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Venemaa ja Esimene maailmasõda (klassiruumi tegevus)

Venemaa ja Esimene maailmasõda (klassiruumi tegevus)


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Venemaa oli 20. sajandi algusaastatel teinud märkimisväärseid majanduslikke edusamme. Aastaks 1914 tootis Venemaa igal aastal umbes viis miljonit tonni malmi, neli miljonit tonni rauda ja terast, nelikümmend tonni kivisütt, kümme miljonit tonni nafta ning eksportis umbes kaksteist miljonit tonni teravilja. Venemaa jäi siiski teistest suurriikidest palju maha. Venemaa tööstuses töötas mitte rohkem kui viis protsenti kogu tööjõust ja see andis vaid umbes viiendiku rahvuslikust sissetulekust.

Sergei Witte mõistis, et oma majandusliku olukorra tõttu kaotab Venemaa sõja oma konkurentidega. Bernard Pares kohtus Esimese maailmasõja eelsetel aastatel mitu korda Sergei Wittega: „Krahv Witte ei eksinud kunagi oma veendumusest, esiteks, et Venemaa peab iga hinna eest sõda vältima, ja teiseks, et ta peab töötama majandussõpruse nimel Prantsusmaa ja Saksamaa, et võidelda Inglismaa ülekaaluga. "

1913. aastal kiitis tsaar Nikolai II heaks "suure sõjaväeprogrammi". See hõlmas Vene armee suurendamist ligi 500 000 mehe ja lisaks 11 800 ohvitseri võrra. Väidetavalt oli Venemaal maailma suurim armee. See koosnes 115 jalaväest ja 38 ratsaväediviisist. Vene hinnanguline tööjõuressurss hõlmas üle 25 miljoni võitlusvanuse mehe. Venemaa kehvad teed ja raudteed aga raskendasid nende sõdurite tõhusat lähetamist ja Saksamaa oli kindel, et suudab selle ohuga toime tulla.

Ertshertsog Ferdinandi mõrvale järgnenud rahvusvahelises kriisis võttis Nikolai II oma välisministri Sergi Sazonovi nõuanded vastu ja kohustas Venemaad toetama kolmekordset antanti. Sazonov oli seisukohal, et sõja korral võimaldaks Venemaa kuulumine kolmekordse antantini saada naaberriikidelt territoriaalset kasu. Sazonov oli eriti huvitatud Poseni, Sileesia, Galicia ja Põhja -Bukovina võtmisest. Suurvürst Nikolai Nikolajevitš ütles tsaarile: "Venemaa, kui ta ei mobiliseeruks, seisab silmitsi suurimate ohtudega ja argusega ostetud rahu vallandab kodus revolutsiooni." (

Esimese maailmasõja puhkemisel anti kindral Aleksander Samsonovile Venemaa teise armee juhtimine Ida -Preisimaa sissetungi eest. Ta liikus aeglaselt provintsi edelanurka, kavatsedes siduda end kirde suunas liikunud kindral Paul von Rennenkampfiga. Kindral Paul von Hindenburg ja kindral Erich Ludendorff saadeti edasi kohtuma Samsonovi pealetungivate vägedega. Nad võtsid kontakti 22. augustil 1914 ja kuue päeva jooksul olid venelased oma suurepäraste numbritega mõned edukad. Kuid 29. augustiks piirati Samsanovi teine ​​armee ümber.

Kindral Samsonov üritas taganeda, kuid nüüd oli Saksa kordonis enamus tema sõdureid tapetud või vangistatud. Tannenbergi lahing kestis kolm päeva. 150 000 Vene sõdurist õnnestus põgeneda vaid 10 000 inimesel. Šokis lahingu katastroofilisest tulemusest tegi Samsanov enesetapu. Sakslased, kes kaotasid lahingus 20 000 meest, suutsid võtta üle 92 000 vene vangi. 9. septembril 1914 käskis kindral von Rennenkampf oma ülejäänud väed taanduda. Kuu lõpuks oli Saksa armee taastanud kogu territooriumi, mis oli kaotatud Venemaa esialgse pealetungi ajal. Preisimaa sissetungi katse läks Venemaale maksma ligi veerand miljonit meest.

Jälle see neetud küsimus suurtükiväe ja laskemoona puudusest - see takistab energilist edasiliikumist. Kui meil peaks olema kolm päeva tõsist lahingut, võib laskemoon otsa saada. Ilma uute vintpüssideta on lünki võimalik täita. Armee on nüüd peaaegu tugevam kui rahuajal; see peaks olema (ja oli alguses) kolm korda tugevam. See on olukord, kus me praegu oleme. Kui me saaksime umbes kuu aega võitlemisest puhata, paraneks meie seisund oluliselt. Muidugi on aru saada, et see, mida ma ütlen, on rangelt ainult teie jaoks. Palun ärge rääkige sellest kellelegi sõnagi.

Ma ei leia sõnu, et väljendada kõike, mida tahan, mu süda on liiga täis. Ma igatsen vaid sind süles hoida ja sosistada tugeva armastuse, julguse, jõu ja lõputute õnnistuste sõnu. Enam kui raske on sind üksi lasta, nii üksi - aga Jumal on sinu lähedal, rohkem kui kunagi varem. Olete võidelnud selle suure võitluse oma riigi ja trooni eest, üksi, julgelt ja otsustavalt ... Jumal annab mulle jõudu teid aidata, sest meie hinged võitlevad õiguse eest kurja vastu ... meie, keda oleme õpetanud kui vaadata kõike teisest küljest, vaata, mis võitlus siin tegelikult on ja tähendab. Näitate oma meisterlikkust, tõestate end autokraadiks ilma selleta, kes Venemaa ei saa eksisteerida.

See on hiilgav lehekülg teie valitsemisajal ja Venemaa ajaloos, nende nädalate ja päevade lugu ning Jumal, kes on teie lähedal ja teie lähedal, päästab teie riigi ja trooni teie kindluse kaudu ... Jumal võitis teid teie kroonimisel. Ta pani sind sinna, kus sa seisad, ja sa oled oma kohust täitnud ... Need, kes kardavad ja ei saa su tegudest aru, viiakse sündmuste abil sinu suurest tarkusest aru. See on teie valitsemise hiilguse algus. Ta ütles nii ja ma usun seda täiesti. Teie päike tõuseb ja täna paistab see nii eredalt. Ja nii võlute ka kõiki neid suuri eksijaid, argpüksid, eksiteele, lärmakad, pimedad, kitsarinnalised ja valed olendid ... Ärge kahtlege - uskuge ja kõik saab korda ja armee on kõik - võrdluseks paar lööki. , nagu saab ja tuleb maha suruda. Vasakpoolsed on maruvihased, sest kõik libisevad käest läbi.

Kõige armulikum suverään. Ärge leidke meile viga, et me teie poole julgelt ja avameelselt pöördusime. Meie tegevust dikteerib lojaalsus ja armastus teie ja meie riigi vastu ning meie murelik äratundmine meie ümber toimuva ähvardava iseloomu suhtes. Eile nõukogu istungil, mida te juhtisite, palusime ühehäälselt, et te ei vabastaks suurvürsti Nikolaust armee ülemjuhatusest ... Julgeme veel kord teile öelda, et meie otsusel ähvardab tõsiste tagajärgedega Venemaa, teie dünastia ja teie isik.

Kuigi neil oli austerlaste vastu mõningaid edusamme, tõi sakslaste lüüasaamine peagi kaasa röövimise. Suurem osa Poolast kaotas 1915. aastal Saksamaale .... Edu tänapäevases sõjapidamises seisnes maailma tööstusriikides, kes suutsid massiliselt toota kaasaegseid relvi ja laskemoona ning kellel oli tõhus võrgustik. maantee- ja raudteeside. Vene tööstus lihtsalt ei suutnud nõudlusega sammu pidada. Aastaks 1915 olid paljud rindesõdurid relvadeta; nad pidid ootama, kuni kolleegid kasvavad, et nad saaksid omale järele tulla. Oli juhtumeid, kus sõdureid väljastati ainult nelja kuuliga päevas! Transpordisüsteem oli täiesti puudulik. Suurem osa Venemaa raudteest asus läänes ja langes peagi vaenlase kätte; veoautosid oli väga vähe ja hobutransport oli sageli seni, kuni see jäi. Paljud hobused olid rekvireeritud talupoegade käest, kes leidsid end ilma loomadeta, et aidata maad harida.

Tuhanded Vene väed saadeti rindele ilma korraliku varustuseta. Neil puudus kõik: relvad, laskemoon, saapad või voodipesu. Tervelt kolmandik Vene sõduritest ei saanud vintpüssi. Aasta lõpus teatas Venemaa peakorter, et iga kuu on vaja 100 000 uut vintpüssi, kuid Vene tehased suudavad toota vähem kui poole sellest (42 000 kuus). Sõdurid olid aga palvetega hästi relvastatud, kuna Vene õigeusu piiskopid ja preestrid tegid usinalt tööd, et õnnistada lahingusse minejaid, kastes neid heldelt ämbrist püha veega ....

1914. aasta detsembriks oli Vene armees 6553 000 meest. Neil oli aga ainult 4652 000 vintpüssi. Koolitamata väed telliti lahingusse ilma piisavate relvade ja laskemoonata. Ja kuna Vene armees oli umbes üks kirurg iga 10 000 mehe kohta, surid paljud sõduritest haavatud haavadesse, mida oleks läänerindel ravitud. Kui meditsiinitöötajad olid laiali üle 500 miili, oli tõenäosus, et mõni Vene sõdur arstiabi saab, nullilähedane.

1915 oli kriisiaasta. Vene armeed ei suutnud 1914. aastal kiiret võitu saavutada ning Saksa ja Austria vasturünnakud olid venelastelt ilma jätnud suure osa territooriumist, mille nad olid võitnud sõja alguskuudel. Vaenlane oli okupeerinud suure ala Venemaa Poolas. Vene vägesid takistas mürskude ja vintpüsside puudus. Juulis 1915 otsustas tsaar oma onu, suurvürst Nikolai asemel võtta relvajõudude isikliku juhtimise. See oli viga. Nikolai II -l oli vähe sõjalist kogemust ja ülemana peeti teda isiklikult süüdi igas lüüasaamises. Uued kohustused hoidsid teda Petrogradist eemal ning igapäevane valitsemine jäi tsaaririigi ja Rasputini kätte. Tsaari pommitati tema naise näägutavate kirjadega, kes nõudsid, et ta järgiks Rasputini nõuandeid ja ignoreeriks duuma ettepanekuid. Rasputin, nagu ka Nikolai, uskus, et tsaaril peaks olema kõrgeim võim. Paljud mehed, kes Rasputini nõuannete kohaselt edutati olulistele valitsuse ametikohtadele, olid saamatud.

Aasta 1915 oli väga raske. Rinde vägedel puudusid relvad ja laskemoon ... rahulolematus kasvas. Eriti kibestunud tunne oli keisrinna vastu. Loomulikult oli ta sünnilt sakslane ja käisid kuuldused, et ta töötab sakslaste heaks Venemaa vastu. Need lood olid üsna valed, kuid inimesed uskusid neid. Tõsi oli aga see, et keisrinna oli täielikult halvustava Rasputini mõju all ning Rasputini soovitusel survestati keisrit valitsuse tähtsamatesse ametikohtadesse korrumpeerunud ja ebakompetentseid mehi nimetama.

Praeguseks on mul andmeid ainult ühe küla, Gruševka, kohta. Arvud on järgmised: 115 (10 hukkunut, 34 haavatut, 71 kadunud või vangistuses) 829st mobiliseeritud hingest. Sellest tulenevalt moodustavad Gruševka küla kaotused 13 protsenti kogu 3030 hingega elanikkonnast, kellest 829 hinge oli armees. Ainuüksi Gruševka külas on lesed, naised, tegevteenistuses olevate sõdurite emad esitanud üle viiesaja avalduse. Nad saavad toetusi regulaarselt, kuid tapetud sõdurite lesed, keda on kaunistatud Püha Jüri ordeniga, pole siiani midagi saanud. ... Meil ​​on ka päris palju pagulasi: suurim protsent pärineb Kholmi kubermangust, kuid on ka pagulasi Grodno ja Minski kubermangudest .... Kõikjal toimub viljakoristus ja viljapeks ning on lootust, et töö läheb sügisel õigeks ajaks valmis saada. Lisaks naistele, lastele ja vanuritele töötan enda heaks 36 inimest Khersoni vanglast ja 947 Austria sõjavangi.

1916. aasta novembriks ja detsembriks olid toiduhinnad neli korda kõrgemad kui enne sõda ja need kuud olid isegi Vene talve jaoks erakordselt külmad. Streigid kõrgema palga saamiseks ja meeleavaldused leiva pärast muutusid Petrogradis ja Moskvas tavaliseks. 11. märtsil 1917 tulistasid tsaarile endiselt lojaalsed väed Petrogradis meeleavaldajaid. Pole teada, kui palju tapeti ... Järgmisel päeval ühinesid demonstrantidega peaaegu kõik Petrogradi sõdurid.

Küsimused õpilastele

Küsimus 1: Uurige allikaid 1, 4, 6 ja 8. Selgitage karikatuuride arvamust Venemaa ja sõja kohta.

Küsimus 2: Miks lõpetab tsaar Nikolai II oma kirja (allikas 2) sõnadega: "Palun ärge öelge sellest sõnagi kellelegi".

Küsimus 3: Uuringu allikas 4. Mida tähendab fraas "teie otsus ähvardab tõsiste tagajärgedega, Venemaa, teie dünastia ja teie isik".

4. küsimus: selgitage, miks tsaari ministrid (allikas 5) olid mures, et ta sai Vene armee ülemjuhatajaks.

Küsimus 5: kasutage allikates olevat teavet, et põhjendada võimalikult palju põhjuseid, miks 1917. aasta alguseks oli nii palju vene inimesi õnnetud.

Vastus kommentaar

Nende küsimuste kommentaari leiate siit.


Teine maailmasõda - esimene suur "toidusõda"

Julian Cribb on autor, ajakirjanik, toimetaja ja teadussuhtleja. Ta on ettevõtte Julian Cribb & amp Associates juhataja, kes pakub erialast nõustamist teaduse, põllumajanduse, toidu, kaevandamise, energia ja keskkonna kommunikatsioonis. Tema karjäär hõlmab ametikohti ajalehe toimetajana, Austraalia ajalehe teadusliku toimetajana, CSIRO riikliku teadlikkuse direktorina, paljude teaduskogude ja nõuandekomisjonide liikmena ning põllumajandusajakirjanduse ja teaduskommunikatsiooni riiklike kutseorganisatsioonide presidendina. Viimati on ta raamatu "Toit või sõda" autor (Cambridge University Press 2019).

See on sageli tähelepanuta jäetud tõsiasi, et II maailmasõda peeti algselt peamiselt toidu ja selle valmistamise vahendite pärast.

Sõjafilosoof Clausewitz märkis kord, et & lsquoWar on poliitika jätkamine muul viisil & rsquo, ja 1920ndatel ja rsquo Weimari Vabariigis Saksamaal oli poliitika väga palju selleks, et tagada rahvale edukaks piisav uus maa ja vältida maailmasõja õuduste kordumist. Ma näljutasin ja surmasin peaaegu miljon sakslast. See oli värske kõigi mõtetes ja armistas endiselt nende keha.

Adolf Hitler tundis nälga isiklikult, mõistis selle võimu oma sakslasest mõtete üle ja seda, kui tähtis on oma äärmuslikuma tegevuskava järgimiseks viia end kokku populistlike eesmärkidega. Tol ajal olid vähesed põhjused populaarsemad kui Lebensraum (eluruum) - rassiliselt varjutatud Saksa ideoloogia, mis oli rahvuslikus diskursuses levinud alates 1890. aastatest.

Lebensraum kui kontseptsioon sai alguse saksa etnograafilt Friedrich Ratzelilt, kuid selle sügavad juured peitusid järjestikustes saksa idasuunalistes asunike liikumistes alates Saksa rüütlite ajastust ja Baltimaade & lsquocrusades & rsquo ajast XIII sajandil, mis oli vallutanud, asustanud ja harinud maid, mis said Ida -Preisimaa ja vaidlusalune Läänemere rannik. Esimeses maailmasõjas oli Saksa ametlik sõjaeesmärk Poolale kuuluvate maade annekteerimine Danzigi koridoris, sõjalise vallutamise ja asustuse eesmärgil. Saksamaa ja Nõukogude Venemaa vahel sõlmitud Bresti ja ndash -Litovski lepingus (märts 1917), millega venelased sõjast taganesid, omandasid sakslased põgusalt rikkaid maid nii kaugel kui Euroopa Venemaa, Balti riikide, Valgevene, Ukraina ja Kaukaasia osad. nad kaotasid kohe uuesti 15 kuud hiljem Versailles 'rahulepingus (juunis 1919).

Hitler teadis, et ilma Suurbritannia ja rsquose kuningliku mereväe edestamiseta ei saa Saksamaa kunagi tagasi oma endisi Aafrika ja Vaikse ookeani kolooniaid, et seda toita, ning tema meel keskendus üha enam Lebensraumi omandamisele idas: Poola, Tšehhoslovakkia ja eriti NSV Liit. Uskumatul kombel uskus ta isegi, et britid toetavad teda: 1922. aastal usaldas ta sümpaatsele ajalehetoimetajale & lsquo. Venemaa hävitamist Inglismaa abiga tuleb proovida. Venemaa annaks Saksamaale Saksa asunikele piisavalt maad ja laia tegevusvaldkonna Saksa tööstusele & rsquo.

1924. aastal sai Hitler oma osa Münchenis ebaõnnestunud Beer Hall Putschi lavastamisel Landsbergi vanglas. Siin hakkasid kujunema tema unistused uuele Saksamaale tohutute maade omandamisest, mida julgustasid tema jumaldav asetäitja ja kaaslind, Rudolph Hess & ndash, kes pidas raamatu „Mein Kampf” (1925/6) kirjutamise ajal müstilisi vaateid pinnasele ja saksa verele. Selles kallutas Hitler kätt, väljendades oma kolme peamist eesmärki:

& härra, et lammutada Versailles 'leping ja selle & lsquounfair & rsquo mõju Saksamaale

& bull, et ühendada saksakeelsed rahvad, st moodustada neist palju suurem, võimsam ja sidusam rassiline ja kultuuriline üksus ning

& pull laiendada ida poole, et luua uuele laienenud Reichile piisav elamispind (Lebensraum).

Hitler selgitas oma pretsedendina Saksa keskaja ajalugu ristisõjaaegsetest rüütlitest, selgitas & lsquoJa nii tõmbame meie, natsionaalsotsialistid, teadlikult joone alla sõjaeelse perioodi välispoliitilisele tendentsile. Jätkame sealt, kus kuuesaja aasta eest katkestasime. Peatame lõputu saksa liikumise lõunasse ja läände ning pöörame pilgu idamaale. Lõpuks katkestame sõjaeelse aja koloniaal- ja kaubanduspoliitika ning liigume tuleviku mullapoliitika poole.

Lebensraumist sai näljamälu ajendil 1930ndatel ja 40ndatel Hitleri juhtimisel Saksa välispoliitika keskne tugisammas ja eesmärk ning seega ka Saksamaa ja rsquose peamine sõjaeesmärk, väidab ajaloolane Manfred Messerschmidt. Vahetult enne Poola pealetungi 1939. aastal ja ajal, mil ta veel paberil oli, teatas NSV Liidu liitlane ja Hitler ise, et Saksamaa vajab Ukrainat, et keegi ei saaks meid uuesti näljutada, nagu viimases sõjas. .

Seega oli Euroopa Teises maailmasõjas ennekõike muld ja nash, mille eesmärk oli see NSV Liidult ära võtta, ümber asustada ja hallata Saksa põllumajanduspõhimõtetel. See, mida ümberasustatud populatsioonidega ette võeti, ei olnud alguses selgelt välja kirjutatud. Saksamaa vastutavate ministeeriumide koosolekul 1941. aasta mais, kuu aega enne pankrotide veeremist Venemaale, jõuti järeldusele:

& bull & lsquoSõda saab jätkata ainult siis, kui kogu Wehrmacht toidetakse sõja kolmandal aastal Venemaalt. & rsquo

& pull & lsquoKui viime riigist välja vajaliku, ei saa olla kahtlust, et kümned miljonid inimesed surevad nälga. & rsquo

Selle õuduse eest vastutas leebe välimusega tehnokraat Herbert Backe, kes oli SS-ohvitser ja teine ​​kõrgeim natsiametnik toiduametis, vastutades muu hulgas kodumaise normimise eest. Tema lahendus, mida tuntakse näljaplaanina (der Hungerplan), kujutas metoodiliselt miljonite Nõukogude kodanike nälga surmamist ja nälja tõeline relvastamine.

Selle tagajärjel hukkunute arv ukrainlaste, valgevenelaste ja juutide nälgimisel on 4,2 miljonit. Lisaks suri Saksa sõjavangide laagrites nälga umbes 3,5 miljonit vangistatud Vene sõdurit ning väidetavalt on miljon Leningradi piiramise tõttu nälga hukkunud veel miljon Nõukogude kodanikku.

Kuigi Jaapani sõjaeesmärk ei olnud nii selge kui Saksamaal, oli kodumaise nälja peletamiseks uute maade omandamine siiski tugev tõukejõud Teise maailmasõja ajal idas. Jaapan oli kannatanud suure depressiooni all ja sellele lisandus nälg: & lsquo. Umbes 1931. aastal muutus maapiirkondade vaesumine tõsiseks. Veelgi enam, 1934. aastal tabas maakogukondi nälg. Eriti Jaapani Tohoku piirkonnas (kirdeosas) tekitas maapiirkondade vaesus palju alatoidetud lapsi ja mõned põllumehed olid sunnitud oma tütred prostitutsiooni jaoks müüma. See maapiirkondade katastroof põhjustas palju viha ja rahva kriitikat valitsuse ning suurte ettevõtete ja rsquo vastu.

Teine maailmasõda algas idas Jaapani okupeerimisel Mandžuuriaga Kirde -Hiinas juunis 1931. Detsembris hakkas Jaapani valitsus aktiivselt ajama välislaienemise poliitikat, et tagada rohkem territooriumi ja ressursse, sealhulgas toitu. depressiooni tagajärgedest üle saada. Manchukuo okupeerimine nukuosariigina sai tuntuks & ndash oma rikkalike loodus- ja põllumajandusressurssidega, leidis Jaapanis laialdast toetust, kus see sai tuntuks kui & lsquoManchurian päästerõngas ja rsquo.

Aastaks 1936 kavatses Jaapani valitsus ja miljonid Mandžuuriasse ning rändeprogramm Jaapani maapiirkonda voldikute ja plakatitega, mis rõhutasid vajadust asustada järgmise 20 aasta jooksul miljon Jaapani põllumeest Mandžuuriasse. Kõnele vastas umbes 380 000 inimest ja nendega ühines veel 600 000 Korea põllumajandusasundajat.

Kokku suri Teises maailmasõjas nälga üle 20 miljoni inimese, võrreldes 19,5 miljoni lahingusurmaga. Tegelik kogusumma võib olla palju suurem, kui Hiinas näljutatud & gt35 m hinnangud on õiged. Enamik neist surmadest tulenes tahtlikust poliitikast, mille eesmärk oli nõrgendada opositsiooni, kontrollida okupeeritud rahvaid või nälgida kohalikke armeed toitma. Need näljahädad esitavad rea eraldiseisvaid, kuid tihedalt seotud toidukuritegusid ja neist on saanud 21. sajandi toidusõdade muster.

Toidus või sõjas (Cambridge University Press 2019) esitan tõendeid selle kohta, et selliseid konflikte saab ennetada ja ravida, tagades probleemsetele piirkondadele toiduvarud. Ja et tehnoloogiad ja ressursid selleks on juba olemas.


Venemaa ja Esimene maailmasõda

Esimene maailmasõda pidi Venemaale laastavalt mõjuma. Kui Esimene maailmasõda augustis 1914 algas, vastas Venemaa sellele patriootlikult Nikolai II ümber.

Sõjalised katastroofid Masuuria järvedel ja Tannenburgis nõrgestasid Vene armeed sõja algfaasis oluliselt. Gregory Rasputini kasvav mõju Romanovite omale kahjustas kuninglikku perekonda väga palju ja 1917. aasta kevade lõpuks ei olnud Venemaad veidi üle 300 aasta valitsenud Romanovid enam Venemaa juhtimisel. olid üle võtnud Kerenski ja Ajutine Valitsus. 1917. aasta lõpuks olid Lenini juhitud bolševikud võtnud Venemaa suurlinnades võimu ja kehtestanud nendes piirkondades, mida ta kontrollis, kommunistliku võimu. Üleminek Venemaal nelja aasta jooksul oli märkimisväärne - autokraatia langemine ja maailma esimese kommunistliku valitsuse loomine.

Nikolai II -l oli romantiline nägemus temast oma armee juhtimisest. Seetõttu veetis ta palju aega idarindel. See oli katastroofiline samm, kuna see jättis Alexandra linnades kontrolli alla. Ta oli muutunud üha enam selle mehe mõju alla, kellel näiliselt oli õigus aidata oma poega Alexist, keda vaevab hemofiilia. Alexandra uskus, et Rasputin on Jumala mees, ja nimetas teda kui "meie sõpra". Teised, kes olid šokeeritud tema mõjust tsaaria üle, nimetasid teda “hulluks mungaks” - ehkki mitte avalikult, kui nad ei tahtnud Alexandra viha tekitada.

Rasputin tõi Romanovile tohutu maine. Tema naistemäng oli hästi teada ja paljud pidasid teda hulluks. Kui palju lugudest on tõsi ja kui palju liialdatud, ei saa kunagi teada, sest pärast tema surma tundsid inimesed end piisavalt vabaks tema võimust, et rääkida oma lugusid. Kuid tema lihtsast mainest elus olles piisas, et Romanovile tohutult kahju teha.

Rasputin uskus väga autokraatia säilitamisse. Kui see oleks lahjendatud, oleks see negatiivselt mõjutanud tema positsiooni Venemaa sotsiaalses hierarhias.

Iroonilisel kombel soovitas Rasputin koos esimese maailmasõja Venemaal põhjustatud laastamisega Nikolausel mitte sõtta minna, kuna ta oli ennustanud Venemaa lüüasaamist. Kuna tema ennustused tundusid üha täpsemad, kasvas tema mõju Venemaal. Rasputin oli alati duumaga kokku puutunud. Nad nägid tema positsiooni monarhias otsese ohuna nende positsioonile. Alexandra vastas nende kaebustele Rasputini võimu kohta, kehtestades õigusaktid, mis piirasid nende võimu veelgi.

Duma viis nende kaebused otse keisrile. Septembris 1915 kohtusid nende esindajad Nicholasega tema sõjaväe peakorteris, et väljendada rahulolematust, et linnades pole valitsuse ministeeriumi, millel oleks inimeste usaldus. Ta käskis neil Peterburi tagasi minna ja tööd jätkata. Septembri lõpus läks teine ​​rühm Nicholase juurde, et paluda valitsust, millel oleks inimeste usaldus. Nicholas ei näinud neid. Pärast seda oli Rasputini võim Peterburis vaieldamatu. Kuni tal oli tsaaririigi toetus, oli tal Alexandra võimuses kõik, kuid ta abikaasa domineeris. Kuni ainus troonipärija Alexis oli haige, oli Rasputinil Alexandra üle võim.

Kui duuma septembris 1915 laiali saadeti, võttis Rasputin enda kätte peaaegu kõik Peterburi valitsemise aspektid. Ta pidas kuulajaid riigiküsimustes ja edastas seejärel arutletud probleemi vastavale ministrile. Tsaarina kaitstud Rasputin osales ka ise sõjas. Ta nõudis, et vaataks tulevaste kampaaniate plaane ja teaks plaanide ajastamisest, et saaks selle edu eest palvetada. See oli kingitus keerukale Saksa luureteenistusele.

Ministrid, kes kritiseerisid Rasputini või ei nõustunud tema poliitikaga, vallandati lühidalt. Scheratov (sisustus), Krivosheim (põllumajandus) ja Gremykim ise vallandati, kuna nad julgesid kritiseerida filmi „Meie sõber”. Gremykimi asendas Sturmer, kes oli Rasputini öelduga lihtsalt nõus. Ehkki teda toetas Rasputini suhtes oma positsiooni tõttu Alexandra, kasutas Sturmer oma raha riigikassa väljapetmiseks. Protopopov määrati siseministriks - ta oli relvastatud röövi eest 10 aastat vangis istunud.

Kuigi kodus tekkis kaos, läks sõda rindel halvasti. Poola kaotas sakslastele 1916. aastal ja nad jõudsid Moskvast vaid 200 miili kaugusele. Selgus, et tavalise Vene sõduri moraal on äärmiselt kehv ja kõrbestumine muutub üha suuremaks probleemiks. Toiduvarud olid kehvad ja ebakorrektsed. Kui rindejoon jõudis kodurindele lähemale, sai paljudele selgeks, et mõlemal rindel valitseb täielik kaos.

Oktoobris 1916 streikisid Petrogradis (Peterburis) raudteetöötajad, protestides oma töötingimuste pärast. Rindelt saadeti sõdureid, et sundida ründajaid tööle tagasi. Nad ühinesid raudtee meestega. Sturmer oli pärast duuma meenutamist sellest olukorrast mures, kuid mõistis ka juhtunu tagajärgi tõsiselt valesti.

"Me võime lubada neil armetutel end olematuks rääkida ja rahutuste kipitust tõmmata ning lojaalseid vägesid komplekteerida." Sturmer

Duuma kogunes 14. novembril 1916. Progressiivide liider Milykov ründas valitsust, küsides iga valitsuse kohta tehtud kommentaari lõpus „Kas see on rumalus või riigireetmine?” Valitsust häiris palju rohkem see, kui konservatiivne Šulgin ja reaktsiooniline liider Puriškavitš ründasid valitsust. Milykovit oleks oodanud - aga mitte ülejäänud kahte.

Sturmer soovis, et Milykov arreteeritaks. Kuid haruldase otsustavuse näite puhul vallandas Nicholas ta 23. detsembril 1916. Teda asendas peaministrina Trepov - vähem kui pädev konservatiiv. Alexandra märkis ka, et "ta ei ole meie sõbra sõber". Trepov kestis vaid 9. jaanuarini 1917, mil tal lubati tagasi astuda. Valitsus oli täieliku lagunemise äärel.

Nicholas oli sõja rindel isoleeritud, kuid oli sageli liiga otsustamatu, et sellest mingit kasu saada. Alexandra üritas ikkagi Rasputiniga kodurindel domineerida. Toitu nappis, nagu ka kütust. Petrogradi inimesed olid külmad ja näljased - Nikolai jaoks ohtlik kombinatsioon.

30. detsembril 1916 mõrvati vürst Jusipov Rasputini. Alexandra kiusas oma abikaasat korraldama keiserlikke matuseid - see oli reserveeritud kuningliku pere liikmetele või aristokraatia või kiriku kõrgematele liikmetele.

Kuningliku pere kõrgemad liikmed rääkisid, kui palju toetust saab Alexis regendi juures valitseda - see näitab selgelt, et nad tunnistasid Nikolai valitsemisaega. Suurvürst Paul saatis rindel armeekindralitele kirja, et selgitada välja nende seisukohad, kas Nikolai tuleks asendada. Intriige oli aga nii palju, et on raske täpselt teada, kes kellele mida ütles.

1917. aasta jaanuariks oli selge, et Nicholas oli olukorra üle kontrolli kaotanud. Ometi sel kuul, keset kaost tundus, kogunes liitlasriikide kongress, et arutada tulevast poliitikat.

27. veebruaril kogunes duuma esimest korda pärast jõuluvaheaega. See kohtus rahutuste taustal Petrogradis. Linnas toimus üldstreik, mis oli välja kutsutud avaliku laskemoona komitee avaliku esindaja vahistamise tagajärjel. Linnas puudus transpordisüsteem. Linnas oli toitu hoiul, kuid seda ei saanud teisaldada. Toidupuudus ja toidujärjekorrad tõid tänavatele veelgi rohkem inimesi.

12. märtsil võtsid külma ja nälja kannustatuna leivakorda sattunud isikud pagaritöökoja. Politsei tulistas neid, et taastada kord. See pidi valitsusele osutuma väga kulukaks veaks, sest linna ümbruses streikis ja tänavatel oli umbes 100 000 inimest. Nad kogunesid kiiresti nende inimeste toetusele, kes olid vallandatud. Nikolai andis korralduse taastada linna sõjaväekuberner kindral Habalov. Habalov käskis Volhiina eliidirügemendil seda teha. Nad ühinesid streikijatega ja kasutasid oma jõudu politsei desarmeerimiseks. Linna arsenal avati ja vangid vabastati vanglatest, mis hiljem põletati. See, mis oli linnapagari juures väike häire, oli muutunud täiemahuliseks mässuks-selline oli viha Petrogradis.

13. märtsil telliti streikijate hajutamiseks tänavatele rohkem sõdureid. Nad nägid rahvahulga suurust ja pöördusid tagasi oma kasarmusse, jättes nõnda nende käsud kuuletumata.

Duuma nimetas ajutise komisjoni, mis esindas kõiki osapooli. Selle juhtimiseks valiti Rodzjanko. Aleksander Kerenski määrati vägede paigutamise eest vastutama, püüdes võita kõik valitsuse jõupingutused duuma laialisaatmiseks. Kerensky oli huvitav valik, kuna ta kuulus Petrogradi nõukogusse ja tal oli sidemeid paljude tehasetöötajate komiteedega Petrogradis.

On teada, et Rodzjanko saatis telegraafi Nicholasele, paludes nimetada peaminister, kellel oli rahva usaldus.

"Viimane tund on saabunud, kui riigi saatus oli dünastia otsustamisel."

Rodzjanko ei saanud oma telegraafile vastust.

14. märtsil liikusid linnas läbi kuulujutud, et ülestõusu mahasurumiseks saadetakse rindele sõdureid. Duuma moodustas sellele tajutud ohule reageerimiseks ajutise valitsuse. Oluline Petrogradi Nõukogude Liit toetas Ajutist Valitsust tingimusel, et ta kutsub kokku asutava assamblee, tagatakse üldine valimisõigus ja kodanikuõigused peavad olema kõigile kättesaadavad.

In reality, the Provisional Government in Petrograd had little to fear from troops at the front. Discipline was already breaking down and thousands of soldiers deserted. The Petrograd Soviet had sent an instruction to the front that soldiers should not obey their officers and that they should not march on the capital.

At this moment in time, Nicholas was caught between the war front and Petrograd. He received news of small disturbances in his capital and gathered together a group of loyal soldiers to put them down. He had no idea of the sheer scale of the ‘disturbances’. He also had no idea of the political input into this uprising. Nicholas did not make it to Petrograd because of a heavy snow storm. He was forced to stop at Pskov. It was only here that Nicholas received a copy of Rodzyanko’s telegram. It was also at Pskov that Nicholas learned that all his senior army generals believed that he should abdicate. On the night of March 15th, two members of the Provisional Government also arrived to request the same. With as much dignity as he could muster, Nicholas agreed and handed the throne to his brother, Michael. He confirmed the existence of the Provisional Government and asked that all Russians everywhere support it so that Russia would win her fight against Germany.

Michael refused the throne unless it was handed to him after the people had voted for him. This was never going to happen and Romanov rule over Russia came to an end.

The March revolution was not a planned affair. Lenin was in Switzerland, the Bolsheviks did not even have a majority in the Petrograd Soviet and the Duma had not wanted the end of the Romanovs. So why did it happen?

The ruling dynasty must take a great deal of the blame. Nicholas was an ineffective ruler who had let his wife dominate him to such an extent that the royal family became inextricably linked to a disreputable man like Gregory Rasputin. Such an association only brought discredit to the Romanovs.

The ruling elite also failed to realise that the people would only take so much. They took their loyalty for granted. In February/March 1917, lack of food, lack of decisive government and the cold pushed the people of Petrograd onto the streets. The people of Petrograd did not call for the overthrow of Nicholas – it happened as a result of them taking to the streets calling for food. People had to burn their furniture to simply get heat in their homes. Very few would tolerate having to queue in the extreme cold just for food – food that might run out before you got to the head of the queue. The spontaneous reaction to police shooting at protestors in a bread queue showed just how far the people of Petrograd had been pushed. That it ended with the abdication of Nicholas II was a political by-product of their desire for a reasonably decent lifestyle.


Suggestions for Teachers

Print a selection of items from the set that depend on visual elements to convey a message. Allow students to select an item and examine it, attending closely to visual techniques. Pair students who selected the same item and allow them to compare their thinking. What techniques can they identify? Why do they think the creator of the item used those techniques? If time allows, also pair students with someone who selected a different item, to compare messages and techniques.

This set includes memoirs, poetry, and news reports. Provide time for students to analyze information from various genres, and then list or diagram similarities and differences.

Select items that represent changes in social conventions and customs of the time, such as contributions to the war effort by women or racial minorities. Before students analyze the items, ask them to jot down what they think they know. As students analyze the primary sources, encourage them to think about what they notice that surprises them, and what questions they have. Support individuals or small groups in research to find additional information.

Allow students time to study a small set of items, and then list technology featured or mentioned in the items. Assign or allow each student to research to learn more about a particular technology.


Russia before World War I

When World War I erupted in August 1914, Russia was a major European power, if only because of its sheer size and population. Russia’s political system was archaic and fragile, however, and

The Russian enigma

At the turn of the 20th century, Russia was an enigma to most Europeans. They knew of its existence, marvelled at its size and feared its military power – but few ever travelled there and reliable information about it was scant.

From the outside, Russia looked and behaved like an imperial superpower. Its land holdings and natural resources were vast. Russia’s territory spanned around one-sixth of the Earth’s landmass, from Finland in the west to Siberia’s Pacific coastline in the east.

The population of the Russian Empire was also enormous, around 128 million people in 1900. Russian military might was feared across much of Europe, largely because of the millions of men Russian leaders could call into service. The Russian empire boasted a peacetime standing army of 1.5 million men, the largest in Europe, and if could increase that fourfold or fivefold with reservists and conscripts were.

A developing economy

Economically and industrially, the Russian empire lagged well behind the rest of Europe. While the Industrial Revolution had a profound impact on nations like Britain, France and Germany, Russia’s economy remained almost entirely agrarian until the mid-1800s.

Defeat in the 1850s Crimean War and a change in government policy produced a swift transformation in Russia’s economy. French investors, attracted by government deals, cheap labour and tax breaks, eagerly pumped money into Russia to construct factories and new mines. Even with this injection of foreign capital, however, Russia still tailed its western European neighbours by a long stretch.

Industrialisation had also created a raft of new problems in Russia, including urban growth, social disruption, demands for workers’ rights and political agitation. Peasants who relocated to the cities to work in newly opened factories found themselves enduring long working days (often up to 15 hours) in appalling and unsafe conditions.

An archaic government

Politically, the Russian empire was beset with backward ideas and values, dysfunction and dissatisfaction. This made it a fertile ground for revolutionaries and anarchists.

While Russia’s economy had begun to modernise in the late 1800s, Russia’s political system still languished in the late Middle Ages. Russia’s monarch, the tsar, retained all political decision-making and all sovereign power. His power, it was believed, was ordained by God.

There was no constitution to define and limit the tsar’s authority there was no elected parliament capable of exercising power. Ministers were appointed and sacked by the tsar and were accountable only to him.

A hierarchical society

Russia’s rigid social structure divided its citizens into 14 ranks: royals, aristocrats, land-owners, bureaucrats, military officers, soldiers and sailors, the industrial and agricultural working classes.

More than four-fifths of Russia’s massive population were peasants: poor farmers working small holdings of land they were uneducated, illiterate, unworldly, religious, superstitious and suspicious about change.

The industrialisation of the late 1800s had given rise to a new industrial working class. Though it comprised less than five per cent of the population, the industrial proletariat was a significant movement in major cities like St Petersburg and Moscow.

Nikolai II

The Russian tsar at the outbreak of World War I – and the nation’s last tsar, as it turned out – was Nicholas II.

An intelligent but shy man, Nicholas came to the throne in 1894. He pledged to retain autocratic power, resisting calls for political reform – but he lacked the judgement, strength and decisiveness to rule in an autocratic fashion.

The Russo-Japanese War

Like his predecessors, Nicholas II placed great store on the strength of Russia’s military. He pushed for expansion, both in eastern Europe and in Russia’s Pacific region.

Russia’s territorial ambitions in modern-day Korea led to a war with Japan (1904-5), a conflict that Nicholas and his advisors thought would be straightforward and easily winnable.

Instead, the Japanese inflicted a humiliating defeat on the Russians, the first time in centuries a major European power had been conquered by an Asian nation. Russia’s army and navy were exposed as poorly equipped and commanded and its Baltic Fleet was decimated at the Battle of Tsushima. The empire’s shortage of industrial and rail infrastructure was also apparent.

The 1905 Revolution

The defeat of 1905 precipitated unrest thatbubbled over into revolution. It was driven by liberal and left-wing groups, disgruntled industrial workers and others who sought political modernisation. Strikes crippled the country, while several of the tsar’s relatives and advisors were killed by political assassins. Nicholas clung to the throne by backing down, issuing a manifesto that promised liberal civil rights and a democratically elected Duma (parliament). But the following year (1906) he reneged on these promises: the Duma became a powerless ‘talking shop’, while radical political agitators were rounded up to be hanged, imprisoned or exiled.

Ajaloolase seisukoht:
“Objectively speaking, Russia’s entry into the war was the most improbable of all. Russia had the least to gain from continental conflict and the most to lose… For its part, the Russian public had very bitter memories of a recent bloody war, was increasingly antagonistic toward its government, and saw little good coming from a titanic clash with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Importantly, all of these reasons not to go to war were visible at the time and were clearly articulated prior to the declaration of hostilities.”
Holger Afflerbach

Abroad, Russia’s chief interest was in eastern Europe, particularly the future of the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire. St Petersburg hoped to take advantage of the Ottoman disintegration, to increase its influence and further its imperial ambitions in the region. Russia was also an ally, indeed something of a ‘protector’ of Serbia, whose people shared religious and ethnic links with Slavic Russians. The tsar’s diplomats and agents encouraged Serbian nationalism, providing secret support to groups which were agitating for Serbian autonomy. This put Russia at odds with the Austro-Hungarians, who had much to fear from a strong and expansionist Serbia.

The Dogs of War, a British cartoon ridiculing Russia’s influence over Balkan nations

In contrast, Russo-German relations during the 1800s had been comparatively friendly. The German chancellor Bismarck had worked hard to nurture good relations with Russia, chiefly to avoid his country being jammed between two hostile powers. Russian military planners during the 1800s had anticipated a future war with Austria-Hungary rather than Germany. The ascension to the throne of Kaiser Wilhelm II did not seem as though it would upset this balance. After all, were not the new Kaiser and the new Russian tsar cousins, on the most friendly terms? This assessment did not take into account the private views of Wilhelm II. Lacking Bismarck’s foresight, the Kaiser had low regard for Russian political influence and military power – and no interest in keeping the Russians on side.

1. Russia spanned one-sixth of the globe and was by far the largest nation of Europe, both in size and population.

2. Russia’s government and social structure retained medieval elements absolute power rested with the tsar (monarch).

3. Despite a marked increase in industrial growth in the late 1800s, Russia’s economy lagged behind western Europe.

4. In 1904-5 Russia suffered a humiliating military defeat at the hands of Japan, which triggered a domestic revolution.

5. Russia’s relationship with Germany had been comparatively good, in part because the Russian tsar and German Kaiser were cousins – but this evolved during the first years of the 1900s.


Revolutionary Activity During First World War in North America

In the First World War (1914-1919), Britain allied with France, Russia, USA, Italy and Japan against Germany, Austria- Hungary and Turkey. This period saw the maturing of Indian nationalism.

The nationalist response to British participation in the War was three-fold:

(i) The Moderates supported the empire in the War as a matter of duty

(ii) The Extremists, including Tilak (who was released in June 1914), supported the war efforts in the mistaken belief that Britain would repay India’s loyalty with gratitude in the form of self-government

(iii) The revolutionaries decided to utilise the opportunity to wage a war on British rule and liberate the country.

The Indian supporters of British war efforts failed to see that the imperialist powers were fighting precisely to safeguard their own colonies and markets.

Revolutionary Activity during First World Sõda:

The Revolutionary activity was carried out through the Ghadr Party in North America, Berlin Committee in Europe and some scattered mutinies by Indian soldiers, such as the one
in Singapore. In India, for revolutionaries striving for immediate complete independence, the War seemed a heaven-sent opportunity, draining India of troops (the number of white soldiers went down at one point to only 15,000), and raising the possibility of financial and military help from Germany and Turkey—the enemies of Britain.

The Ghadr:

The Ghadr Party was a revolutionary group organised around a weekly newspaper The Ghadr with its headquarters at San Francisco and branches along the US coast and in the Far East.

These revolutionaries included mainly ex-soldiers and peasants who had migrated from the Punjab to the USA and Canada in search of better employment opportunities. They were based in the US and Canadian cities along the western (Pacific) coast.

Pre-Ghadr revolutionary activity had been carried on by Ramdas Puri, G.D. Kumar, Taraknath Das, Sohan Singh Bhakna and Lala Hardayal who reached there in 1911. Finally in 1913, the Ghadr was established. To carry out revolutionary activities, the earlier activists had set up a ‘Swadesh Sevak Home’ at Vancouver and ‘United India House’ at Seattle.

The Ghadr programme was to organise assassinations of officials, publish revolutionary and anti-imperialist literature, work among Indian troops stationed abroad, procure arms and bring about a simultaneous revolt in all British colonies.

The moving spirits behind the Ghadr Party were Lala Hardayal, Ramchandra, Bhagwan Singh, Kartar Singh Saraba, Barkatullah, Bhai Parmanand. The Ghadrites intended to bring about a revolt in India. Their plans were encouraged by two events in 1914 the Komagata Maru incident and the outbreak of the First World War.

Komagata Maru Incident:

The importance of this event lies in the fact that it created an explosive situation in the Punjab. Komagata Maru was the name of a ship which was carrying 370 passengers, mainly Sikh and Punjabi Muslim would-be immigrants, from Singapore to Vancouver. They were turned back by Canadian authorities after two months of privation and uncertainty.

It was generally believed that the Canadian authorities were influenced by the British Government. The ship finally anchored at Calcutta in September 1914. The inmates refused to board the Punjab-bound train. In the ensuing with the police at Budge Budge near Calcutta, 22 persons died.

Inflamed by this and with the outbreak of the War, the Ghadr leaders decided to launch a violent attack on British rule in India. They urged fighters to go to India. Kartar Singh Saraba and Raghubar Dayal Gupta left for India. Bengal revolutionaries were contacted Rashbehari Bose and Sachin Sanyal were asked to lead the movement. Political dacoities were committed to raise funds.

The Punjab political dacoities of January-February 1915 had a somewhat new social content. In at least 3 out of the 5 main cases, the raiders targeted the moneylenders and the debt records before decamping with the cash. Thus, an explosive situation was created in Punjab. The Ghadrites fixed February 21, 1915 as the date for an armed revolt in Ferozepur, Lahore and Rawalpindi garrisons.

The plan was foiled at the last moment due to treachery. The authorities took immediate action, aided by the Defence of India Rules, 1915. Rebellion regiments were disbanded, leaders arrested and deported and 45 of them hanged. Rashbehari Bose fled to Japan (from where he and Abani Mukherji made many efforts to send arms) while Sachin Sanyal was transported for life.

The British met the wartime threat by a formidable battery of repressive measures—the most intensive since 1857 and above all by the Defence of India Act passed in March 1915 primarily to smash the Ghadr movement.

There were large-scale detentions without trial, special courts giving extremely severe sentences, numerous court-martials of armymen. Apart from the Bengal terrorists and the Punjab Ghadrites, radical pan-Islamists Ali brothers, Maulana Azad, Hasrat Mohani—were interned for years.

Evaluation of Ghadr:

The achievement of the Ghadr movement lay in the realm of ideology. It preached militant nationalism with a completely secular approach. But politically and militarily, it failed to achieve much because it lacked an organised and sustained leadership, underestimated the extent of preparation required at every level—organisational, ideological, financial and tactical strategic—and perhaps Lala Hardayal was unsuited for the job of an organiser.

Revolutionaries in Europe:

The Berlin Committee for Indian Independence was established in 1915 by Virendranath Chattopadhyay, Bhupendranath Dutta, Lala Hardayal and others with the help of the German foreign office under ‘Zimmerman Plan’. These revolutionaries aimed to mobilise the Indian settlers abroad to send volunteers and arms to India to incite rebellion among Indian troops there and to even organise an armed invasion of British India to liberate the country.

The Indian revolutionaries in Europe sent missions to Baghdad, Persia, Turkey and Kabul to work among Indian troops and the Indian prisoners of war (POWs) and to incite anti-British feelings among the people of these countries. One mission under Raja Mahendra Pratap Singh, Barkatullah and Obaidullah Sindhi went to Kabul to organise a ‘provisional Indian government’ there with the help of the crown prince, Amanullah.

Mutiny in Singapore:

Among the scattered mutinies during this period, the most notable was in Singapore on February 15, 1915 by Punjabi Muslim 5th Light Infantry and the 36th Sikh battalion under Jamadar Chisti Khan, Jamadar Abdul Gani and Subedar Daud Khan. It was crushed after a fierce battle in which many were killed. Later, 37 persons were executed and 41 transported for life.

Revolutionary Activity in India during War:

The revo­lutionary activity in India in this period was concentrated in Punjab and Bengal. The Bengal plans were part of a far-flung conspiracy organised by Rashbehari Bose and Sachin Sanyal in cooperation with returned Ghadrites in Punjab.

In August 1914, the Bengal revolutionaries reaped a rich haul of 50 Mauser, pistols and 46,000 rounds of ammunition from the Rodda firm in Calcutta through a sympathetic employee.

Most Bengal groups were organised under Jatin Mukherji (or Bagha Jatin) and planned disruption of railway lines, seizure of Fort William and landing of German arms. These plans were ruined due to poor coordination, and Bagha Jatin died a hero’s death near Balasore on the Orissa coast in September 1915.

There was a temporary respite in revolutionary activity after the War because the release of prisoners held under the Defence of India Rules cooled down passions a bit there was an atmosphere of conciliation after Montagu’s August 1917 statement and the talk of constitutional reforms and the coming of Gandhi on the scene with the programme of non­violent non-cooperation promised new hope.


Russia leaves the war

In March 1917 riots broke loose in Russia. The people were not pleased with how the government handled the scarcity of food and fuel. On March 15, Czar Nicholas II, the leader of the Russian Empire, left his throne to a temporary government. This government supported Russia's continued participation in World War I, but they still could not solve the situation with the food shortages that were affecting the country.


Bolševike Vladimir Lenini juhitud rühmitus kommuniste kukutas 1917. aasta novembris valitsuse ja lõi kommunistliku valitsuse. Lenin tahtis keskenduda kommunistliku riigi ülesehitamisele ja tahtis Venemaad sõjast välja tõmmata. He accomplished this by agreeing to the Treaty of Brest-Litvosk with Germany on March 3, 1918. This treaty gave Germany the territory of Ukraine, Finland and Polish and Baltic territories. Saksamaa aga pidi oma armee Vene maadelt ära viima.


How Russian Kids Are Taught World War II

Sophia Miroedova

F rom Kaliningrad to Vladivostok, Russian schoolchildren are preparing for the most important holiday of the year: Victory Day. Commemorated with a grand military parade on Moscow’s Red Square every May 9, the Soviet Union’s defeat of Nazi Germany has long been used by authorities to rally support for the state. And it starts in school.

Russian students play a central role in the patriotic celebrations: popular Victory Day merchandise for children ranges from mini Red Army uniforms to toy guns. They also lead the Immortal Regiment, a march where participants carry portraits of relatives who fought and died in World War II. Entire classrooms are taken to the event.

Amid the euphoria surrounding the event, however, Russia’s history teachers are finding themselves under pressure to conform to the Kremlin’s interpretation of the war.

“Everything that is forced is bad,” says Alexander Abalov, a history teacher at a prominent Moscow school. Abalov is not the only history teacher worried about the state’s interference in his job.

Teaching history has never been easy in Russia, where archives are closed and transparent discussions about the country’s Soviet past are met with hostility. Even then, teaching World War II is more difficult: with every year that Putin is in power, Russia fails to confront its role in the war head on.

In August 2016—on the eve of the new school year—a new Education Minister, Olga Vasilyeva, took office. Vasilyeva is perceived as a supporter of the conservative Orthodox agenda. She has also defended Soviet policies and made controversial statements about Stalin.

While control over the classroom is supposed to be in the teacher’s hands, a new set of history textbooks introduced this year presents a view of the Soviet role in the war uncannily close to Vasilyeva’s—and the Kremlin’s.

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In September 2016, three history textbooks were sanctioned by the Ministry of Education, all of which gloss over Stalin’s crimes and his initial alliance with Nazi Germany. “My main issue with the textbooks is that they do not reveal the whole truth,” says historian and teacher Leonid Katsva.

What is still unclear is who decides which book should be used in the classroom. “Is it the teacher, the school director or the city? I asked this question to the Moscow city government many times and received no answer,” says Abalov.

Most schools across the country have sided with one of them, published by Prosveshenie, whose retelling of the war focuses almost exclusively on the heroic aspects of the Soviet war effort.

The pact was defensive!

For Russians, World War II began—not in 1939 as it did for the rest of the world—but in 1941. What happened before, and the Soviet Union’s role in it, has stirred emotions and denial in Russia. The most controversial moment, which the Kremlin traditionally does not emphasize, is the Molotov–Ribbentrop “non-aggression” pact between the USSR and Nazi Germany.

Putin has made contradictory statements about the pact. He struck a conciliatory tone in 2009 when he spoke in Gdansk in Poland, saying the Russian parliament had condemned the pact. Six years later, in a meeting with Germany’s Angela Merkel, Putin said the pact “made sense for ensuring the security of the Soviet Union.”

Other Russian officials have also defended the Soviet alliance with the Nazis. Culture Minister Vladimir Medinsky, known for his pseudo-historical novels, has said that the pact “deserves a monument.”

But publicly questioning Russia’s role in World War II in 1939-40 is controversial.

This year, a man in Perm, a city in the Urals, was fined 200 thousand rubles ($3,500) for reposting an article which correctly stated that the Soviet Union invaded Poland in 1939 in collaboration with the Nazis.

Russian textbooks have treaded a careful line when describing the Pact. But the 2016 edition of Russia’s most popular history textbook puts less emphasis on its secret protocols, in which the Soviets and Nazis carved up Eastern Europe among themselves, than ever before.

How Russian Authorities Hijacked a WWII Remembrance Movement

“It has a more justifying tone,” says Katsva. In fact, there is no word ‘aggression’ in the text. Instead, the book portrays the invasion of Eastern Europe by Soviet troops as a “liberation” from Poland and the impending Nazi invasion.

“On September 17, part of the Red Army was given orders to cross the Western border and liberate western Ukraine and western Belarus,” the text says.

The textbook gives a similar explanation for Russia’s military presence in the Baltic states. According to the authors, Russia’s invasion and annexation of the three northern European countries was the result of democratic parliamentary elections in the countries in which the communists in the Baltic States won.

“It doesn’t say anything about the fact that [the Baltics had] no choice,” says Katvsa, referring to the Soviet-installed governments in Baltic nations in June 1940.

Stalinist repressions?

The other most contentious episode which has divided Russians is Stalin’s role in the war. The new textbook admits the Stalinist repressions became “the central element of Soviet life” but devotes less space to them than previous editions.

“It is impossible to understand what happened in 1941 without the knowledge of the repressions,” says Abalov. Soviet troops were not-prepared for the Nazi attack because Stalin had purged the army on the eve of war.

But Katsva thinks the reason for glossing over difficult topics is that the USSR’s role in the war is supposed to inspire national pride. “Russia is not alone in glossing over the negative sides of its national memory,” he stresses. But the Kremlin has gone far further than that, turning Russia’s wartime memory into a political tool.

On the surface, it has worked. No other holiday sees the same crowds drawn onto Russian streets. But does Victory Day really unite Russians?

History teacher Abalov doubts it. “There is no single conception of the war,” he says, adding that there are no discussions about the human cost of the war. “The identity the government is trying to enforce on people is flawed,” he says.


Russia’s First World War. A Social and Economic History

The First World War is Russia’s ‘forgotten war’. After the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917, the memory of the war was subsumed into the history of the revolutionary process. The war was a difficult subject for the new rulers of Soviet Russia, since they viewed it as an expansionist conflict, embarked upon by Russia – and the other European Great Powers – as an inevitable consequence of their imperialist ambitions. Despite the death of some two million Russian soldiers during the war, the Bolshevik regime concentrated on the events of 1917 in their historical treatment of the period, seeing the war as almost incidental to the triumphal progress of the revolutionary movement. Western historians too have given relatively little treatment to Russia’s war the volumes published by the Carnegie Foundation in the late 1920s remain the most comprehensive treatment of Russia’s First World War in all its aspects. The military side of the war was well covered in Norman Stone’s The Eastern Front (1975), but until now there has been no satisfactory modern treatment of the social and economic aspect of Russia’s First World War. Peter Gatrell’s book is therefore especially welcome.

Gatrell draws on a very wide range of scholarship – both Russian and western – to provide the first single-volume history of the impact of the war on Russian economy and society. He is able to combine discussion of the national war economy with analysis of the war’s impact on ordinary Russians and thus to give a well-rounded picture of Russia between 1914 and 1917. The book begins with an account of the military dimension of the war, analysing not just Tsarist military performance but also the direct impact of mobilisation on the population. Gatrell is well placed to appreciate the social impact of the military disasters that befell Russia in 1914 and 1915: he draws on his outstanding earlier book, A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War One (Bloomington, 1999) to discuss the enormous population displacement that accompanied the Russian retreats of the first two years of the war. More than one fifth of Russia’s railway wagons were involved in evacuating people and equipment in the summer of 1915 and over half a million peasant households were displaced. Military reverses had a direct impact on the ordinary people of Russia and Gatrell gives a vivid depiction of the chaos and confusion that ensued from defeat, as peasant families had to abandon their farm machinery and other basic items of rural life. This ability to link the wide and seemingly abstract elements of the war to the experience of ordinary Russians is one of the strengths of Gatrell’s book and gives his narrative an immediacy that brings the experience of war to life. The book considers the ways in which the different sections of Russian society reacted to the war, laying particular stress on ‘educated society’ and the traditional elites. Gatrell suggests that the war again showed how far apart the government was from educated society, but he is careful not to labour the point. The Russian social elite remained committed to achieving victory in the war and made significant efforts to assist the national war effort. Urban and rural local government united around the Union of Towns and the Union of Zemstvos, while business established war industries committees to help in the mobilisation of the Russian economy. The civilian administration was much less inclined to cooperate with these efforts than the military, allowing the divisions between Russian elites to deepen. The government’s attempts to mobilise public opinion in support of its conduct of the war had very mixed success. Gatrell suggests that the state’s efforts merely concentrated the public’s mind on the hardships and difficulties that they were enduring and that the tone of government propaganda was misjudged. Unofficial street literature helped to accentuate popular negative perceptions by focussing on issues such as Rasputin and on the Empress’s German background, both of which proved difficult for the government to counter.

Gatrell provides close analysis of the economic elements of Russia’s wartime problems. In some ways, Russia was in a strong position to withstand the stresses that war placed on its economy: it had rich reserves of raw materials and fuel that could have enabled it to provide the additional industrial output that was needed to sustain its military campaigns. Difficulties arose, however, in transporting raw materials to the main manufacturing centres: the Russian economy was dependent on the railway network and the railways proved unable to cope with the twin demands of transporting soldiers and materials to the front and keeping Russian manufacturing industry supplied. Labour supply was also a continuing problem for Russia’s war industries. The army took many skilled workers and the stresses on those remaining in factories grew as the war progressed. The First World War was an expensive conflict, requiring sustained expenditure on arms and military equipment by the state. It cost Russia fifteen times more than the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–5 and the government had to resort to financing the war by taking out loans and printing money. As a result, inflation roared ahead: Gatrell shows that retail prices in Moscow doubled in the first two years of the war and then accelerated dramatically in 1916 and early 1917, more than trebling in twelve months. Russia’s indebtedness grew significantly as the government needed additional finance to keep its war effort going while the policy was also storing up problems for the post-war period. The Bolshevik repudiation of Russia’s debts after 1917 had a financial, as well as an ideological motive. Russia was able to survive in spite of the problems it encountered with industrial production and the state’s finances. Food supply, however, presented more severe difficulties. The agricultural labour force fell significantly during the war, and this drop also concealed important changes in the composition of the workforce. By 1916, women outnumbered men by more than two to one, with many of these men being those who were too old to be conscripted into the army. Gatrell shows that, despite this, the levels of agricultural production did not fall dramatically during the war. Food supply problems arose because government intervention to ensure the army was fed and to control prices disrupted a sophisticated system of grain distribution. The changes in the distribution of the population brought about by the concentration of the army in the west and the movements of refugees destabilised the distribution system for food. Local authorities attempted to prevent grain leaving their own regions, while government price controls meant that some peasant farmers were unwilling to market their grain. Even though, as Gatrell pointed out, there had been more severe food shortages in Russia in the previous twenty-five years, the problems experienced during the war were blamed firmly on the inadequacy of the government. The demonstrations in Petrograd that sparked the collapse of the Tsarist regime in February 1917 were by people protesting about the regime’s inability to keep them fed. The revolution that overwhelmed Nicholas II appeared to offer the opportunity for Russian society to coalesce around the new Provisional Government. The political pressures that destroyed any consensus during 1917 have been exhaustively analysed elsewhere, and Gatrell shows how these strains were reflected in economic issues. Ordinary Russians turned on the state and the social elite as political and economic anarchy intensified across the empire. Their actions were reciprocated: Gatrell quotes Riabushinksii, a prominent industrialist, as arguing that only the ‘bony hand of hunger’ would quell popular discontent. The failure of the Provisional Government was comprehensive and opened the way for the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917. Four months later, Russia signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany and its participation in the First World War ended, but civil war and foreign intervention meant that Bolshevik Russia continued to be at war until early 1921. Russia’s withdrawal from the First World War did not give it any form of economic advantage. The Bolshevik regime was ostracised by the rest of the world and the links Russia had developed with Britain and France during the war were broken so that Russia’s trade and finances were shattered. Gatrell shows how, overall, Russia’s national income dropped by a third during the war years and how gross industrial production halved between 1913 and 1918, with the decrease occurring entirely in the final two years.

Halévy wrote that ‘the world crisis of 1914 was not only a war – the war of 1914 – but a revolution – the revolution of 1917'(1) and Gatrell’s book exemplifies the problems that this conjunction of events presents. The intertwining of revolution and Russia’s exit from the war makes it very difficult to draw conclusions about the longer-term impact of the First World War on Russia’s economy and society. The disruption that engulfed Russia after the February revolution and the toppling of the Tsar accelerated a process of economic and social collapse that had gathered pace during late 1916, but it is impossible to disentangle this from the effects of military uncertainty in the wake of the revolution. The ‘dual power’ of Provisional Government and Soviets helped to destabilise Russia’s armed forces, but any judgement on how the Russian army and economy would have performed if revolution had not intervened is pure speculation. Gatrell recognises these difficulties in his penultimate chapter by concentrating on the issues that were affecting the Russian people as the war progressed: casualties and public health overall economic performance and the nature of Russian memory of the First World War. His conclusion adopts a comparative perspective, and suggests that Russia’s experience during the war was far from unique. Gatrell argues that most of the problems that Russia encountered during the war were common to the main combatant states. Each of them had difficulty in making the change to a war economy and shortages of equipment were not confined to Russia. Food supply was also a problem, especially in Germany and Italy, while violence and revolution were not confined to Russia at the end of the war. The German and Austro-Hungarian monarchies collapsed under the weight of military defeat civil war engulfed Ireland and Finland in the aftermath of war while Hungary experienced a short-lived revolution. The First World War also exacerbated social tensions across Europe. Gatrell suggests that antagonism grew between social groups as ordinary people grew more and more resentful of the privations that they were enduring, while traditional elites prospered.

This comparative framework is in the tradition of writings that explained the war itself as the product of European-wide movements, but while Gatrell recognises that Russia was different from other combatant states in experiencing a successful revolution, a ‘total transformation’ (p. 274), his explanation for this uniqueness is all too brief. He suggests that the revolution of 1905 had left many problems unsolved for Russian society, but does not link this argument firmly enough to the effects of war. Gatrell’s impressive range of evidence about the impact of the war on the economy and society of Russia between 1914 and 1918 suggests that, while other European states experienced some of the same difficulties as Russia, no other country endured such a range and intensity of problems. Russian industry found it difficult to transform itself to a war footing, the rural world was hit by the conscription of peasant men into the army and the transport system proved to be inadequate to cope with transporting millions of soldiers and all the equipment and material they needed to fight a prolonged war. Refugees streamed eastwards during 1914 and 1915 in their tens of thousands, further disrupting a society already strained by war itself. Price inflation intensified during 1916 and 1917, deepening the economic crisis for ordinary Russians. Gatrell is right that 1905 failed to resolve any of the questions that confronted the Russian state at the beginning of the twentieth century, but the First World War introduced a further set of political, economic and social issues that made it impossible for the Tsarist regime to survive. Russia was unique in both the range and the depth of problems that it faced during the war, so that the collapse of political authority after February 1917 was accompanied by economic meltdown and social atomisation. The Bolsheviks found it difficult to commemorate the war and the millions who died during it, not just because the October revolution superseded the war, but also because it was inconvenient to recognise that their own revolution had occurred through the suffering of ordinary Russians during the war. Bolshevik memorialisation of their revolution stressed the heroic actions of their supporters in October 1917, not the privations endured by Russians during years of war that Gatrell describes so well.


Final Resting Place of the Romanovs

Another 73 years would pass before the bodies were found. In 1991, the remains of nine people were excavated at Ekaterinburg. DNA testing confirmed they were the bodies of the czar and his wife, three of their daughters, and four servants. A second grave, containing the remains of Alexei and one of his sisters (either Maria or Anastasia), was discovered in 2007.

Sentiment toward the royal family—once demonized in Communist society—had changed in post-Soviet Russia. The Romanovs, canonized as saints by the Russian Orthodox church, were remembered at a religious ceremony on July 17, 1998 (eighty years to the date of their murders), and reburied in the imperial family vault at the Peter and Paul Cathedral in St. Petersburg. Nearly 50 descendants of the Romanov dynasty attended the service, as did Russian President Boris Yeltsin.


Vaata videot: 15 Esimese maailmasõja põhjused videost 8 klass video nr 35 Esimene maailmasõda (Mai 2022).


Kommentaarid:

  1. Phaon

    See on klass!

  2. Demissie

    normul

  3. Menhalom

    Thanks for an explanation.

  4. Gozshura

    Ma arvan, et ei.



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