and remained leader of the Court even after Roosevelt appointed five new justices to the Court who were loyal New Dealers. That’s quite a tribute to Hughes’ leadership.

You’re a renowned law professor and you’ve written narrative histories that have been praised for their storytelling and readability. How did you decide to write history in addition to your work as a law professor?

I was a writer before I became a law professor. I was a journalist and wrote the law section for Ajakiri Time. And I worked for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch before that. That may have helped me in writing about law for a general reader, all before I became a law professor.

And I’ve always been interested in history. I majored in history in college and I teach constitutional law and history. It was natural for me, after I became a constitutional law professor, to look to subjects for books that involved constitutional history and politics. I’m also interested in the human dynamics in how justices decide cases. This book on FDR and Chief Justice Hughes gave me a wonderful opportunity to delve into all three: law, politics and the human dynamic in making our constitutional law.

Do you have any other thoughts on what you hope readers will take away from this story of FDR and Charles Evans Hughes?

There are clearly lessons to be learned for today as we await the decision on the health care law, but I think the FDR-Hughes story is important in itself as a great story about two remarkable American leaders.


Collection inventory

Charles Evans Hughes (1862-1948) was an American lawyer and politician who served as Governor of New York, U.S. Secretary of State, and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

Charles Evans Hughes was born in Glen Falls, New York on April 11, 1862. His parents David Charles Hughes, a Methodist preacher, and Mary Connelly, a Baptist minister's daughter, were deeply religious. An intelligent child, Hughes began attending Madison College (presently Colgate University) at the age of fourteen before transferring to Brown University. He graduated first in his class from Columbia Law School and began practicing law in 1884. While working at the firm Chamberlin, Carter, and Hornblower, Hughes met his future wife, Antoinette Carter, the daughter of Walter S. Carter, a senior partner in the firm.

Hughes established himself politically by leading investigations into corporate corruption and the insurance industry. In 1906 he was elected Governor of New York. Four years later, President William Howard Taft appointed Hughes to the United States Supreme Court. Hughes left his Associate Justice position to run on the Republican nomination for President of the United States in 1916, but lost to Woodrow Wilson. After a few years in private practice, Hughes served as Secretary of State from 1921 to 1925 under Presidents Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge. During his tenure, Hughes focused on various international efforts to avert another great war.

In 1930, President Herbert Hoover named Hughes the eleventh Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The Hughes court faced the Great Depression and President Franklin D. Roosevelt's court-packing plan. While in this position Hughes also oversaw the opening of the Supreme Court building in 1935. He resigned his post in 1941. Hughes died in Cape Cod, Massachusetts on August 27, 1948.

Works Written by Hughes

Scope and Contents of the Collection

The Charles Evans Hughes Letters are a collection of 65 outgoing and two incoming items written between 1894 and 1934. As a lawyer, New York State Governor, Secretary of State under Warren G. Harding, and Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Hughes answered letters from constituents, politicians (Martin H. Glynn, George B. McClellan), editors (Hamilton Holt, Louis Wiley), and clergymen (S. Parkes Cadman, Samuel Cavert, Smith T. Ford, Paul Hickok, Charles MacFarland, Robert E. Speer). Most of the letters are responses to recommendations for various appointments (Joseph Buffington, Joseph Carlino, Edward H. Fallows, McClellan, Wiley) as well as social and speaking invitations (G. Lennox Curtis, Ford, D. W. Hakes, Roy F. Fitzgerald, Winfield Jones, Mrs. J. E. Norcross, Clarence J. Owens, Amasa Parker, D. H. Pierson, Palmer C. Ricketts). In addition to a number of letters of introduction (Princess Bibesco, Diplomatic and Consular Office), there are also several responses to congratulatory messages received upon Lodge's assumption of various appointments (John Barrett, Ford, Lilla Day Monroe, William R. Rose).

Arrangement of the Collection

The collection contains one series, Correspondence, which is arranged chronologically. There is also an alphabetical Index to the Correspondence located at the end of the finding aid.

Restrictions

Access Restrictions

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Written permission must be obtained from SCRC and all relevant rights holders before publishing quotations, excerpts or images from any materials in this collection.


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Restrictions on Access

The following boxes are located off-site: Boxes 6-57. You will need to request this material from the Rare Book and Manuscript Library at least three business days in advance to use the collection in the Rare Book and Manuscript Library reading room.

This collection has no restrictions.

Terms Governing Use and Reproduction

Single photocopies may be made for research purposes. The RBML maintains ownership of the physical material only. Copyright remains with the creator and his/her heirs. The responsibility to secure copyright permission rests with the patron.

Preferred Citation

Identification of specific item Date (if known) Charles Evans Hughes papers Box and Folder Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University Library.


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